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Introduction to the portfolio
This portfolio is the culmination of three years of doctoral study. It contains both 
theoretical and research papers and its three dossiers cover different aspects of the 
PsychD course. The Academic Dossier contains three essays and a diagnostic report. 
The topics explored in this section are diverse. The first essay considers how useful 
attachment theory has been in furthering our understanding of the development of 
psychological disorders. The second looks at brief interventions in psychological 
therapy. The third essay examines the important psychoanalytic concept of 
countertransference, and the section concludes with a formal diagnostic report. The 
Therapeutic Practice Dossier relates to clinical practice and, in addition to providing 
the reader with descriptions of placements and client populations, it also includes a 
‘final clinical paper’, which provides an overview of my development (to date) as a 
psychotherapeutic practitioner. The Research Dossier contains a literature review and 
two pieces of original research. The papers in this dossier will be considered in greater 
detail below.
Viewed thus, the overall weighting of the portfolio might seem to be mainly 
academic, however it is also a personal document. Personal development and self- 
reflection are seen as key components of counselling psychology (British 
Psychological Society, 2001) and this ethos is reflected in every area of training. For 
example, in addition to reflecting upon their work with clients, trainees are 
encouraged to reflect upon their research interests and trace, not just the development 
of these interests, but also how their personal views and experiences may have 
impacted upon different aspects of the research process.
Each of the three pieces in the research dossier explores a different aspect of so called 
‘personality disorder’ (PD). I first became interested in this topic when, as an 
undergraduate, I spent a year in a therapeutic community which specialised in the 
treatment of individuals with ‘severe personality disorders’ (SPD). Many of these 
clients had had “repeated contacts with psychiatric, social, forensic, penal and 
probation services” (Menzies, Dolan and Norton, 1993, p. 517). Others had been
unable to access appropriate secondary and tertiary services previously, and had been 
regular attendees at their local general practitioners surgeries. All reported that they 
had had negative experiences with health professionals.
In recent years a number of writers have highlighted the stigmatising effect of 
pathologizing labels (e.g. Fink and Tasman, 1992; Parker, Georgaca, Harper, 
McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith, 1995; Tomm, 1990). Gergen (2001) observes that 
“the number of labels for ‘mental illness’ has expanded exponentially over the present 
century” (p. 1). And Parker (1999) writes, “Diagnosis brings with it dehumanization, 
labelling, the pathologization of many human activities, and iatrogenesis” (p. 104). 
He continues “People living in varying degrees of discomfort or unhappiness are 
themselves transformed into categories, and modes of behaviour and thinking are then 
prescribed and proscribed for them” (ibid. 1999, p. 104). This negative picture of 
psychodiagnosis is compounded when one reads the accounts of service users who 
have attracted the diagnosis of ‘personality disorder’.
For example, a piece of user led research, conducted in collaboration with the 
Colchester branch of the mental health charity ‘Mind’, found that seventy-two per 
cent of service users believed that they had experienced poor treatment because they 
had been labelled as ‘personality disordered’ (Castillo, 2000). Respondents to the 
survey described being treated as ‘service lepers’ and many reported that they felt 
stigmatised by the diagnosis. One service user wrote:
“It is no wonder that those of us with a Personality Disorder diagnosis 
feel like second - or more like third class -  citizens (life’s rejects). You 
only have to look at the definitions given in ICD 10 and DSMIV and read 
comments such as ‘limited capacity to express feelings - disregard for 
social obligations - callous unconcern for others - incompetence - 
threatening or untrustworthy’. The list is endless, but one thing these 
comments have in common is that they are not helpful in any way. All I 
know is that we cannot call ourselves a civilised society when so many 
people are outcasts and are simply not understood” (Castillo, 2000, p. 3).
The reactions of clinicians to clients presenting with personality difficulties will, 
clearly, have a profound effect on individual experiences of therapy. And the fact that 
doctors often respond more negatively to people who have previously been given a
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diagnosis of personality disorder (Lewis and Appleby, 1988) is a matter for concern. A 
recent issue of Research and Development News ran an article with a headline: 
‘Personality Disorder -  Diagnosis or judgement?’ (Castillo, 2001, p. 2). This 
dichotomy is evident in much of the news media reporting of PD and it also arises in 
medical debates about the topic. Until relatively recently many psychiatrists claimed 
that it was not possible to ‘treat’ people with severe personality disorders. Leaving 
aside, for a moment, the debate about the validity and utility of the standard diagnostic 
systems, such attitudes mean that individuals presenting with severe personality 
difficulties have frequently been denied help.
In spite of the general pessimism about the treatment prospects of people with SPD, 
clinicians working in therapeutic communities (TC) which specialise in the treatment 
of people with severe personality difficulties, have reported some very encouraging 
outcome results (Chiesa, Iacoponi and Morris, 1996; Copas, O’Brien, Roberts and 
Whiteley, 1984; Dolan, Evans and Wilson, 1992; Menzies, Dolan and Norton, 1993). 
Although there are many different types of TC (Millard and Oakley, 1994) Roberts 
(1997) offers a useful definition: “A therapeutic community is a consciously-designed 
social environment and programme within a residential or day unit in which the social 
and group process is harnessed with therapeutic intent. In the therapeutic community 
the community is the primary therapeutic instrument” (p. 4).
In his classic monograph ‘Community as Doctor’, Rapoport (1960) identified four 
themes which he believed characterised the TC approach to treatment: 
‘democratization’, ‘permissiveness’, ‘communalism’ and ‘reality confrontation’. 
According to Roberts (1997), these themes have now. become “the four features by 
which the authenticity of a Therapeutic Community has been judged” (p. 5). However 
in recent years some clinicians have questioned the validity of these constructs. Haigh 
(1996) argues that they do not really describe what goes on in modem therapeutic 
communities and he suggests that ‘attachment’ and ‘containment’ are key features of 
the current approach. The literature review that opens the research dossier 
‘Reinterpreting Therapeutic Community Treatment in Terms of Attachment Theory’ 
explores this further.
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The idea for the second paper in the research dossier “Newspaper constructions of 
‘dangerous psychopathologies’ following the conviction of Michael Stone in 1998 for 
the murders of Lin and Megan Russell” had its origins in a newspaper article that I 
had read some years previously. As has been mentioned above, I had been working in 
a NHS unit which specialised in the treatment of people with ‘SPD’ and was horrified 
to read the statement (written by a well-known journalist working for the Sunday 
Times Newspaper) “psychopathy, or to give it its posh name personality disorder”. 
Following this, I found myself becoming increasingly concerned by what I considered 
to be ‘inaccuracies’ in media reports relating to the topic and decided to pursue this 
further in my doctoral research.
A search of national newspaper archives between the dates of Saturday October 24th 
1998 and Thursday 21st December 2000 yielded over a hundred articles relating to the 
topic of PD. Discourse analysis (DA) (Potter and Wetherell, 1987) of the material 
revealed that different versions of ‘dangerous psychopathology’ were being 
constructed in the texts, centred around a ‘bad/mad’ dichotomy. Another interesting 
feature of the articles was that certain pathologising labels were used apparently 
interchangeably. For example: ‘psychopath’, ‘sociopath’, ‘anti-social personality 
disorder’, ‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’, ‘serious personality disorder’, 
‘dangerous personality disorder’ and ‘personality disorder’.
The third and final paper in the research dossier ‘Social Representations of Personality 
Disorder: Professional and Lay Understandings’ follows on from the DA study 
outlined above. The fact that the journalists had used so many pathologising labels, 
apparently interchangeably, intrigued me. I thought that it might, in part, reflect the 
fact that in lay/non-expert thinking, the term ‘personality disorder’ does not have the 
same consensual status that it does in the world of mental health. So I decided to 
investigate professional and lay understandings of PD, using Moscovici’s (1984, 
1985, 1988) Theory of Social Representations as an interpretative framework. 
Quantitative methods were employed for the study and a newly developed 
questionnaire, specially designed to examine social representations of ‘personality’ 
and ‘personality disorder’, was administered to 160 health professionals and 91 lay 
participants. Discriminant function analyses was used to analyse the data and, as had
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been predicted at the outset, significant differences were found, not just between the 
professional and lay groups, but also between different groups of professionals.
The importance of context has been emphasised by a number of writers (for example 
Strawbridge and Woolfe, 1996). I am acutely aware that my research and clinical 
interests have been influenced by both professional and personal experiences. The fact 
that I worked as an undergraduate, in a specialist NHS setting, under the supervision 
of a highly experienced writer and researcher who encouraged me to make the most of 
every opportunity that came my way, clearly played an important part in my 
professional development. The fact that I am a white, middle class female will also 
have afforded me a number of experiences and understandings that would not have 
been open to me if I had come from a different ethnic and/or cultural background. 
Another important influence has been my own experience as a client in therapy.
One of the strengths of counselling psychology is that it does not seek to divorce the 
psychologist from the ‘therapeutic or research process’. Instead it encourages 
psychologists to acknowledge their own part in these processes and to reflect critically 
upon them. I hope that my own efforts to do this are evident in the pages of this 
portfolio.
NB. Throughout the portfolio, in order to protect confidentiality, the names of clients 
have been changed and any other identifying information has either been altered or 
omitted.
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Academic Dossier
Introduction to the Academic Dossier
This dossier contains a selection of essays and one report that were submitted during 
the PsychD course. The first essay is concerned with ‘Lifespan Development’ and 
considers how useful attachment theory has been in furthering our understanding of 
the development of psychological disorders. The second essay looks at brief 
interventions in psychological therapy. The third essay examines the psychoanalytic 
concept of countertransference and the section concludes with a formal diagnostic 
report.
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How useful has attachment theory been for our understanding of the 
development of psychological disorders?
‘The great strength of attachment theory in guiding research is that it 
focuses on a basic system of behaviour - the attachment system - that is 
biologically rooted and thus species-characteristic. This implies a search 
for basic processes of functioning universal in human nature, despite 
differences attributable to genetic constitution, cultural influences, and 
individual experience’ (Ainsworth, 1991, p. 33).
Attachment has been a perennial topic for developmental and clinical research papers 
since Bowlby published ‘The nature of the child’s tie to his mother’ in 1958. In this 
important paper Bowlby rejects the classical drive theory of Freudian metapsychology 
(Freud, 1984)1 and, using concepts borrowed from ethology, he argues that attachment 
is a primary, independently motivated behavioural system concerned, at its most basic 
level, with the safety and survival of the immature infant. This radical shift away from 
the secondary reinforcement theories put forward (curiously) both by psychoanalysts 
(Freud, 1984) and learning theorists (Sears, Maccoby and Levin, 1957), towards a 
model of interpersonal relatedness, was to have profound and far reaching effects. 
This paper will attempt to show that attachment theory has been invaluable in 
furthering our understanding of both positive developmental processes and negative 
ones, which research suggests can lead to poor outcomes and (in extreme cases) to 
psychopathology in later life.
Attachment theory has undergone a number of revisions since it was first proposed in 
the late 1950s and it is now seen very much as the product of two major theorists - 
John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth. Bowlby believed that children internalise their 
primary attachment relationship as a ‘working’ or ‘mental model’, which is then used 
as a template for subsequent relationships. If this bond is not ‘good enough’ and the 
infant is insecurely attached, the child will grow up with a negative view of both itself 
and the world, and its relationships will be impoverished (Bowlby 1958, 1960a,
1 Freud had suggested that the child becomes attached to the person who feeds it. In this theory hunger is seen as 
the primary drive and attachment/dependency as secondary. Bowlby called this ‘the cupboard lo ve’ theory o f  
attachment.
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1960b). Bowlby described attachment as ‘monotropic’2 and in his early writing he 
seemed to suggest that if the mother/infant bond was absent (privation) or if it was 
seriously disrupted or destroyed (deprivation), the effect on the child’s physical, 
behavioural, intellectual, and psychological development would be severe and 
irreversible.
Over the years a number of writers have criticised Bowlby’s theory. From a social 
constructionist perspective authors such as Burman (1994) have argued that much of 
the theorising about attachment has been artificially shaped by societal attitudes, and 
there is evidence from cross-cultural studies to support this view. Researchers have 
found that patterns of attachment do vary in different cultural contexts (e.g. Grossman, 
Grossman, Spangler, Suess andUnzer, 1985; Miyake, Chen and Campos, 1985; Sagi, 
Lamb, Lewkowicz, Shoham, Dvir and Estes, 1985; Sagi, van Ijzendoom, Avizer, and 
Donnell, 1995). However the results of these studies need to be interpreted with 
caution as some difficulties have been identified with aspects of the methodology (van 
Ijzendoom and Kroonenberg, 1988).
Rutter (1985) has also questioned Bowlby’s conclusions about the consequences of 
privation and deprivation, pointing out that in some instances early hardship actually 
seems to ‘steel’ the child. Looking across the spectrum of research, including the 
information obtained from ‘temperament studies’ (Buss and Plomin, 1984; Goldsmith, 
Buss, Plomin, Rothbart, Thomas, Chess, Hinde and McCall, 1987) and the ‘goodness 
of fit’ literature (Thomas and Chess, 1989), there is evidence to suggest that it may be 
that it is not so much the effects of separation per se but the nature and quality of the 
mother/infant bond prior to the traumatic event that is important. For example children 
who have lost their mother through death are less likely, subsequently, to manifest 
signs of delinquent behaviour than those who have lost their mother through divorce 
or separation (Gibson, 1969).
In his review of the research evidence Rutter (1985) concludes that there are a number 
of different developmental pathways through childhood and he suggests that a whole
2 Monotropy - An innate tendency on the part o f the infant to become attached to one preferred figure, usually the 
mother.
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range of influences can (and do) affect which path a particular child takes. ‘Protective’ 
factors such as an ‘easy’ temperament, good schools, academic success, strong peer 
relationships - even a sense of humour - can mitigate the effects of early 
environmental and constitutional disadvantage and increase the likelihood of a 
positive outcome.
However this does not invalidate the theory. It simply suggests that the process is 
much richer and far more complex than was initially proposed. Indeed it would be 
surprising if it were not. The research evidence from behavioural genetics suggests 
that genotype-environment correlations are incredibly subtle. Plomin and his 
colleagues (Plomin, DeFries, McCleam and Rutter, 1997) describe an ‘evocative’ 
genotype-environment correlation in which ‘individuals are reacted to on the basis of 
their genetic propensities’ (Plomin et al., 1997, p. 256). Clearly, the relationship 
between the infant and its [m]other/primary caregiver is an intricate one and many 
different factors will impact upon it (including the mother’s own attachment history 
and her style of mothering, which will be discussed below). But Bowlby’s theory 
provided a valuable new way of conceptualising the attachment bond, which has, over 
the years, been validated by numerous researchers. Consistently, across many 
different types of study, the findings show that children who do not form secure 
attachments in infancy are more vulnerable to other risk factors than their more 
securely attached peers.
As might be expected from the argument outlined above, research has shown that 
attachment is not simply a dichotomous event with a neat dividing line between 
securely and insecurely attached infants. Nor is it fixed for all time. Holmes (1993) 
describes how following therapeutic interventions with their mothers, infants who 
prior to the treatment had been classified as insecurely attached, on retest, showed a 
pattern of secure attachment. Furthermore infants can form multiple attachments to 
their peers as Freud and Dann’s (1951) account of their work with child survivors of 
the Holocaust has shown. Main and Weston (1981) have demonstrated that attachment 
status can differ between parents - for example an infant can be insecurely attached to 
its mother but securely attached to its father (or visa versa) and they report that there is 
considerable longitudinal stability in the relationship. However, it does seem that in
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normal development children form a principle attachment to one figure (usually but 
not invariably the mother) and that this occurs at around 7 -8  months.
Ainsworth and her colleagues (Ainsworth and Wittig, 1969; Ainsworth, Bell and 
Stayton, 1971) in an experimental situation designed to assess the attachment status of 
12 month old infants, initially identified three distinct types: Type A - Anxious- 
avoidant, Type B - Securely attached and Type C - Anxious-resistant/ambivalent. The 
experimental situation involved testing the reactions of the infants in an unfamiliar 
environment (The Strange Situation) to an unexpected event (meeting a stranger and 
being left alone by their mother for a few minutes in the company of the 
experimenter). In the strange situation experiment Type ‘A’s typically showed very 
little distress when separated from their mothers. During the initial stage they tended 
to be more involved with the toys than with the events going on around then. After the 
separation when they were reunited with their mothers they avoided or ignored her but 
did not express much emotion. In contrast to this the ‘securely attached’ group ‘B’s 
were distressed when their mothers left the room but on her return they were readily 
comforted and they soon settled down to play again. Type ‘C’s seemed anxious and 
upset throughout, displaying approach/avoidance behaviours. Sometimes they 
expressed anger towards their mother when she came back into the room. After the 
reunion they did not settle and their attention remained focused on their parent.
Mary Ainsworth’s original findings have been replicated many times and the 
classification system that she and her colleagues proposed is generally regarded as 
reliable (Main, 1996). However a proportion of infants (generally those who had been 
ill-treated in some way) displayed gross disturbances of behaviour in the Strange 
Situation which made them difficult to classify and this led to the development of a 
fourth category Type D - which was labelled Disorganised-disoriented (Main and 
Soloman, 1986).
Attachment type has been used as the dependent variable in whole range of studies. 
For example Ainsworth and her co-workers (Ainsworth and Bell, 1969; Ainsworth, 
Bell and Stayton, 1971) looked at maternal style and they found that maternal 
sensitivity contributed significantly to the infant’s style of attachment. In the 1969
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study, which concentrated on feeding behaviours, all of the mothers who had been 
rated as ‘responsive’ 3 had infants who were classified as Type ‘B’s - securely 
attached. But only two of the infants in the ‘unresponsive’ group were classified as 
Type ‘B’s, the rest were either Type ‘A’s or Type ‘C’s - insecurely attached.
Direct links have also been found between the type of attachment at 12-15 months and 
the nature of later social interactions (Waters, Wippman and Sroufe, 1979). This 
finding is very robust. Waters et al. (1979) assessed attachment in a group of infants at 
fifteen months and then observed the same children at playgroup when they were 
three and a half years old. They found that infants who were securely attached at 
fifteen months were more likely to have good interactions with their peers, be social 
leaders and be rated by their teachers as secure, forceful and self directed. However 
infants who had been assessed as being ambivalently attached were socially 
withdrawn, had poorer peer interactions and were rated by teachers as less forceful 
and less self directed. Links have also been found between attachment and cognitive 
development. Main (1973) observed infants in the ‘Strange Situation’ at twelve 
months and then, using the Infant Bayley Scale (Bayley, 1969) looked at their 
cognitive development at twenty months. She found that Type ‘B’s had higher IQ 
scores than Types ‘A’ or ‘C’.
These findings are important because cognitive ability and social competence are two 
of the foundation stones upon which many subsequent developmental tasks rest. 
Children (and later, teenagers and adults), build their self-esteem through their 
relationships with others and their ability to negotiate their way successfully in an 
increasingly complex world. Rutter (1985) argues that good self esteem can act as a 
‘buffer’ against stress, enabling individuals to transcend adverse life events and turn 
potentially negative situations into positive outcomes. It would seem logical then, that 
infants identified in the Strange Situation as being ‘securely attached’ should be more 
resilient and have better outcomes than those who fall into one of the ‘insecurely 
attached’ categories. Furthermore, one might hypothesise that adults who have poor 
attachment histories and who are unable to provide a coherent account of their early
3 Responsive to their babies’ signals and needs - For example bow quickly the mothers responded; how much 
coaxing was used; whether the baby was over or under fed; whether it was allowed to reject new foods.
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attachment relationships might be similarly disadvantaged. Increasingly, the evidence 
seems to support this.
The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) is a research instrument devised by Main and 
Goldwyn (1985-1994). In this semi-structured interview participants are asked to 
provide detailed descriptions and evaluations of relationships and events in childhood, 
which relate to their attachment history, and the classifications of response4 have been 
shown to correspond broadly to the four categories of attachment identified in the 
Infant Strange Situation Response (Ainsworth and Wittig, 1969; Ainsworth, Bell and 
Stayton, 1971; Main and Soloman, 1986).
The AAI has been useful in a number of ways. For example it has been shown to have 
predictive validity: Main writes ‘Among parents differences in patterning of AAI 
response predict corresponding forms of infant Strange Situation behaviour, both 
concurrently and before the birth of the first child’ (Main, 1996, p. 237, emphasis 
added). The Adult Attachment Interview has also been administered in a variety of 
settings with different clinical and sub-clinical populations. The results show that the 
majority of distressed individuals who were interviewed fell into one of the 
‘insecurely attached’ categories (D, E and Ud) (Main, 1996), which lends further 
support to the theory that attachment status is related to psychological well-being.
Drawing upon Bowlby’s ideas about internal working models, Kobak and his 
colleagues (Kobak, Cole, Ferenz-Gillies, Fleming and Gamble (1993) have put 
forward a model of a control theory, which links an individual’s internal working 
model of their attachment figure’s availability with their current emotional state. 
Securely attached individuals, who perceive themselves to be effective in their 
interactions with other people, will tend to develop a flexible, strategy of engagement. 
But individuals, whose internal working models of attachment are fragile, do not 
usually see themselves as capable of (or worthy of) eliciting a satisfactory response.
4 The correspondence between the two classification systems (Infant Strange Situation Response and The Adult 
Attachment Interview) has been demonstrated ' both theoretically and empirically’ (Main, 1996, p 240). 
Dismissing-detached (D ’s) are the adult equivalent o f Type ‘A ’ - anxious-avoidant infants; Autonomous-secure 
(F’s) o f Type ‘B ’ - Securely attached; Preoccupied-entangled (E) o f Type ‘C’ - Anxious-resistant/ambivalent; and 
Unresolved-disorganised (Ud) o f Type ‘D ’ - Disorganised-disorientated (Main, 1996).
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Typically, they will develop a strategy which will involve one of two patterns: those 
who have been exposed to rejection or who have been ignored by their primary 
attachment figure (Type ‘D’s) will tend to employ (deactivating) distancing or 
avoidant behavioural strategies and they will ignore attachment cues, whereas 
individuals who have experienced inconsistent responses early in life (Type ‘E’s) will 
be endlessly preoccupied with attachment related information and they will often 
adopt (hyperactivating) approach/avoidant behaviours. These patterns are well- 
documented (Main and Weston, 1982) and have been found to be particularly relevant 
in a recent study examining depression in eating disorders (Cole-Detkem and Kobak, 
1996). Cole-Detkem and Kobak found that individuals who employed deactivating 
strategies reported more eating disorder symptoms, while the hyperactivating group 
(who tended to focus much more on their internal thoughts and feelings) reported 
higher levels of depressive symptoms.
Other studies have found attachment organisation/classification to be relevant in a 
range of clinical and non-clinical populations. For example: suicidal behaviour in a 
sample of adolescents in psychiatric treatment (Adam, Sheldon-Keller and West, 
1996) adolescent psychopathology (Rosenstein and Horowitz, 1996) psychiatric 
symptomology in primagravidas, 5 (Pianta, Egeland and Adam, 1996) and 
agoraphobia (Liotti, 1991). Attachment status has also been shown to be a significant 
feature in mediating how individuals cope with loss and bereavement (Harris and 
Bifulco, 1991; Parkes 1991). Similarly, a significant proportion of children with 
depressed mothers have been shown to employ avoidant strategies and many fall into 
the insecurely attached categories A and C (Radke-Yarrow, 1991).
In addition to providing an explanation for the development of psychological 
difficulties, attachment theory can be a valuable aid to planning therapeutic 
interventions. For example, research has shown that clients who have had troubled 
attachment histories also manifest similar problems in therapy in relation to their 
therapists (Holmes, 1993, 1997). It is outside of the scope of this paper to discuss this 
in detail here, but Bowlby (1988) argues that the therapeutic alliance can function as a
5 As assessed by the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI).
16
‘secure base’ for clients, which, in optimal circumstances, can help them to face and 
‘work through’ hitherto unmanageable feelings.
This paper has attempted to show that attachment theory has provided a useful 
framework for furthering our understanding of early developmental processes. It has 
demonstrated how researchers have consistently found links between poor attachment 
status and the development of psychological difficulties in later life. And shown how 
secure attachment in infancy can provide individuals with resilience in the face of 
adversity. Bowlby’s theory has generated an almost unprecedented level of interest 
and research activity in virtually every sphere of psychology, and attachment theory is 
informing clinical practice in a very practical way.
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Brief Interventions in Psychological Therapy.
“It is very probable that the large scale application of our therapy will 
compel us to alloy the pure gold of psychoanalysis with the copper of 
suggestion” (Freud, 1918).
In recent years the National Health Service (NHS) has experienced a great deal of 
structural and organisational change. During the 1970s and 80s rapid advances in 
medical science, combined with heightened expectations and an increasing demand 
for medical treatment, raised serious concerns about the feasibility of providing 
unlimited access to healthcare (free at the point of delivery) in the way that had been 
envisaged by the pioneers of the NHS in 1946. In an attempt to bring health service 
spending under control, successive governments have implemented a series of reforms 
that have had profound ethical and moral implications. This paper will examine the 
impact of these reforms on one aspect of the delivery of healthcare - namely, the 
intensity and duration of psychological therapy. It will also explore the relative merits 
of both short-term and longer-term treatments, and the clinical effectiveness of 
different interventions will be discussed.
In 1990 the last Conservative administration introduced the NHS and Community 
Care Act of 1990. The aim was to extend individual choice and restore the family 
doctor to the “centrifugal point” (Banham, 1995, p. 22) in the planning of patient care. 
The Act was radical in that it sought to apply free market principles to the NHS. In the 
re-organisation hospitals became ‘service providers’ and fundholding 1 general 
practitioners became ‘purchasers’. Thus, GP’s were (in effect) free to ‘shop around’ 
for the ‘best deals’ in healthcare that they could find for their patients. Perhaps not 
surprisingly ‘fundholding’ was highly controversial, partly because it shifted the 
balance of power away from hospital consultants to fundholding practitioners, and 
partly because there was a widespread belief that it would lead to a ‘two tier’ system 
of service provision. However, although there were very real problems associated with
1 Fundholding - General Practitioners (or groups o f  GPs) who list sizes exceeded 11,000 patients (in the first wave o f  
fundholding) were eligible to apply for Fundholding Status. This enabled them to negotiate their own treatment contracts with 
service providers but led to some inequalities between fundholding and non-fundholding practices.
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fundholding it did force ‘sedimented’ (Spinelli, 1989) or fossilised secondary and 
tertiary service providers to become more responsive to concerns of general 
practitioners and the needs of their patients.
The New Labour Government of 1997 swept to power on a pledge to reform the NHS 
once more. Their party manifesto promised to address inequalities in healthcare and 
abolish fundholding, but it did not propose a return to the pre-1990 administrative 
structure. Instead general practitioners would form ‘collectives’ or Primary Care 
Groups (PCGs) with the aim of attaining Primary Care Trust status (PCTs) early in the 
new millennium. PCTs would take over many of the functions of the old Health 
Authorities and each would consist of groups of GP practices (with perhaps up to 40 
or 50 general practitioners in each trust) which would allow them to retain their 
purchasing power without disadvantaging smaller practices. In addition PCGs and 
(later) PCTs would have on their boards practitioners from allied professional groups 
and lay members to steer policy development. In this way they would be truly 
representative of the communities that they served.
Because of the differential levels of service provision across the country, the 
Department of Health set up the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 
1999, to identify examples of good/best practice and endorse clinically effective 
treatments in selected areas. In addition, following extensive consultation with experts 
and clinicians working in core specialities, National Service Frameworks are being 
prepared to set standards of care in these areas.
The National Service Framework (NSF) for Mental Health was published by the 
Department of Health in September 1999 (Department of Health, 1999) and it lays out 
clear guidelines in Standards 2 and 3 for Primary Care and in Standards 4 and 5 for 
Secondary and Tertiary Care.
For example Standard 2 stipulates that: “Any service user who contacts (heir primary 
health care team with a common mental health problem should 1) have their mental 
health needs identified and assessed and 2) be offered effective treatments, including
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referral to specialist services for further assessment treatment and care if they require 
it” (Department of Health, 1999, p. 28).
As a result Primary Care Groups are now working in partnership with Secondary and 
Tertiary Service Providers to ensure that the policies laid out in The National Service 
Framework for Mental Health are implemented. In Primary Care the emphasis is very 
much on prevention and the provision of psychological therapies (and 
pharmacological therapies where appropriate) for common mental health problems, 
whereas Secondary and Tertiary services are reserved mainly (but not exclusively) for 
people with more severe and enduring mental health problems.
Thus, counselling and clinical psychologists can be found working in a range of health 
care settings: primary care; community mental healthcare teams; outpatient 
departments; in patient units and specialist (tertiary) services, providing both short 
term and longer term psychological therapies.
The intensity and duration of the treatment provided by psychologists depends on the 
needs of the patient or client and the setting where they are seen. For example in 
Primary Care people tend to be offered around six weekly or fortnightly sessions with 
a psychologist or counsellor. In other healthcare settings the length of treatment may 
be longer. Some outpatient psychology services offer their clients up to 20 sessions, 
others 15; occasionally people are seen on an open-ended basis. In psychotherapy 
departments the situation is slightly different. Generally people are seen for longer but 
the frequency in most NHS psychotherapy departments still tends to be once a week. 
The Tavistock Clinic in London is a notable exception to this rule. At the ‘Tavy’ 
patients may be seen up to three times a week (usually by trainee psychotherapists or 
analysts).
The debate between the relative merits of long term versus short term therapy is a long 
standing one which began with Freud (1918), as the quotation at the beginning of this 
paper indicated. In the early days long term therapy tended to be associated with 
psycho-analysis, which required the ‘patient’ to attend for treatment five or six times a 
week. Often the status of the therapist was associated with the intensity of treatment.
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So the hierarchy, for many years, went psychoanalyst, psychiatrist, psychotherapist, 
psychologist, counsellor. This situation has changed now partly because few people 
today have either the time or the money to devote themselves to a ‘classical’ Freudian 
analysis, and partly because psychoanalytic theory does not have the same status that 
it once had. However there is still, nevertheless, a feeling in some circles that short 
term equals short changed.
Apart from the afore mentioned impediments of time and money, another problem 
with psychoanalytical treatment is that the theory upon which it is based lacks 
scientific validity. Much of what is written about it is presented in the form of single 
case studies and although single case studies are valuable and can be instructive, they 
are written retrospectively and may, therefore, be subject to certain biases (Wilson,
1995). Popper (1959) suggests that one of the most important criteria of ‘a good 
theory’ is that is can be falsified. It is very difficult to apply this criterion to 
psychoanalytic theory because certain aspects of it can not be disproved. Critics like 
Eysenck (1973) see this as a fatal flaw but psychoanalytic/psychodynamic theories 
have survived, albeit in a modified form.
For reasons of space it is not possible to discuss the history of psychodynamic 
research in this paper. However I propose to present a summary of three outcome 
studies that were conducted at Tavistock Clinic over a period of 25 years, initially 
under the direction of Michael Balint and later under his successor David Malan. In 
his research trilogy: ‘A Study of Brief Psychotherapy’ (Malan, 1963), ‘Towards the 
Validation of Dynamic Psychotherapy’ (Malan, 1976) and ‘Psychodynamics, 
Training, and Outcome in Brief Psychotherapy’ (Malan and Osimo, 1992) Malan 
presents a compelling argument in support of the efficacy of brief psychotherapy.
The studies described in these three books were based on the treatment of a series of 
patients seen at the Tavistock Clinic in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s 2. The researchers 
were rigorous in their methodology. Patients were carefully selected and those who 
were obviously unsuitable were excluded at the outset. For research purposes the
2 Different patients were used in the different studies. The first two studies included patients seen in Balint’s Workshop during the 
period between 1955 and 1962. The third study (reported by Malan and Osimo in 1992) involved patients seen in Malan’s Brief 
Psychotherapy Workshop in the years 1970 to 1978 (inclusive).
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excluding factors were “excessive dependence; severe inability to cope with stress; the 
potential for depressive or psychotic breakdown and poor impulse control” (Malan 
and Osimo, 1992, p. 13). Indicators for inclusion consisted of a) an understanding of 
the underlying psychodynamics of the patient and, b) on the basis of this, a clear focus 
for therapeutic interventions, c) Evidence of motivation to work in this way and d) 
The ability to use ‘trial’ interpretations during the assessment interviews (Malan and 
Osimo, 1992). All of the therapists were psychiatrists, psychologists or social workers 
who were undertaking the Tavistock Clinic four-year training in adult psychotherapy.
Outcome was assessed by a team of four clinicians who had access to all the material 
relating to the case and scores were given by each judge for ‘dynamic improvement’ 
on a scale ranging from - 2 (deterioration) to + 4 (positive change). The analysis of 
change and the methods of scoring employed by Malan and his colleagues were more 
subtle and much more complex than can be described here. However suffice it to say 
that the final mean score (of the four judges) was used as an indicator of the degree of 
change post therapy. As might be expected the results were mixed. There were some 
impressive improvements and (at the other end of the spectrum) one case ended in 
tragedy when the patient committed suicide (Malan and Osimo, 1992).
But, overall, the results were encouraging and in their 1992 summary of the research 
Malan and Osimo (1992) conclude that the three studies demonstrate that “where 
supervisors of the right quality are available, the evidence suggests that brief therapy 
by trainees can provide an important resource, particularly for psychotherapeutic 
centres faced - as so often - with demands for therapy that are impossible to meet” 
(p.vi).
Although, clearly, short term psychodynamic therapies today do differ from long term 
treatments (if only in terms of length), Malan (Malan, 1976) maintains that 
practitioners working with this model still utilise all of the basic types of interpretation 
found in psychoanalysis (Malan, 1976; Malan and Osimo, 1992). Similarly in short 
term psychodynamic counselling all of the core concepts are used to inform practice 
(Jacobs, 1988), although some clinicians have found there can be problems with 
transference interpretations in short term dynamic therapy (Pearson, 1995). Because of
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this Pearson suggests that certain modifications to technique are required when 
working in time limited, short term psychodynamic therapy, which involve:
“ .. monitoring the transference but making comments using the material 
which the patient brings to the therapy session.” He goes on to say that 
often the “material is not about the therapist-patient relationship .. [and 
that] .. patients will frequently prefer to work in other areas for reasons of 
space and safety (Pearson, 1995, p. 38).
If short term therapy per se is considered by some people to be controversial (in that 
the perception is that it’s service driven, rather than patient or needs led) then 
Davanloo’s (1980; 1990) ‘single session therapy’ might be regarded as ‘heretical’. In 
essence Davanloo’s technique “involves a systematic challenge to the patient’s 
defences and minute attention to the manifestations of transference” (Malan and 
Osimo, 1992, p. 16). In some patients a single session is enough to enable them 
experience and express transference feelings directly in the session. In others it may 
take longer. But a fundamental principle of the technique is to enable the patient to 
experience his or her feelings “to the maximum” that s/he can bear (Davanloo, 1990). 
Davanloo believes that if patients can be helped to experience their deepest and most 
intense feelings then ‘de-repression’ will occur and access to the unconscious will be 
facilitated.
It is unlikely, however, that the needs of majority of patients or clients presenting in 
Primary Care can be accommodated in a single therapy session with a psychologist. 
Although it is interesting that the preliminary results of a study looking at the 
provision of psychological therapies in Primary Care settings in Merton, Sutton and 
Wandsworth (Gilleard and Wynne, 1998), shows that around 20 percent of clients in 
the study were seen for one session only.
However one of the difficulties in determining ‘who needs what’ in terms of therapy is 
the vexed problem of psychiatric classification or ‘caseness’ (Wing, Mann, Leff and 
Nixon, 1978). Many clinicians are wary of classification because they feel it can be 
stigmatising and can skew outcome research so that (for example) “depression 
becomes that which is measured by DSM-IV” (Parry and Richardson, 1996, p. 48). 
But classification systems can be useful in helping to plan appropriate care, although
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deciding whether clients meet the criteria for psychiatric caseness (i.e. reporting 
enough symptoms to gain a psychiatric diagnosis) is not always as straightforward as 
one might imagine (Wing et al, 1978). There are now however a number of well 
validated instruments that can be used to assist diagnosis and measure core aspects of 
clients’ distress and levels of functioning - for example the Global Assessment of 
Functioning (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), the General Health 
Questionnaire - 28 (Goldberg and Williams, 1988) and the Social Functioning 
Questionnaire (Howes, Haworth, Reynolds and Kavanaugh, 1997) to name but a few. 
In Gilleard and Wynne’s study (1998) over 80% of people referred for psychological 
therapy met the criteria for psychiatric caseness which suggests that there is a 
considerable need for these services in Primary Care.
But can the needs of clients presenting in GPs surgeries be met by short-term 
interventions? Roth and Fonagy’s comprehensive review of psychotherapy research - 
‘What Works for Whom’ suggests that they can (Roth and Fonagy, 1996). It would 
seem that short-term interventions can be extremely effective for less severe mental 
health problems, providing that they are targeted appropriately. There is now a great 
deal of research evidence, which demonstrates the value of structured therapies 
(cognitive behaviour therapy and interpersonal therapy) for depression. Brief 
structured psychodynamic therapy has also been shown to be effective but research in 
this area is still in the early stages. Structured behavioural and cognitive approaches 
have also been shown to be effective in the treatment of obsessive compulsive 
disorder and panic disorder. In eating disorders (because of the chronicity of the 
illness) short term interventions are often contraindicated. But where they are 
appropriate psychodynamic therapy combined with family therapy has been shown to 
be effective in the treatment of anorexia nervosa, and cognitive behaviour therapy and 
interpersonal psychotherapy (combined with psycho-educational treatment) in bulimia 
nervosa (Roth and Fonagy, 1996).
The structured therapies referred to above - namely cognitive behaviour therapy and 
interpersonal therapies - have become widely used in recent years. The fact that they 
can be evaluated more effectively than psychodynamic approaches (Roth and Fonagy,
1996), and that they address specific deficits in functioning, has made them appealing
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to psychologists and clients alike. Many clients find the comparative lack of structure 
in short-term psychodynamic therapy anxiety provoking (Malan and Osimo, 1992). 
Often they have come to therapy with the hope that they will be provided with a 
‘solution’ to their problems and the relative activity of the clinician in structured 
approaches (providing feedback and reinforcement in many instances) combined with 
the use of techniques such as activity scheduling, diary keeping, graded task 
assignments, assertiveness training and the provision of psycho-education can be 
extremely reassuring.
Clark and Fairbum (1997) note that the term ‘Cognitive Behaviour Therapy’ (CBT) 
first began to appear in the literature in the mid 1970s. CBT evolved (essentially) in 
three stages (Rachman, 1997). In the 1960s the influence of behaviourism led to the 
development of a range of behavioural techniques and treatments, which were applied 
widely, both here in the UK and in the United States. Because in behaviour therapy 
the aim is to alter maladaptive behavioural responses, any changes in the behavioural 
repertoire of the patient can be observed and measured, therefore it lends itself to 
clinical evaluation and there is now a large body of research which details its success. 
However although clinical applications of behaviourist theories were being developed 
and applied successfully, new theorising was not taking place. And Rachman (1997) 
writes that behaviour therapy had shifted from a ‘science to a technology’. Also, 
although it had considerable success in treating certain problems, there had been a 
lack of progress in treating disorders such as depression.
The cognitive revolution also began in the 1960s, in parallel with behaviourist 
theorising, and had its origins in the work of two major theorists - Aaron T. Beck and 
Albert Ellis. Beck’s (Beck, 1967, 1976) pioneering work on the cognitive origins and 
treatment of depression has been well documented; as has Ellis’ enormously 
influential Rational Emotive Therapy (Ellis, 1962). However although Beck and Ellis 
emphasise the importance of cognitions in the development and maintenance of 
psychological disturbance, both acknowledged the value of behaviour therapy and 
Ellis himself stated that “insight alone was not likely to lead an individual to 
overcome his deep-seated fears and hostilities; he also needed a large degree of fear 
and hostility combating action” (Ellis, 1962, p. 10). Thus, the stage seemed set for a
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marriage between the two approaches - cognitive therapy and behaviour therapy and, 
put simply, that is exactly what happened. In the 1970s clinicians and theorists began 
to merge the two approaches and a new range of treatments were developed for 
problems that previously had appeared to be intractable. An interesting area of 
development recently, is the use of cognitive behaviour therapy for the treatment of 
conditions such as obsessive compulsive disorder (Salkovskis, 1985), phobias and 
hypocondriasis (Salkovskis and Clark, 1993).
However, although there is clear evidence to support the application of specific 
techniques in certain conditions, the process is more complex that simply matching a 
client with a CBT therapist or a psychodynamic counsellor, depending on the 
problem. It would seem that two of the most important factors in any therapeutic 
enterprise is the quality of the working alliance and the skill of the therapist. In fact 
there is evidence to show that in sessions conducted in naturalistic settings by master 
cognitive-behaviour therapists and master psychodynamic-interpersonal therapists, 
there are relatively few ‘between group’ differences in therapeutic focus (Goldfried, 
Raue and Castonguay, 1998). It is interesting to note therefore that in their 1996 
Review of NHS Psychotherapy Services Parry and Richardson conclude that:
“Much of the variance in outcome does not depend on the therapeutic 
procedure ... other factors are important, particularly the ability of the 
therapist and client to form a therapeutic alliance. Good matching of 
individual patient to form of therapy, and the therapist’s skill at 
developing and maintaining a working alliance, are probably at least as 
important as the specific effects of therapeutic technique for a particular 
diagnosis” (Parry and Richardson, 1996, p. 54).
Frequently one reads in the literature about the ‘dose effect’ in short term 
psychotherapy (Howard, Kopta, Kranuse and Orlinsky, 1986), and often it is used to 
support the ‘more equals better’ equation. However Howard and his colleagues 
(Howard, Kopta, Kranuse and Orlinsky, 1986) found that this was true, but only up to 
a point. The gain they reported continues up to 26 sessions and after that it tends to tail 
off. Shapiro (1995) compared the benefit of 8 sessions against 16 and found very little 
difference in treatment outcome except in the case of highly disturbed patients. This
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seems to suggest that in some instances short-term therapy really can be ‘the treatment 
of choice’.
However where there is comorbidity with a personality disorder (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) the treatment prognosis may adversely affected (Dolan, 
Evans and Wilson, 1992). The American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV, 1994) 
defines a personality disorder as an “enduring pattern of behaviour that deviates 
markedly from the expectations of the individual’s culture, is pervasive and inflexible, 
has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to 
distress or impairment” (APA, 1994, p. 630). DSM-IV lists ten different personality 
disorders, however research has shown that there is often a considerable overlap 
between disorders. For example Dolan, Evans and Norton (1992), using the self-rating 
Personality Disorder Questionnaire (Hyler and Ryder, 1987), found that in a sample of 
patients at Henderson Hospital3 males averaged 7.2 personality disorders and females 
6.7. Although this sample is not typical of the population at large, nevertheless, people 
with personality disorders are notoriously difficult to treat and they frequently have a 
reputation among general practitioners for being ‘heart sink’ or problem patients 
(Norton, 1996). Norton reports that the prevalence rate of people with personality 
disorders in the general population has been estimated at approximately 10%, and that 
this rises to 20% in studies of GP attendees (Norton, 1992a).
Because of their enduring attitudes and patterns of behaviour, people with personality 
disorders frequently cannot use therapy in the same way as other service users. They 
are often difficult to engage in treatment (Norton, 1992b) and tend to ‘suck in’ 
services “in a reactive and unproductive way” (Menzies, Dolan, and Norton, 1993, 
p.517). Furthermore brief psychotherapy is rarely effective for people with severe 
personality disorders because of their propensity to ‘act out’ their difficulties rather 
than talk about them in therapy (Kemberg, 1984). This means that it may be 
unrealistic to expect people with personality disorders to be able to ‘fit it’ with 
existing service provision, and that service planners will have to tailor their treatment 
programs to meet the needs of this challenging client group.
3 An in patient unit which specialises in the treatment o f individuals with severe personality disorders.
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An approach which attempts to match clinical need with available resources is Ryle’s 
(1992, 1997) Cognitive Analytic Therapy (CAT). CAT is the result of another merger 
between therapeutic approaches - this time between Cognitive Therapy and Psycho - 
dynamic Therapy. In an interesting paper “When Less is More or at Least Enough” 
Ryle and his colleagues (Ryle, Spencer and Yawetz, 1992) discuss the difficulty of 
service provision and make the point that
“for each fifty hours of therapy per week that can be offered, the choice 
lies between treating 25 patients weekly for two years, 50 patients for one 
year, 100 patients for six months or 150 for four months” (Ryle et al,
1992, p. 401).
Stated thus, the prospect of treating patients with enduring personality disorders in 
Primary Care settings or in Out Patient Psychology and Counselling Services (where 
the number of sessions that can be offered in any one ‘module’ are restricted) seems 
remote. Ryle et al (1992) present two case examples of time limited (one of 16 
sessions and one of 24) cognitive analytic treatment with patients presenting with 
persistent personality difficulties (one client had had both inpatient treatment, and five 
years of three times a week psychoanalysis). The results in both cases are impressive 
in terms of reduction in symptomatology and improvement in quality of life. 
Furthermore the therapeutic gains were maintained after the termination of the therapy 
and at follow up both reported continuing improvement in their feelings and/or 
relationships.
Ryle (1997) has also been using cognitive analytical therapy in the treatment of 
borderline personality disorder (BPD). Generally when individuals receive 
simultaneous diagnoses of more than one personality disorder the existence of 
borderline symptomatology ‘trumps’ all of the others. Borderline patients are 
characterised as being impulsive, unstable and self-destructive (DSM-IV, APA, 1994). 
They often self-harm by cutting, abusing alcohol and drugs, and a significant 
proportion (especially females) have disordered eating patterns (Baker Dennis and 
Sansone, 1991). Needless to say their chaotic behaviour makes them extremely 
difficult to treat. Thus, the existence of BPD is generally greeted with extreme 
pessimism by clinicians and interventions are often geared towards containment rather
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than treatment. However the application of cognitive analytic therapy to the treatment 
of BPD has offered real hope to this extremely challenging group of patients. Ryle 
(1997) has demonstrated that it is possible to apply both cognitive and analytical 
principles, in time limited therapy, with borderline patients. Following a pilot study 
which offered 16 sessions with one follow up, the number was increased to 24 
sessions with follow up appointments at 1, 2, 3, and 6 months (Ryle, 1997). In view of 
the nature of the difficulties experienced by borderline patients - their well 
documented terror of abandonment and the difficulties they have with endings - this 
seems to be a remarkably successful and cost effective method of treatment.
However, having demonstrated (I hope) the value of short term interventions, I would 
now like to make a plea for the provision of some longer term treatment in Primary 
Care and Adult Psychology Outpatient Services. Although, clearly, cost-offset 4 is 
very much on the minds of service managers and commissioners in the ‘new’ NHS, 
there are some cases where short term gains are simply not worth the longer term 
costs. For whatever reason some clients can not use short term therapy and ethical 
considerations must be factored into every cost/benefit equation. Although rationing 
of healthcare services does take place in the National Health Service (and probably 
always has), we need to think very carefully about the range of services that we can 
offer clients and, in some cases, longer term interventions may be the treatment of 
choice.
Many GPs argue that it is impossible to weigh the value of ‘X’ number of sessions of 
counselling, against the provision of a new hip for an 80 year old lady. But the reality 
is that such decisions do take place. GPs, especially those who were fundholders 
under the last Conservative administration, are used to the fact the one person’s gain 
must be weighed against another person’s loss. The NHS does not have unlimited 
funds and the demand for healthcare services is still on the increase. However the 
danger is that when we try to weigh the ‘physical’ against the ‘psychological’ the 
physical will usually win because it can be seen. It is ‘real’ and therefore quantifiable. 
Psychological distress can only manifest itself in behavioural responses and there is
4 Cost-offset. The saving made following treatment (i.e. the annual saving to the public exchequer) when total service usage, has 
been taken in to account..
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still a widespread belief that people can and ‘should’ be able to control their own 
behaviour. There is also, still, a certain amount of stigma attached to psychological 
illness and people are frightened about being labelled as ‘mad’. Care in the 
Community (Department of Health, 1990), though well intentioned, has not helped the 
public perception that mental health problems are something that people should be to 
be ashamed of, and that they should be kept hidden at all costs.
This paper has attempted to show that a range of psychological services need to be 
available to GPs so that the psychological needs of all of their patients who present 
with less severe mental health problems can be met, either in a Primary Care setting or 
in an Adult Outpatient Psychology Department. The relative merits of different 
therapies have been discussed and some of the research evidence in support of 
different therapeutic approaches has been presented. It would seem that the fear that 
‘short term inevitably means short changed’ has not been supported. There is now a 
considerable body of research evidence to support the efficacy of short-term 
approaches in specific cases. However there remain instances where short-term 
therapy will not be appropriate. Some patients simply can not use short-term therapy 
and for them longer term, open-ended therapy may be necessary.
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Discuss an aspect of the therapeutic relationship in relation to 
psychoanalytic ideas ~ Countertransference.
A recent search (09/01/01) of the American Psychological Association’s PsycINFO 
database (1887-2000) for journal articles and book chapters relating to 
countertransference (CT) produced 5536 references to the topic and, of these, nearly 
half have been published since 1992. This burgeoning of the literature on CT in recent 
years may, in part, be a reflection of what Gabbard (1995, p. 475) has termed “an 
emerging common ground” amongst theorists. Initially Freud had viewed 
countertransference, essentially, as a negative phenomenon and he advised physicians
“to model themselves during psychoanalytic treatment on the surgeon, 
who puts aside all his feelings, even his human sympathy and concentrates 
his mental forces on the single aim of performing the operation as skilfully 
as possible.”
(Freud 1912, p. 114-116).
For many years this somewhat ‘mechanical’ view prevailed, almost unchallenged. 
Great emphasis was placed on the importance of the training analysis, as it was 
thought to be the best way to minimise possibly unconscious pathological reactions to 
the patient’s transferences and, thereby, prevent unresolved conflicts in the therapist 
from interfering with the analytic treatment. In her seminal paper ‘On 
Countertransference’ Paula Heimann provides a succinct definition of this early 
classical view - “It could be argued ... that countertransference simply means 
transference on the part of the analyst.” (Heimann 1950, p. 81). However she did not 
agree with this narrow use of the term and her assertion that “The analyst’s emotional 
response to his patient .. represents one of the most important tools for his work” 
(Heimann, 1950, p. 81) was to have a profound effect on subsequent thinking in this 
area.
Although Heimann’s paper, read at the Zurich Congress in 1949, is generally 
considered to be a major breakthrough in the field, other analysts were also coming to 
similar conclusions at around the same time as a result of their clinical work. For 
example Little, in an interview with Langs (Little 1981, p. 208), states that when she
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read Heimann’s paper (she had not been at the congress) some of the ideas in it were 
already familiar to her because she had discovered them independently. Similarly, 
Winnicott’s (1949) famous paper ‘Hate in the Countertransference’ indicates that, as a 
result of his analytic work with psychotic patients, he too was moving away from the 
idea that countertransference was (necessarily) something to be deplored. In a paper of 
this length it is not possible to provide a comprehensive review of all of the literature 
on countertransference. Instead it will trace some of the main developments in the 
field and will then examine one aspect of countertransference which, to date, has 
received comparatively little attention in the literature -  namely erotic 
countertransferences. This latter part of the paper will focus mainly upon one kind of 
erotic CT. The maternal erotic countertransference.
Although transference and countertransference are probably universal phenomena 
which occur in all dyadic settings (Wright, 1995, p. 461), in the 
psychoanalytic/psychotherapeutic literature the terms tend to be reserved specifically 
for communications which arise in clinical relationships between therapist and patient. 
The revolution in thinking about countertransference which occurred in the 1950s 
following the publication of Heimann’s important paper, stimulated a great deal of 
debate in psychoanalytic institutions and, subsequently, two broad schools of thought 
emerged. Theorists adhering to the classical view insisted on retaining the narrower 
definition of the term described below by Reich (1952).
“Counter-transference comprises the effects of the analyst’s own 
unconscious needs and conflicts on his understanding or technique. In 
such cases, the patient represents for the analyst an object of the past onto 
whom past feelings and wishes are projected, just as it happens in the 
patient’s transference situation with the analysis. The provoking factor for 
such an occurrence may be something in the patient’s personality or 
material or something in the analytic situation as such. This is counter­
transference in the proper sense” (Reich, 1952, p. 26).
However others believed that a wider conceptualisation was more useful and 
Heimann’s (1950) definition was extended to include
“ [All of] the analyst’s conscious feelings about and reactions to the 
patient as a whole .. the analyst’s reactions to the patient’s transferences to
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him .. the analyst’s neurotically determined reaction to a particular conflict 
with a particular patient .. any and all of the feelings the analyst has about 
a particular patient in any context” (Tyson, 1986, p. 251).
Racker (1957) divides countertransference into what he terms ‘concordant’ and 
‘complementary’ identifications. According to Racker concordant identifications are 
those where there is an empathic connection between analyst and patient which 
enables him/her to identify with an aspect of the patient’s self. In complementary 
identifications the patient treats the analyst like one of his/her (the patient’s) internal 
objects and, as a consequence of this, the analyst identifies with this object and may 
respond accordingly.
Recently Gabbard (1995) has argued that, in practice, the differences between analysts 
of divergent schools are not as great as their theoretical writings would suggest and he 
talks about an “emerging area of common ground” (Gabbard, 1995, p. 475) among 
practitioners. Gabbard believes this is due to the elaboration of two important 
concepts: projective identification (which will be discussed below) and
countertransference enactment.1
The increasing influence of Kleinian concepts in the 1940s and 1950s had a profound 
impact on the development of ideas concerning the nature of the relationship between 
patient and analyst. Over the years many psychoanalysts had come to believe that 
even after extensive training analyses, it was simply not possible to eliminate their 
own feelings from the therapeutic equation. Freud’s injunction that the analyst should 
‘put aside all his feelings’ seemed an impossible requirement, and it is interesting that 
a number of writers have questioned whether this was what he really meant. For 
example Heimann (1950) suggests that the widespread belief that analysts should 
avoid any emotional response to their patients “probably came from a misreading of 
some of Freud’s statements” (p. 81). In a similar vein Professor Robert Young (1994) 
points to a passage in Freud’s ‘Recommendations to physicians practising psycho­
analysis’ (Freud, 1912) where he specifically draws attention to the importance of 
unconscious perceptions in the analyst, stating that he [the analyst] “.. must turn his
1 Countertransference enactments have been described to occur “when an attempt to actualize a transference fantasy elicits a 
countertransference reaction" (Chused, 1991, p. 629). The similarity between the concepts o f  projective identification & 
countertransference enactment has been discussed at a recent psychoanalytic conference (Panel, 1992).
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own unconscious like a receptive organ towards the transmitting unconscious of the 
patient” (Freud 1912, p. 115). This seems to suggest an intimate connection that 
involves far more than simply ‘reflecting back’ a mirror image to the patient.
The concepts of projection, introjection and projective identification have also played 
an important part in helping to further our understanding of transference and 
countertransference manifestations. Projection, initially described by Freud (1911) is a 
process whereby split off feelings and experiences, which are felt (at an unconscious 
level) to be unacceptable or unbearable to the ego, are projected into the object. In 
introjection aspects of the object are taken in to the ego. Melanie Klein’s concept of 
projective identification (Klein, 1946) is more complex than the relatively 
straightforward mechanisms of projection or introjection. Projective identification is a 
process whereby the patient can evoke certain feelings or experiences in the analyst 
and, thereby, induce the analyst to feel or even to act (countertransference enactment) 
in accordance with those feelings. In ‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’ Klein 
(1946) describes how hateful feelings can be expelled and projected into the [m]other.
“These excrements and bad parts of self are not meant only to injure but 
also to control and take possession of the object. Insofar as the mother 
comes to contain the bad parts of the self, she is not felt to be a separate 
individual but is felt to be the bad self. Much of the hatred against parts of 
the self is now directed towards the mother. This leads to a particular form 
of identification which established the prototype of an aggressive object 
relation. I suggest for these processes the term ‘projective identification”
(Klein 1946, p. 8). (Original emphasis).
However it is not just ‘bad’ aspects of the self which are projected in this way, ‘good’ 
aspects can also be projected and loving identifications can be formed. In therapy 
these positive identifications can assist integration and promote ego functioning. In the 
years since Klein first outlined the concept, a number of prominent theorists have 
extended and developed her original contribution. For example Bion (1957, 1959, 
1970) has suggested that both normal and pathological projective identifications can 
occur. And his conceptualisations of the ‘container’ and the ‘contained’ have also 
been extremely useful clinically. Put very simply Bion proposed that, initially, the 
mother helps the infant to organise its world, not just on a physical and an emotional
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level, but also on a cognitive level, by transforming ‘raw’ and fragmentary beta 
elements in to more structured alpha elements (Bion, 1962a and b). In some ways this 
is reminiscent of Money-Kyle’s (1956) suggestion that the analyst helps the patient to 
‘metabolise’ or ‘digest’ difficult feelings and experiences.
Although papers relating to positive and negative countertransference feelings and 
responses regularly appear in psychoanalytic publications, one area still remains 
relatively unexamined -  erotic countertransference. The reason for this may be may be 
that some analysts still regard it as a taboo subject; something to be considered in 
private but certainly too exposing to write about and present to one’s colleagues. The 
prohibition of any kind of sexual contact between therapist and patient may make 
clinicians feel that they should not have sexual feelings towards vulnerable (or 
potentially vulnerable) people who have come to them for help. This attitude, although 
understandable, may mean that valuable information about the patient is lost.
Having said this, some writers have begun to discuss these difficult issues in their 
publications. In a book intriguingly entitled ‘Psychotherapy -  An Erotic Relationship’ 
Mann (1997) addresses the topic openly and frankly, and using examples from his 
clinical work, he explores the meaning that the erotic can have for the therapy. Mann 
(1997) suggests that it is useful to think in terms of the positive and negative aspects 
of the erotic pre-oedipal and oedipal mother, and the positive and negative aspects of 
the erotic pre-oedipal and oedipal father. He then goes on to discuss how the 
countertransference can vary, depending on the stage of the analysis and the nature of 
the transferential relationship that is being re-enacted by the patient at that time. Mann 
(1997) believes that the erotic pre-oedipal mother has characteristics in common with 
the erotic oedipal mother.
For example, both need, (in Winnicott’s terms) to be ‘good enough’ rather than 
perfect. In the early stages of the infant’s life, as well as functioning as a ‘container’ 
(Bion, 1962 a and b) for her baby’s anxiety and distress, the pre-oedipal mother relates 
to the child in an intimately physical way. Washing it, changing it, feeding it (perhaps 
at her breast). This kind of skin to skin connection is sensuous and may be exciting to 
both members of the dyad. For the infant this early experience provides the basis for
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mature adult sexual relationships. But it is interesting that Mann (1997, p. 84) also 
cites research studies which show that, for many women, in addition to making them 
feel ‘close-to’ and ‘bonded-with’ their babies, breast-feeding can also be an intensely 
erotic experience.
Two American psychoanalysts Harriet Wrye and Judith Welles have explored the 
relevance of these findings to psychotherapy. These authors describe a new 
transference/countertransference constellation - Maternal Erotic Transferences (Wrye 
and Welles, 1989) and Maternal Erotic Countertransferences (Welles and Wrye, 1991; 
Wrye and Welles, 1994) which they say may emerge in the treatment of individuals 
whose early mothering did not facilitate the development and subsequent 
transformation of early erotic desire.
According to Wrye and Welles maternal erotic transferences (MET) are “rooted in 
mother and baby’s earliest sensual contacts and manifested in concrete loving and 
hateful erotic wishes towards the real parts of the body of the therapist, as well as their 
symbolic counterparts” (Welles & Wrye, 1991, p. 94). The ‘slipperiness’ of this early 
relationship when it re-emerges in the therapy may give rise to very primitive longings 
for a reunion with the pre-oedipal mother’s sensually experienced body. If the analyst 
if not prepared for this, the emergence of such intense feelings can result in ‘erotic 
terror’. In a fascinating paper Wrye (1993) writes specifically about the fear that can 
arise in such situations for a male patient and a female analyst. But it may well be that 
the regressive pull to fusion and symbiosis can be just as painful and frightening for 
female patients in analysis with a female analyst. In a male (patient) female (analyst) 
dyad the experience might be more acceptable to the therapist (and patient) because of 
its (essentially) heterosexual nature. However, in same sex dyads, the uncovering of 
early maternal erotic transferences may give rise to homosexual fears, and both 
partners may erect powerful defences against the experience.
I would like to illustrate this with an example from my own (supervised) practice as a 
trainee counselling psychologist. Ms Q is a 30 year old architect of mixed parentage 
(her mother was Israeli and her father is from South America) who was referred to the 
department complaining of anxiety and mood swings. Her mother had died of breast
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cancer when Ms Q was four years old and she had been brought up in the UK by her 
father. At her assessment interview it was clear that she identified with her father’s 
strength. Previously Ms Q had seen a private therapist to whom she had become very 
attached. Unfortunately, for financial reasons, it was not possible for Ms Q to continue 
to see her for treatment. Although Ms Q was extremely anxious about commencing a 
time-limited therapy she seemed to engage well with the treatment and the therapeutic 
relationship felt sound. At the end of the fourth session, however, she revealed that 
she had doubts about her sexuality for some time, and she told me (with difficulty) 
that she had feelings of a sexual nature for her previous therapist. She explained that 
she had never slept with a woman but that she felt drawn to ‘strong’ females.
Although it is not possible to provide a complete formulation here, it seemed likely 
Ms Q grew up in a situation where it was extremely difficult for her to get certain 
basic psychological needs met. Her mother’s illness and subsequent death when she 
was just four years old may have meant that for much of her early life her mother had 
not been able to be emotionally available to her daughter. One could hypothesise that 
in order to survive Ms Q had been forced to develop a ‘false’ self (Winnicott, 1960b. 
p. 150). Furthermore her identification with her father and her concerns about her 
sexuality might reflect the fact the she had not had a ‘strong’ female role model 
available for her to identify with during her formative years. The desire to be 
physically intimate with a woman, may therefore, in part, have been a belated attempt 
to remedy this deficit.
At the end of the fourth session, after she had revealed her doubts about her sexuality 
to me, I was acutely aware of the need to remain neutral vis-a-vis her sexual 
orientation. We discussed the possibility of her ‘experimenting’ with different kinds of 
relationship, but I suggested to her that maybe, at this stage, we just did not know 
what was right for her. After this it felt as though she was becoming more and more 
remote. I was aware that the Christmas break was only a few weeks away but, 
somehow, although I interpreted this, I did not believe that that was causing the 
problem. I found myself working ‘harder and harder’ in the sessions but to little effect. 
Christmas came and went and Ms Q took an extra week off. In the mean time I was 
reading material for this paper and trying to make some sense of our relationship.
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In the first session after the Christmas break the atmosphere seemed a little easier. 
However during this session a new and disturbing event occurred. Ms Q took off her 
jacket and underneath she had on a striking teashirt with a circular pattern over the left 
breast. To my horror I found my eyes drawn to it, constantly. I would look at her face 
and, almost immediately, my eyes would be drawn back to the pattern - and her breast. 
During the session I could not make much sense of this. I tried to think of it in terms 
of her mother’s illness, as she had told me that she could remember seeing her without 
her bandages following her mastectomy and had been upset by this, but the feeling 
that I was experiencing seemed to be erotic.
Near the end of the hour the atmosphere in the session shifted again and suddenly it 
became much more intimate. Then it became possible for us to look at what had been 
happening in the previous weeks when it had felt as though there was an insuperable 
barrier between us. Finally Ms Q was able to say to me that it had felt as though ‘we 
were coming from different places’ and that I didn’t believe that she was bi-sexual. 
This episode has taught me that perhaps I needed to experience her directly in this 
way (i.e. as someone who was physically desirable) before such a fundamental shift 
could take place and we could become ‘connected’ again at a more basic level.
In a paper of this length it has been difficult to do justice to the richness and 
complexity of thinking in this area. Countertransference is still a developing field and 
new concepts are emerging all the time. Finally the importance of monitoring 
countertransference feelings can not be over emphasised, as these feelings can provide 
important information about the internal world of the client.
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Diagnostic Report
The following diagnostic report relates to Ms Alice Siegel, a twenty-two year old 
college student with a long history of behavioural and emotional problems. In the 
report various diagnoses have been considered and the evidence concerning the most 
likely diagnosis has been explored and evaluated. Recently the American Psychiatric 
Association (APA) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) co-ordinated their 
psychiatric classificatory systems so that the codes and terms used in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders -  Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) were 
compatible with those in the tabulated index of the International Classification of 
Mental and Behavioural Diseases (ICD-10). For clarity this report refers mainly to the 
DSM-IV categories. However, where there is a marked divergence between the two 
schemes each account has been considered separately. The report concludes with a 
brief discussion about the validity and the utility of the official diagnostic systems, 
and suggests additional assessments that might be useful in this case.
According to the APA (1994, p. 33-35) there are two ways to record the results of a 
DSM-IV evaluation: multi-axially and non-axially. The format used in this report is 
the non-axial format.
The diagnosis, based upon the material in the case history, is 
Code:
DSM-IV
301.83 Borderline Personality Disorder.
ICD-10
F60.31 Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder -  Borderline Type.
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Parry (1997) suggests that certain features are ‘characteristic’ of patients diagnosed 
with Borderline Personality Disorder, including “extremely variable and volatile 
mood, intense relationships switching from idealization to devaluation, impulsive, self 
injuring behaviour, outbursts of unmanageable rage and desperate attempts to avoid 
abandonment” (Parry, 1997, p.xi). The information presented in the text suggests that 
all of these features are present in Ms Siegel’s case. This report will now consider the 
case material in detail, referring to the DSM-IV and ICD-10 diagnostic criteria where 
appropriate.
Personality Disorders 
DSM-IV Borderline Personality Disorder (301.83) ~ ICD-10 Emotionally 
Unstable Personality Disorder -  Borderline Type (F60.31).
DSM-IV states that the essential feature of a personality disorder is that it is: “an 
enduring pattern of inner experience and behaviour that deviates markedly from the 
expectations of the individual’s culture” (APA, 1994, p. 630)
Borderline Personality Disorder is characterised by “a pervasive pattern of instability 
in interpersonal relationships, self-image and affects, and marked impulsivity 
beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts” (APA, 1994, p. 
650).
There are 9 diagnostic criteria for Borderline Personality Disorder, and at least five are 
needed to meet the criterion level for ‘caseness’.
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships [..] alternating 
between extremes of idealization and devaluation.
3. Identity disturbance and markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of 
self.
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging.
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5. Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior.
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood.
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness.
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger.
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms.
Criterion 1: The case material suggests that Ms Siegel was deeply affected by her
parents divorce. Her father’s abrupt withdrawal from the family, combined with the 
fact that her mother had to return to work soon after his departure and the children 
were left unsupervised for long periods of time, may have left her feeling that she was 
unworthy of care and attention. It would seem that she attempted to escape from the 
reality of her father’s abandonment by entertaining a fantasy that her parents would, 
somehow, be reunited. When her mother remarried, however, this defence was 
challenged and her emotional distress became evident in her deteriorating academic 
and social behaviour. Ms Siegel’s early history may also have affected her 
relationships with hospital staff, leaving her fearful that they too would abandon her.
Criterion 2: Ms Siegel’s interpersonal relationships appear to have been troubled.
Her inability to turn down sexual advances from other members of her peer group 
seems to reflect a sense of confusion about notions of ‘closeness’ and ‘care’. It may 
also have been an attempt to stave off rejection. Furthermore the early sexual abuse by 
her stepbrother, which for many years represented the extent of her sexual experience, 
may have left her feeling that she could not say “no” to people when they made sexual 
demands of her.
Her need to idealise people is illustrated by the relationship that she formed with 
another patient during her first admission to hospital. Although, outwardly, there was 
nothing in their behaviour to suggest that it was a romantic relationship, Ms Siegel 
appears to have woven an elaborate fantasy around it, believing that it would end in 
marriage. However it would seem that he did not share her feelings and when, as had 
happened previously with her father, the relationship ended she attempted to deny the 
reality of the situation. In addition to this her relationships with members of staff also 
seem to have been characterised by ‘honeymoon’ periods of idealisation followed by a
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rapid devaluation when she felt that she has been let down in some way. This pattern 
of singling out individual clinicians for special one to one relationships can lead to 
deep splits in the staff team and is characteristic of people with borderline personality 
disorders (Main, 1957).
Criterion 3: Although there appear to be features of identity disturbance in the case
material, for example her tendency to over identify with members of staff and her 
adoption of the ‘therapist’ role with other patients, there is not enough evidence to 
suggest that that the disturbance is “markedly and persistently unstable” (APA, 1994, 
p.654).
Criterion 4: Ms Siegel has a history of impulsivity and she has been using illegal
drugs since her early teens. In addition she has engaged in risky promiscuous sexual 
activities.
Criterion 5: When under pressure from stressful interpersonal events Ms Siegel
would sometimes respond by cutting herself or threatening self harm. Similarly, when 
feelings of abandonment (see criterion 1) became too painful she had, on several 
occasions, threatened to kill herself. This has resulted in a number of hospital 
admissions over the years but usually these have been of relatively brief duration and 
on discharge she has been able to return to her studies.
Criterion 6: Miss Siegel has also suffered from affective instability at times. During
her first visit to hospital it seems that she often had violent mood swings and her case 
notes say that “she would express anger at an intensity level that was out of proportion 
to the situation”. These outbursts sometimes had negative consequences but at the 
time she seemed unable to control herself; afterwards she would feel guilty and 
express regret.
Criterion 7: It would seem that, in her teenage years, Ms Siegel often felt bored and
depressed when she did not have anything specific to do, especially when friends were 
not available to provide companionship and (perhaps) a sense of purpose. In addition,
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during the course of her first hospitalisation, the case notes indicate that “she 
vacillated between outbursts of anger and feelings of emptiness and depression”.
Criterion 8: There are a number of references in the case notes to episodes in which
“inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger” are manifest. For 
example Ms Siegel lost her temper when the admitting psychiatrist confronted her 
about her self-harming behaviour. She was also angry and abusive towards the nurse 
in charge when she arrived on the ward and her belongings were searched for illegal 
drugs and sharp objects, even though she knew it was a routine procedure.
Criterion 9: At different times, particularly in response to stressful situations (for
example the break-up of a relationship or the emergence of painful feelings in her 
individual psychotherapy) Ms Siegel experienced brief episodes of derealization. To 
‘make herself feel real again’ she would cut herself with a knife.
The DSM-IV Manual stipulates that for a diagnosis of Borderline Personality Disorder 
(DSM-IV.301.83) to be made five (or more) of the diagnostic criteria must be present. 
The brief outline above shows that Ms Siegel meets eight out of the nine criteria for 
Borderline Personality Disorder.
Differential Diagnosis
It should be noted here that it is extremely difficult to make a differential diagnosis of 
personality disorder (Dolan, Evans and Norton, 1995) and Multiple Axis-II diagnoses 
are common. A survey conducted by researchers at Henderson Hospital (a unit, which 
specialises in the treatment of severe personality disorder) found that ‘comorbidity’ 
was the norm, with inpatients scoring an average of six diagnoses per individual. This 
study used a 152 item self-report measure - the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire - 
Revised (PDQ-R) (Hyler and Reider, 1987) to assess Axis-II pathology and the most 
common individual category among the inpatient group was borderline personality 
disorder. Although the PDQ has been shown to be ‘overly sensitive’ in some research 
studies (Hunt and Andrews, 1992) it is widely used in specialist treatment settings and
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is generally considered to be a useful screening tool. In view of the areas of overlap 
between the 10 different Axis-II personality disorders, and the fact that some of Ms 
Siegel’s presenting features seem to suggest a histrionic component to her condition, 
the PDQ might be used in this case to aid differential diagnosis.
Similarly, the Borderline Syndrome Index, a 52 item forced choice measure (Conte, 
Plutchick, Karasu and Jerrett, 1980), is designed to assess borderline psychopathology 
associated with BPD. According to Conte et al. (1980), it equates well with the 
clinical diagnosis of borderline personality disorder and it might, therefore, also 
provide some additional assistance in this case.
ICD-10 Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder (F60.30) Impulsive Type.
Although ICD-10 is operationalized in a different way from DSM-IV (ICD-10 
descriptions tend to be somewhat ‘looser’ than DSM-IV’s and classification operates 
on a ‘goodness of fit basis’ - whereas DSM-IV provides a list of criteria with a 
threshold, which much be reached in order to meet the criterion for ‘caseness’) there 
is, nevertheless, a fair degree of correspondence between the two systems. ICD-lO’s 
Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder -  Impulsive Type is, essentially, very 
similar to DSM-IV’s Borderline Personality Disorder. Ms Siegel can, therefore, be 
classified under both diagnostic schemes.
Substance Abuse
Ms Siegel is reported as having abused illegal drugs and alcohol since her early 
teenage years but the case material does not specify which substances she has been 
abusing. It is difficult, therefore, to make an accurate assessment about the extent of 
her physiological and psychological dependence. The text indicates that at one point 
she was a regular user of drugs and had experienced paranoid ideation and visual 
hallucinations as a result of this. At times she also experienced drug-induced 
derealization and dissociation.
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Schizophrenia
During her first admission to hospital, as part of a battery of diagnostic tests Ms Siegel 
was administered a Rorschach and a Thematic Apperception Test. The results of these 
projective tests indicated a great deal of underlying anger and “a number of bizarre 
and confused responses .. [of the type] usually seen in more serious disorders such as 
schizophrenia”. In addition, she had also, upon occasion, experienced episodes of 
dissociation, which is one of the cardinal symptoms of the disease. However, since she 
did not fulfil any of the other criteria this diagnosis is rejected.
DSM-IV Depressive Disorder Not Otherwise Specified (311)
At different times in her life Ms Siegel has experienced episodes of depression. 
Although the details relating to them are sketchy it seems unlikely that the individual 
episodes would meet the necessary criteria for them to be considered as Major 
Depressive Episodes (DSM-IV. 296.2). For reasons of space all of the diagnostic 
criteria cannot be included but the case material indicates that Ms Siegel experienced 
episodes when her mood was depressed for most of the day. She lost her appetite and 
her sleep patterns were disturbed. The diagnosis of Depressive Disorder Not 
Otherwise Specified would seem, therefore, to be the best way to classify her 
symptoms.
Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders (DSM-IV) ~ Disorders of Sexual 
Preference (ICD-10)
DSM-IV lists Sexual Masochism (302.83) and Sexual Sadism (302.84) separately, 
whereas ICD-10 has a single category -  Sadomasochism (F65.5).
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual specifies that the person must be aroused by 
sexual “fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviours involving the act (real not simulated) of 
being humiliated, beaten bound or otherwise made to suffer” (DSM-IV-302.83). Or, 
in the case of Sexual Sadism, be aroused by sexual “fantasies, sexual urges, or
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behaviours involving the act (real not simulated) in which the psychological or 
physical suffering (including humiliation) of the victim is sexually exciting to the 
person” (DSM-IV-302.84).
ICD-10 adds that “the sadomasochistic activity is the most important stimulation or is 
necessary for sexual gratification” (ICD-10-F65.5).
Both systems emphasise that the paraphiliac focus must have existed for a period of 
not less than six months.
The information provided in the text indicates that Ms Siegel has engaged in a range 
of potentially self-destructive behaviours, including sexual promiscuity. At times she 
has also participated in sadomasochistic enactments. It would seem, however, that she 
did not derive any sexual satisfaction from these activities. She reports that she felt 
guilty and ashamed afterwards and that she participated only because she did not feel 
able to refuse the sexual advances of her peers. It is clear, therefore, that she does not 
meet any of the criteria outlined above.
Additional Information
Although mention is made in the report of Ms Siegel’s relationship with her mother, it 
tends to focus on her early and teenage years. It is not clear whether Ms Siegel is still 
living in the family home or whether she has moved into campus accommodation. It 
would be helpful to know something about the external support structures that are 
available to her and an interview, either with her mother or another family member, 
might provide valuable independent information about her life and level of 
functioning outside of the hospital environment.
N.B. As this is a diagnostic report, therapeutic interventions and relationship/process 
issues have not been discussed.
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Concluding Remarks
Although the major classificatory systems are useful for heuristic and research 
purposes, they have been criticised on a number of philosophical and theoretical 
grounds. For example Costello (1996) has pointed out that “there are 93 different 
ways to meet the DSM-III-R criteria for borderline personality disorder and 
149,495,616 different ways to meet the criteria for anti-social personality disorder” 
(Costello, 1996, p. 1).
From a social constructionist perspective, Parker and his colleagues (Parker, 
Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith, 1995) argue that “such diagnoses 
are not simply descriptive of reality ‘out there’. Rather, these categories are 
constitutive. In other words the existence of these categories actually creates these 
problems” (p. 39, original emphasis). As the publication date of DSM-V draws nearer 
it seems likely that the debate about the validity and utility of such systems as DSM- 
IV and ICD-10 will intensify and papers will continue to be written on the topic for 
many years to come.
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Introduction to the Therapeutic Practice Dossier
The Therapeutic Practice Dossier relates to clinical practice and contains a brief 
description of the placements undertaken during training. It also contains a ‘Final 
Clinical Paper’ discussing how I integrate theory and research into therapeutic 
practice.
Names and any other identifying information relating to clients, placement locations 
and placement supervisors have been altered or omitted to preserve confidentiality.
64
Descriptions o f Clinical Placem ents
Placement I: Adult Outpatient Psychology and Counselling Service
This placement was in an Adult Outpatient Psychology and Counselling Service, 
which received referrals from general practitioners, psychologists working in Primary 
Care, professionals working in Community Mental Health Teams (CMHTs), and 
psychiatrists. The service employed a range of mental healthcare professionals 
including chartered clinical psychologists, chartered counselling psychologists, 
psychotherapists and counsellors. In addition to providing psychological services at 
the Clinic, psychologists also worked (part-time) in CMHTs and in Primary Care.
The service offered individual cognitive-behavioural, psychodynamic, existential/ 
phenomenological and systemic interventions on an outpatient basis. The client group 
was a varied one and a wide range of problems were referred to the service for 
psychological therapy.
I conducted psychological assessments (under the supervision of my supervisor, a 
chartered counselling psychologist) and provided individual psychotherapy on a time- 
limited basis. I was also required to write assessment and discharge reports for general 
practitioners and to liaise with other healthcare professionals. Weekly meetings and 
seminars provided continuing professional development and time was devoted to 
single case discussion.
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Placement II: Psychotherapy Department in a District General Hospital
This placement was in an Adult Psychotherapy Service, situated in a specialist unit in 
the grounds of a large district general hospital. The Psychotherapy Department was 
headed by a Consultant Psychiatrist/psychotherapist and was staffed mainly by part- 
time psychotherapists, students/trainees and a specialist psychotherapy registrar. 
Clients were referred by general practitioners and psychiatrists and the department 
provided several different kinds of intervention including: individual psychotherapy, 
couple therapy, sexual therapy and group psychotherapy. The client group was a 
varied one and a wide range of problems were referred to the service (for example, 
anxiety, depression, and histories of trauma and abuse). The service had close links 
with the Art Therapy Department and the Specialist Psychology Service (Forensic and 
Learning Disabilities).
I saw clients on a long-term basis, in both individual and group settings. During the 
year I co-facilitated a psychodynamic psychotherapy group, with a group analyst. I 
continued to work with the group during my third year of training, thereby gaining 
experience of working with a psychotherapy group from its inception right through to 
the end when the therapy concluded. This provided me with a valuable opportunity to 
observe the different stages in the journeys of eight patients in a way that would not 
have been possible if I had left at the end of my second year placement.
Each week a member of staff presented a case for discussion and I found this to be a 
particularly valuable learning experience. Weekly supervision was provided by a 
psychodynamic psychotherapist.
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Placement III: Specialist Psychology Service in a District General Hospital
This placement was in a Specialist Psychology Service (SPS) which had two teams: a 
Forensic Team (which received referrals from psychiatrists, the probation service and 
the courts) and a Learning Disabilities Team. The service was staffed by a consultant 
clinical psychologist, three ‘A’ Grade (clinical) psychologists, a behavioural 
psychologist and three assistant psychologists. Registered nurses were also attached to 
the Learning Disabilities Team.
The Forensic Team had multi-disciplinary input from a variety of sources. As it was a 
tertiary service, all clients had to have some form of CMHT support. In addition, the 
SPS also had links with the Probation Service and Psychotherapy. Clients presented 
with a range of psychological and management issues, and many had complex needs.
I conducted psychological assessments and provided individual therapy on an open- 
ended basis. I also wrote assessment letters and reports for other health professionals 
(general practitioners, psychiatrists and social workers) and attended seminars and 
department meetings. At the end of the year I presented a research paper at an 
academic meeting.
For six months I co-led a Dialectical Behaviour Therapy skills training group with a 
chartered clinical psychologist. The primary therapeutic model used in the specialist 
psychology service is Cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT) but I also worked 
integratively.
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Integrating Theory, Research and Clinical Practice
In order to protect client confidentiality details of individual clients have been 
changed and pseudonyms have been employed throughout this paper.
Introduction
Woolfe (1996) suggests that “counselling psychology can be defined as the 
application of psychological knowledge to the practice of counselling” (p. 4). Firmly 
rooted in humanistic values and traditions, counselling psychology places the 
relationship between therapist and client at the very heart of the therapeutic enterprise. 
In a recent issue of The Psychologist, Woolfe (2002) highlights this point when he 
writes, “the most crucial factor in healing is not what we [counselling psychologists] 
do with clients but how we are with them. In this formulation the emphasis is placed 
on the power of the therapeutic relationship (being) rather than the application of 
specific skills or techniques (doing)” (p. 169).
However, the emphasis on ‘being’ does not mean that counselling psychologists 
eschew learned skills or research. On the contrary, counselling psychologists are 
trained to use a wide range of therapeutic methods and they may draw upon both 
implicit and explicit psychological theories to guide their interventions (Wilkinson 
and Campbell, 1997). Furthermore as scientist-practitioners they contribute to the 
development of the theoretical knowledge base through practice orientated research 
(British Psychological Society, 2001; Farrell, 1996).
The drive towards evidence-based practice in the National Health Service (Parry and 
Richardson, 1996) means that, increasingly, counselling psychologists are being called 
upon to account for their clinical work. However, in many quarters, ‘high quality’ 
research still tends to be equated with the scientific methods espoused by the 
positivist/empiricist tradition of the natural sciences, and randomised controlled trials
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remain the ‘gold standard’ by which most clinical research is judged (Roth and 
Fonagy, 1996). For many counselling psychologists this sits uncomfortably with a 
philosophy which emphasises the importance of the individual and highlights the 
subjective nature of human experience (Spinelli, 1996; Winter, 1996). However, 
attitudes are beginning to change and, increasingly, students are being encouraged to 
employ qualitative and phenomenological methods in their research studies (Clarkson, 
1995).
In relation to this key issue of professional accountability, one of the strengths 
Counselling Psychology is the importance that accords to reflective practice. The 
requirement that therapists in training should undergo a minimum of 40 hours of 
personal therapy during the first year of their course is invaluable. I know from my 
own experience of analysis how profoundly it has affected my approach to clinical 
practice, and I firmly believe that there is no substitute for what Moser (1977) has 
elegantly termed the “apprenticeship on the couch”. In addition to helping me to 
understand my own psychological processes, it has taught me, in a very direct way, 
what it is like to share my innermost thoughts and feelings with a stranger. At times it 
was an extremely painful process, especially when explorations of some disavowed 
aspect of myself made me feel naked and exposed. Along the way I became 
acquainted with many psychodynamic concepts, such as those of resistance and 
shame, of transference and countertransference, projection and introjection. But, I was 
fortunate because I have also learned about generosity and gratitude, and kindness and 
care. Furthermore, this experience has brought home to me that although theories and 
techniques are extremely important, it is the relationship that ‘heals’.
Writing this feels like a daunting task because I am acutely aware that I am still very 
much ‘in the process of becoming a practitioner’ and know that my professional 
identity has not yet been consolidated. Nevertheless the aim of the paper is to present 
the reader with an account of how I use theory and research evidence (including my 
own thoughts, feelings and responses) to inform my clinical practice. For clarity, I 
shall consider the three theoretical models taught on the course (humanistic, 
psychodynamic and cognitive-behavioural) in turn, using examples from my 
therapeutic work with clients to illustrate key points. However, in addition to a
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consideration of how these paradigms have influenced my clinical work, I shall also 
include a fourth -  Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT) (Linehan, 1993) and 
describe how I have used it in my group work with clients who have borderline 
personality difficulties. I will also describe how I have been able to integrate aspects 
of these different theories to help me to work more flexibly with clients whose 
difficulties make it hard for them to conform to classical models of therapy.
The humanistic/phenomenological approach
Humanistic/phenomenological approaches (Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1951) also 
emphasise the importance of the relationship and Rogers (1951) identified three 
therapist qualities which, he felt, were necessary to establish optimum conditions for 
therapy -  genuineness, empathy and unconditional positive regard. Genuineness refers 
to the therapist’s ability to engage with the client as a ‘real’ human being, instead of 
hiding behind a mask of professional impersonality. Empathic understanding, is 
concerned with the ability of the therapist to ‘enter the inner world of the client’ and, 
by a process of restatement and mirroring, to convey his/her understanding of the 
emotional significance of the material back to the client. The final ‘core condition’, 
unconditional positive regard, requires the therapist to accept the client as he or she is, 
in a non-judgemental way. This means that although he/she may have very different 
values or beliefs from the client, the therapist accepts that the client is a separate 
person who is equally entitled to their own world-view.
In my first year placement, while learning about this model of therapy, I had a 
supervisor whose primary therapeutic orientation was existential/phenomenological. 
As most of my previous experience and reading had centred around psychodynamic 
theory this provided me with a valuable opportunity to learn directly about 
phenomenological approaches to treatment. One of the first lessons that I learned was 
the importance of ‘bracketing’ (Spinelli, 1989) existing knowledge and assumptions. 
Spinelli (1989) writes that this rule urges us to “set aside our initial biases and 
prejudices of things, to suspend our expectations and assumptions .. so that we can
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focus on the primary data of our experience” (p. 17). This can be illustrated by the 
case of Mrs A.
Clinical illustrations of a humanistic/phenomenological approach 
Clinical Example 1
Mrs A was a 35 year-old lady who presented with a long history of anxiety and low 
self-esteem. Although she had had many years of psychological therapy (both in the 
NHS and privately) she continued to get very trapped by her anxiety and tended to 
need constant reassurance from health professionals. Her many psychological 
difficulties had led to an early diagnosis of ‘personality disorder’ and, when I read her 
case notes, I felt doubtful about her ability to use the ‘fifteen session’ model (which 
had been adopted as standard by the service) of therapy productively. I already had 
some knowledge of ‘personality disorder’, both from the literature and from my own 
experience as a member of staff in a unit which specialised in the treatment of people 
with ‘severe personality difficulties’, and I was not sure that this was, necessarily, the 
treatment of choice for her. Nevertheless Mrs A was, in some areas of her life, quite 
accomplished - for example she had substantial academic achievements. However her 
anxiety made it hard for her gain a job that was commensurate with her abilities and, 
consequently, she had become ‘trapped’ in a low paid, unskilled job.
Before the therapy commenced, my supervisor and I discussed the case in supervision. 
I expressed my concerns about the therapy, and about my ability to contain someone 
in once a week therapy who had previously had difficulties coping in a more intensive 
(and therefore potentially more supportive) therapeutic setting. My supervisor, 
although he did not minimise the difficulties, emphasised the importance of 
‘bracketing’ (Spinelli, 1989) any previous knowledge during the sessions to prevent 
bias, and explained that although the therapy might follow a predictable course, it was 
extremely important not to judge the issue prematurely.
My first session with Mrs A was not encouraging. At the end of the hour she told me, 
in an very distressed way, that she would not be able to contain herself over the next
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seven days without additional support from me and she asked if I could schedule her 
another appointment the following day. At this point I felt extremely anxious and my 
initial pessimism about the therapy resurfaced. Perhaps predictably, the session 
overran somewhat. Eventually, however, she was able to leave the room and 
gradually, over the course of the next six to eight weeks, she was able to adapt to the 
structure of the model and use the sessions to gain the support and understanding that 
she needed.
During our meetings I attempted to ‘stay with her’ by adopting a phenomenological 
approach to treatment, which focused on a description of her experiences rather than 
an analysis of them. I also tried to ‘bracket’ my knowledge to prevent my own ideas 
and assumptions from skewing the therapy. Mrs A’s ‘sedimented’ (Spinelli, 1989) or 
fixed view of herself as someone who could not cope with just about every aspect of 
life persisted for many weeks, but together we were able to identify instances when 
she had been able to cope effectively and slowly her confidence in her abilities grew.
This case illustration shows that by focusing primarily on the therapeutic relationship 
and paying careful attention to the inevitable strains and tears in the alliance (Safran 
and Muran, 2000), Mrs A and I were able to do some valuable work together. 
Towards the end of the therapy Mrs A had gained sufficient confidence to apply for 
and obtain a managerial job in a national telecommunications company. She was also 
able to report improvement in her personal relationships and, at her follow-up 
appointment three months later, she told me that one of the most important things 
about the therapy had been that I had ‘maintained the boundaries’ (for example, by not 
acceding to her request for more frequent sessions) -  something, apparently, that 
previous therapists had found difficult.
Clinical Example 2
Focusing on the therapeutic relationship/alliance was also extremely important for Mr 
R, a 40 year old man who presented with a history of anxiety which, he said, had 
become almost unmanageable in the months leading up to his referral. He described 
change as being difficult for him and said that he found it very hard to relax. During
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his initial contact with my supervisor, he appeared somewhat ambivalent about the 
prospect of therapy, even though he had seemed keen at his assessment appointment. 
Mr R agreed to attend a first appointment with me, but reserved the right to decide 
whether or not to continue after that.
During our first session together I was mindful of the importance of establishing a 
good working alliance with Mr R. He had opened the session by informing me that his 
employers had told him that if he wanted to come to therapy on a regular basis he 
would have to take half a day’s holiday for every session he attended. This sounded 
like a powerful disincentive to me and I knew that I had to make a ‘meaningful’ 
connection with him, in that session, otherwise I felt sure he would not return. During 
that first hour it seemed very important to Mr R that we should relate to one another 
on a ‘person to person’ or ‘real’ basis (Gelso and Carter, 1994). He told me that he 
was a keen model railway enthusiast and almost immediately I found myself telling 
him that I too was fascinated by these models, and that my son had built one in our 
attic.
I spent a lot of time thinking about this piece of self-disclosure, both in supervision 
and in my own personal therapy. I wondered why I had chosen to be self-revelatory at 
such an early stage in the therapy and whether by giving him the information I had 
somehow foreclosed on the therapeutic space. One explanation for this might be that 
my own analyst has, at times, told me details about her personal life and I have found 
this to be helpful. However, I am aware that by doing this I could have closed off a 
valuable avenue of enquiry. For example, Mr R had responded by telling me that most 
people laughed when he told them about his hobby. Perhaps he had a fantasy (or fear) 
that I too might laugh at him and we could have explored this. I could also have 
looked at it in dynamic terms -  was he bringing part of his child self directly in to the 
room (i.e. the boy who played with electric toys)?
Mr R stayed in therapy for the full fifteen sessions and he worked extremely hard. The 
therapeutic alliance seemed solid throughout and, when he finished, his scores on the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale were considerably reduced, to a ‘sub-clinical’ 
level. At his three-month follow-up appointment they had fallen still further and he
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looked much fitter. He informed me that he had virtually stopped drinking (he had 
been drinking heavily when he started therapy), was exercising regularly and that he 
had cut down his cigarette intake. This follow-up information was important because 
it provided a means of evaluating the therapy. Unfortunately it is not always possible 
to obtain outcome data in this way.
During the course of the therapy Mr R often talked about his model layout. He 
brought pictures of it to show me and somehow the topic would usually serve as a 
launch pad for other, more important discussions. I have no way of knowing what 
would have happened if I had refused to answer him in that first session. My suspicion 
is that if I had interpreted it, or adopted a stereotypically ‘blank screen’ approach he 
would not have returned the following week. Looking back on that first year of 
training I think that with Mr R, perhaps more than with any other patient, I was able 
simply ‘to be with him’ during the therapy, in the Rogerian sense. For Mr R it would 
appear that this was ‘the treatment of choice’.
However not everyone is able to use such an unstructured approach and I can think of 
two clients who I saw during my first year, who might, with the benefit of hindsight, 
have gained more from a cognitive behavioural approach.
The Psychodynamic Approach
During my second year, I worked in the psychotherapy department of a District 
General Hospital. I saw individuals on a long-term basis (for up to twelve months) and 
I also co-facilitated a psycho dynamic psychotherapy group. Although many people 
tend to think of psychodynamic theory as a unified ‘metatheory’ it is, in fact, more a 
collection of theories, with a ‘family resemblance’ (cf. Rosch, 1973) to one another, 
based upon the writings of Freud. In spite of this there are certain features which can 
be found across the different branches of the model: 1) the role of unconscious mental 
processes in the development of intrapsychic conflict and disturbance 2) an
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acceptance of the universality of transference/countertransference 1 phenomena and 3) 
that anxiety will give rise to the manifestation of defences and resistances on the part 
of the client, which can then be interpreted by the therapist and worked through in the 
therapy (Freud 1973, 1974; Malan, 1992).
Although I have found many Freudian concepts to be extremely useful in my clinical 
work, I do have concerns about the fact that classical theory often appears to neglect 
the role of environmental events, both in ‘normal’ development and in the 
development of psychological difficulties. An approach which I feel, intuitively, is 
closer to humanistic theories, and which does not neglect the role of the environment, 
is Kohut’s (1971, 1977, 1984) self-psychology.
Like Winnicott (1958) before him, Kohut sees the ‘self as a self ‘in relation to other 
selves’. Kohut (1984) proposes that the ‘self is a tri-partite structure, which develops 
from the empathic attunement of the parents to the infant’s psychological needs. He 
emphasises the importance of ‘mirroring’ (i.e. being confirmed, admired and 
understood) for the development of self-esteem, and ‘idealising’ and ‘kinship’ 2 
relationships for the creation of security in later life. According to this theory 
grandiose/exhibitionistic needs are fulfilled by parental pleasure in the ‘specialness’ of 
the child. But if these conditions are not met during childhood, the individual will 
search throughout life for substitute ‘self-objects’ 3 in an attempt to remedy the 
deficits.
Self-psychology was originally developed to meet the needs of a sub-group of 
‘narcissistic’ patients who did not seem able to adjust to, or use, traditional approaches 
to psychoanalytic therapy. However, recently it has been applied more widely and 
aspects of the theory have been adopted by clinicians of all schools (Kahn, 1991). 
When I came to formulate the problems of my own clients, I found that, often, many 
of their difficulties could be conceptualised in terms of self-psychology.
1 Transference is the repetition o f  past conflicts with significant others, such that thoughts, feelings, attitudes, and behaviors 
belonging rightfully in those earlier relationships are displaced onto the therapist; and countertransference is the therapist’s 
transference to the client’s material, both to the transference and nontransference communications by the client. Gelso and Carter 
(1994, p.297).
2 The Idealising need involves merging with an ‘idealised other’. The kinship need involves feeling kinship with a ‘similar other’.
3 Self-objects are people who can fulfil early narcissistic needs either by mirroring the child’s ‘greatness’ or by carrying his/her 
idealisation (Mollon, 1994).
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Clinical examples illustrating disturbances in the relation of self to self-object
Clinical Example 1
For example, in my first year I worked with a 45-year-old artist -  Ms L. who grew up 
in a situation where, it would seem, it was extremely difficult for her to get her 
psychological needs met. During the sessions she would bring me photographs of her 
work to study and we spent much of our time discussing her paintings and what they 
meant to her.
One day it struck me just how much time we were using in this way and I decided to 
change tack. I put the album aside and began to focus on her. The reaction was 
immediate. She seemed to withdraw and become unavailable to me. I drew her 
attention to this and eventually she revealed that it had felt like a rejection -  as though 
I was rejecting her. Thinking about this afterwards in supervision, I realised that by 
looking at and admiring her pictures, I had, in some very basic way, be looking at and 
admiring her. Thus I had, although I did not realise it at the time, been providing her 
with a ‘self-object’ experience -  i.e. mirroring her and building her sense of self worth 
by allowing her to feel ‘special’. It could be that when I stopped doing this it had felt 
to her like a narcissistic injury, making her feel ashamed of her need to be admired 
and leading to the impulse of withdrawal (i.e. a defence).
Clinical Example 2
Another woman who I saw in my second year, Mrs R, had similar difficulties, 
although in this case object relations theory (Hinshelwood, 1994) provided an 
additional lens through which to view her problems. She was referred for 
psychotherapy because she was experiencing depressive symptoms following the birth 
of her daughter. The clinician who assessed her felt that many of her problems 
stemmed from the fact that her mother had died when she was very young. Finding 
himself alone with five children to care for, Mrs R’s father did not appear to be able to 
meet the psychological needs of his 4-year-old daughter. It could be that she may not
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have been able to develop a reliable ‘maternal’ object (Hinshelwood, p. 59-77) to 
provide her with the support and sustenance needed to care, not just for herself, but 
also for her child. It also seems likely that the birth of her daughter had brought to the 
surface painful feelings of need, abandonment and loss that had become split off from 
the competent ‘caretaker’ self (Winnicott, 1960, p. 150) which she had developed 
following the death of her mother.
Although in the early months the sessions were very painful for Mrs R, she was able 
to use the therapy to explore her feelings and we were able to make some important 
links between her current circumstances and her early childhood loss. During the ten 
months of treatment she was able to work through some of her unresolved feelings of 
grief concerning her mother’s death, and at the end she reported that she understood 
her emotional reactions better and, consequently, was able to cope with them more 
effectively. For my part, in the countertransference, I often felt as though I was 
providing Mrs R with a ‘developmentally-needed relationship’ (Clarkson, 1995). In 
many ways Clarkson’s model dovetails with Kohut’s, which also informed my work 
with this client (i.e. mirroring her attempts to ‘mother’ her daughter and validating her 
experiences).
I am, however, not convinced that psychodynamic therapy is the treatment of choice 
for all clients. For example, during my second year I saw another woman, Ms Q, who 
had also lost her mother early in life. She came to therapy with a number of 
difficulties but an important one, which felt difficult to address within the confines of 
this model, related to concerns about her sexual identity. Milton (2000) suggests that 
existential psychotherapy can be useful for lesbian and gay clients and again, with the 
benefit of hindsight, I now believe that this would have been a more helpful and a 
more ‘affirmative’ approach for Ms Q.
Cognitive-Behaviour Therapy
In my third year I was employed in a Specialist Psychology Service (SPS) which had 
two teams: a forensic team (which received referrals from psychiatrists, the probation
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service and the courts) and a learning disabilities team. Last year, as part of a joint 
therapies initiative, the SPS joined forces with the psychotherapy department to set up 
a pilot ‘Personality Disorder Service’. The primary therapeutic model used in the 
specialist psychology service is Cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT) but I also worked 
integratively.
A central principle of the cognitive-behavioural framework is that “thoughts, 
emotions, behaviours and physiology are part of a unified system. A change in any 
one part will be accompanied by changes in other parts” (Curwen, Palmer and 
Ruddell, 2000, p. 8). In this model the therapist actively collaborates with the client to 
help them solve their difficulties. An important task of therapy is to identify ‘thinking 
errors’ (i.e. unhelpful ways of thinking about oneself and the world, such as 
‘catastrophizing’ and ‘black and white thinking’), which can result in ‘negative 
automatic thoughts’ (thoughts and images which occur involuntarily) (Beck and 
Greenberg, 1974; Curwen et al. 2000).
As the therapy progresses the therapist helps the client to examine the ‘core beliefs’ or 
‘schema’ (Markus, 1977) which underpin automatic thoughts. Core beliefs are 
fundamental opinions about oneself and/or the world -  ‘I am unlovable’ would be a 
characteristic example. According to cognitive theorists these structures are laid down 
early in life and are thus, extremely resistant to change. In this model much of the 
work is done outside of the therapy in the form of ‘homework tasks’ (for example, 
diary cards and daily thought records). Clients are also encouraged to ‘test’ the reality 
of their thoughts and feelings and collect evidence in the form of behavioural 
experiments.
Because I worked in a specialist service setting many of my clients were ‘atypical’. 
For example some had a history of offending behaviour, while others were being 
cared for by the forensic psychology team because of the risk that they represented 
(either to themselves or to other people). I was also involved in a pilot project offering 
treatment to people with borderline personality difficulties. In addition I saw one 
woman with learning difficulties. Many of these clients could not work within a
78
classical CBT framework and I found that I needed to adapt my approach according to 
the abilities of the client and the demands of the situation.
Clinical illustration of an integrative approach with a client who has learning 
difficulties
Ms V, was a 24-year-old woman, who was referred to the department with depressive 
symptoms and difficulties with anger management. She had borderline learning 
difficulties and had also suffered for most of her life from severe epilepsy. Never 
having worked with this client group before I felt very deskilled initially. However I 
was encourage by the research literature (Kroese, 1998; Lindsay, Howells and 
Pitcaithly, 1993) which suggested that people with learning difficulties could benefit 
from a CBT approach, albeit with some modifications.
Although the theoretical framework used to conceptualise Ms V’s problems was 
predominantly cognitive-behavioural, existential/phenomenological (Spinelli, 1989) 
thinking also informed my practice with this client. Corrie and Milton (2000) have 
argued that it is possible to use both models to enrich practice and suggest that “that 
there is a strong case for developing a relationship between existential and cognitive 
models at both a theoretical and a therapeutic level” (p. 7). Over the weeks I found 
that Ms V responded to a ‘client centred’ approach and she began to relax and talk 
about her difficulties.
Nevertheless it was still very hard to do traditional ‘CBT type’ tasks with her and I 
began to feel quite ‘disabled’ as a therapist. Talking about this in my own therapy and 
in supervision I began to see that some kind of parallel process was operating. In 
terms of her learning abilities Ms V is considered by some to be ‘disabled’ but then, in 
the sessions (as a therapist) so was I. Thus, I was experiencing, in a very direct way, 
what ‘being in the world’ is like for her. My work with Ms V (as with the majority of 
my clients in the specialist psychology services) was, essentially integrative, and I am 
aware that in (and out) of sessions, I frequently conceptualised psychological 
processes both in psychodynamic and CBT terms.
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Clinical illustration of a cognitive-behavioural approach to anger management
My work with Mr W, a 30-year-old technical engineer, was much more 
straightforward. Referred initially by the Crown Prosecution Service for a 
psychological assessment because he had assaulted a policeman, I agreed to take him 
on for a (voluntary - it was not a condition of the court) six session course of anger 
management. Novaco’s (1978) approach uses the ‘ABC’ model (A = activating event, 
B = belief [cognition] C = consequences) to teach clients about ‘normal’ cognitive 
processes, and the relationship between cognitive factors, physiological arousal and 
behavioural reactions is underlined by both in session and extra-session experiments. 
The core components of the therapy are cognitive restructuring, arousal reduction and 
behavioural skills training (Novaco, 1978).
Prior to commencing the therapy I was aware that I felt quite anxious. I wondered 
what would happen if Mr W became angry with me. Would he assault me too? 
However when we met I felt reassured by the fact that Mr W seemed very keen to 
engage with the therapy. In the first session I spent some time teaching Mr W about 
the CBT model and acquainting him with his homework tasks. We discussed the 
importance of his keeping an anger diary and, in subsequent sessions, Mr W brought 
examples of situations which had been difficult for him, and we would study how he 
had handled them and explore ways of doing things differently in the fixture. Mr W 
responded well to this approach and he reported a significant improvement in his 
ability to control his anger. At the end of therapy he also said that he was finding work 
less stressful and that his relationship with his partner (which had been strained 
following his arrest and trial for assault) had improved.
Dialectical Behaviour Therapy
Linehan’s (1993) Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) is an integrative approach to 
the treatment of people with borderline personality difficulties, which places the 
relationship between client and therapist at the very heart of the treatment process 
(Linehan, 1993). Using concepts from a variety of models (psychodynamic, cognitive-
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behavioural, humanistic, eastern philosophy) Linehan argues that clients with 
borderline difficulties often find ‘dialectical’ thinking extremely difficult. The 
approach, therefore, is carefully structured to help clients to think in a less ‘black and 
white’ way and learn new strategies for coping with the very real psychological pain 
that many clients experience on a daily basis. An important point to note about this 
approach is that it has been empirically validated (Linehan, Armstrong, Suarez, 
Allmon and Heard 1991; Linehan, Heard and Armstrong, 1993) and the findings have 
been replicated in other treatment settings (Bohus, Haaf, Stiglmayr, Pohl, Bohme and 
Linehan, 2000; Low, Jones, Duggan, Power and MacLeod, 2001).
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Clinical illustration from a dialectical behaviour therapy skills training group
During my third year of training I co-led a DBT skills group with a clinical 
psychologist. This was challenging because the model requires that therapists are 
much more ‘open’ (i.e. more transparent) and available to their clients. It is not 
possible to discuss the rationale for this here, but it meant that on ‘skills training days’ 
my colleague and I often used to spend an extra 30 minutes or so offering support and 
skills ‘coaching’ to clients (in addition to the two and a half hours already spent with 
the group during the session and coffee break). In many ways it felt as though DBT 
demands an ‘even greater than usual’ commitment on the part of the therapist, and the 
fact that the model encourages therapists (within clearly defined limits) to share 
personal experiences and difficulties with clients felt quite exposing at times.
Another challenge for us as co-leaders was that often group members did not want to 
stay focused on the task of the group (i.e. skills training). Frequently individuals 
would try to turn the session into an unstructured ‘psychotherapy’ group and it could 
be quite difficult, if you were the one leading that particular skills training module, to 
keep the group task orientated. Often in DBT the primary skills trainer becomes ‘the 
bad guy’ (Linehan, 1993) and a target for negative group projections, and the second 
therapist is seen as ‘the good guy’. However this situation is invariably reversed when 
the co-facilitators swap roles. Unlike some cognitive-behaviour theorists (Linehan has 
called the main DBT text ‘Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment of Borderline Personality
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Disorder) Linehan (1993) does pay attention to transference/countertransference 
issues. Indeed one of the reasons that she gives for having two therapists in the group 
is so that the therapist who is not leading can ‘cheerlead’ and support the leader who is 
being perceived as the ‘bad guy’.
Clearly group processes do occur in psycho-educational groups (even though some 
therapists do not, necessarily, accept this) and they must be attended to. A difficult 
situation for me arose one day when my colleague (who had been leading this 
particular module) became ill and had to miss a session. Normally we had an assistant 
psychologist sitting in on the group observing, so it was decided that I would take over 
the teaching and he would assume the support role.
Prior to the group I felt slightly anxious. I had not had adequate time to prepare for the 
session and I felt sure that certain members of the group would be angry with me 
because of the unexpected change in leadership. In fact I was given a relatively easy 
time during the session. This may have been because the group, feeling unsettled 
about my colleague being away, did not want to do anything to upset me (in case I 
disappeared too). Instead, they turned their attentions to the assistant psychologist and 
attacked him. It felt very difficult for me to manage this situation because I felt that I 
should be protecting my (junior) colleague but I was also aware that I was the group 
therapist and needed to attend to what was going on for my clients.
In the end I decided to say something like “I wonder whether people are feeling a bit 
unsettled today because X is not here, when they were expecting her to be. Perhaps, 
under the circumstances, it feels hard to criticise me, so you are expressing your angry 
feelings towards Y instead”. Although members of the group denied this, nevertheless, 
the tension was relieved, which made me think that the interpretation had been 
correct. Although it would not normally be appropriate to make this kind of 
intervention during the teaching part of a DBT skills training group, Linehan (1993) 
does leave space in these sessions for process issues to be discussed.
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Conclusion
In this paper I have tried to present an account of the way I that use theory and 
research evidence to inform my clinical practice. I have used case material to illustrate 
how I apply different models of therapy, sometimes in a classical manner, at other 
times modifying certain techniques when the needs of the client require that I do so.
In my practice as a counselling psychologist I try to adhere to the ethical standards, 
values and ethos of the profession. For example, by engaging in reflexive practice, 
valuing and respecting the individual (regardless of their race, colour, creed or sexual 
orientation) and paying particular attention to the therapeutic relationship. I am 
acutely aware that a clinical paper such as this can only provide the reader with a 
‘snapshot’ of my work and that it is almost impossible to convey the richness of some 
of the therapies contained in this dossier. I only hope that I have managed to preserve 
the fundamental truths of my client’s stories, and also to convey the admiration that I 
have for my clients, and their struggles to come to terms with painful feelings and 
difficult life events.
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Introduction to the Research Dossier
This dossier consists of a literature review and two pieces of original research. The 
literature review examines four separate strands of the psychological literature relating 
to personality disorder: research into the prevalence, aetiology and clinical 
manifestations of personality disorder (PD); evidence for the efficacy of the 
therapeutic community approach to the treatment of PD; studies relating to the process 
of therapy in TCs; and the origins of attachment theory and its relevance to the clinical 
treatment of personality disorders.
The second paper examines newspaper constructions of ‘dangerous
psychopathologies’ following the conviction of Michael Stone for the murders of Lin 
and Megan Russell.
The third paper is entitled ‘Social Representations of Personality Disorder: 
Professional and Lay Understandings’ and examines professional and lay perspectives 
of ‘personality’ and ‘personality disorder’.
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Reinterpreting Therapeutic Community Treatment In Terms Of
Attachment Theory
Abstract
People diagnosed with ‘personality disorders’ (PD) are often viewed as problem 
patients by clinicians and, traditionally, psychotherapeutic treatment for this client 
group has been regarded with extreme pessimism. However there is now a significant 
amount of research evidence that demonstrates the efficacy of the Therapeutic 
Community (TC) approach for people with personality difficulties, although it has 
proved difficult to identify core TC therapeutic mechanisms empirically. In the 
contemporary clinical literature there has been a renewed emphasis on attachment 
theory and, recently, it has been suggested that attachment is also a key feature of the 
therapeutic community approach. This paper examines the relevance of attachment 
theory to the therapeutic community treatment of PD; existing research is reviewed, 
methodological limitations in published studies are highlighted and implications for 
future research are discussed.
Key words: attachment, personality disorders, therapeutic communities.
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INTRODUCTION
In his 1994 “Review of Services for Mentally Disordered Offenders” Reed concluded 
that the therapeutic community approach provided the “most encouraging results of 
any form of treatment” for people with personality disorder (Reed, 1994). Since this 
report was published empirical research has reinforced this conclusion and, recently, 
central funding has been approved for the development of two new national treatment 
centres.
It is not always clear from the literature, however, precisely what the term therapeutic 
community means, as different settings, often with very different treatment regimes, 
call themselves therapeutic communities. Main (1946) used the term initially to 
describe one aspect of the changes that were occurring in institutional psychiatry in 
the wake of the Second World War. Founded upon principles of democracy and 
collaboration, the therapeutic community represented a shift in hospital psychiatry 
away from the authoritarian style of the Victorian and inter-war years, towards a more 
‘liberal, humane and participative kind of culture’ (Millard, 1989).
Whiteley and Gordon (1979, p. 105) define the therapeutic community as ‘A specific, 
specialised treatment process utilising the psychological and sociological phenomena 
inherent in the large, circumscribed and residential group.’ Henderson Hospital,1 
Maxwell Jones’ pioneering unit, is frequently cited as the prototypical TC (Roberts, 
1997). However many non-residential units also call themselves TCs, as do those 
which offer individual treatment in addition to group work. This has led some 
theorists to draw a distinction between ‘a therapeutic community approach’ and the 
therapeutic community ‘proper’ (Clark, 1965). Roberts (1997) has argued that it may 
be more useful to view therapeutic community as a generic term, which can be given 
an additional modifier to indicate a particular client group (p. 6). This would mean 
that any unit (residential or day) which uses the community, as the primary therapeutic 
instrument could be included in the classification.
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This pragmatic approach has been adopted by the Association of Therapeutic 
Communities,11 but it is clear that within the association there are very real differences 
between groups, not only in the way clinicians work but also in patients’ levels of 
functioning.
Therapeutic Community Treatment for Personality Disorder
Therapeutic community treatment has been used for a variety of client groups. For 
example, some communities provide treatment for people suffering clinical disorders, 
such as schizophrenia, while others specialise in the rehabilitation of drug addicts 
(Millard and Oakley, 1994; Wexler, 1995). There are also communities, run on 
psycho-educational lines, which provide care for adults with learning difficulties 
(Manning, 1989, p.42). However, because most of the TC Outcome research relates to 
the treatment of people with personality disorders, this review will focus, mainly, 
upon the treatment of this client group. It will also consider the relevance of Bowlby’s 
(1969, 1973, 1980) theory of attachment for contemporary therapeutic community 
practice.
Definition of personality disorder
The American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV, 1994) defines personality disorder 
as an “Enduring pattern of behaviour that deviates markedly from the expectations of 
the individual’s culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or 
early adulthood, is stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment.” (APA, 1994, 
p. 629).
However critics have suggested that the two main classificatory systems, which are 
currently used for the diagnosis of personality disorders (ICD10, WHO, 1992; DSM- 
IV, APA, 1994) are fundamentally flawed (Costello, 1996; Pilgrim, 2000; Widiger, 
1991; 1992). It has been argued that classification can be stigmatising (Castillo and 
Allen, 2000) and that anyway, because there is often an overlap between personality
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disorder subtypes (Dolan, Evans and Norton, 1995; Norton, 1996; Tyrer, Seivewright, 
Ferguson, Murphy, Darling, Brothwell, Kingdon and Johnson, 1990), it can be 
extremely difficult to classify someone with complex problems in a meaningful way. 
For clarity, throughout this review, DSM (1994) diagnostic categories will be used. 
However, very real concerns remain about the validity and utility of the standard 
diagnostic systems.
Clinical presentation of personality disorder
People with moderate to severe personality disorders are frequently considered to be 
untreatable because their characteristic way of expressing psychological distress is 
often via self-destructive or anti-social behaviour. Many present with multi-impulsive 
and self-damaging behaviours (Lacey and Evans, 1986), such as cutting, substance 
misuse, eating disorders and sexual disinhibition. Symptoms of anxiety and/or 
depression may also be present. Norton (1992) suggests that people with personality 
difficulties often find it extremely difficult to regulate their internal states. Because of 
their poor tolerance of anxiety and low self-esteem many find it difficult to ask for 
help in an appropriate manner and, frequently, they employ maladaptive strategies in 
an attempt to deal with psychic pain.
These difficulties are similar to those found in individuals who have poor attachment 
histories. This will be considered in more detail below.
Aetiology
It seems likely that many different factors are involved in the development of 
personality disorders (Coid, 1995). The emotional lability and impulsivity, frequently 
observed in people with personality difficulties, has led some theorists to suggest that 
affected individuals may have an inherent biological vulnerability (Spoont, 1996). 
Others have highlighted the effects of early environmental influences (Paris, 1993; 
Silverman and Ollendick 1999).
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Clinicians (for example Campling, 1996; Norton, 1996; Whiteley, 1994) have also 
reported that that the formative years of many individuals with severe personality 
difficulties are often characterised by insecure (Ainsworth and Wittig, 1979) or 
disorganised attachments (Main and Solomon, 1986; 1990). In addition Spoont (1996) 
has suggested that child abuse occurs more frequently in families where attachment is 
compromised and that the trauma is compounded by the absence of a reliable figure to 
turn to for comfort.
From this brief overview some of the difficulties involved in the investigation of PD 
will have become apparent. Leaving aside the fact we still do not know whether there 
are genuine boundaries between normality and abnormality, the lack of agreement 
over the nosology and phenomenology of personality disorders, coupled with the 
‘confusion’ of methodologies employed by researchers (Costello, 1996: Dolan, 1995), 
makes the assessment of PD problematic.
Evaluation of therapeutic community treatment for personality disorder 
Outcome Studies
Since the early 1960s a great deal of evaluative research has been conducted in British 
TCs with the aim of establishing the legitimacy of the therapeutic community model 
of treatment within the National Health and the Prison Services. Although some of the 
early research suffered from methodological flaws (such as poorly defined outcome 
criteria and small samples), recent studies suggest that therapeutic community 
treatment can be effective for people with severe personality difficulties.
For example, Chiesa, Iacoponi and Morris (1996) compared pre and post-treatment 
samples of patients admitted to the Cassel Hospital111 and they reported a significant 
reduction in medical, surgical and psychiatric service usage in the post-treatment 
group in the year following their discharge from the unit (p<.01). In a similar study 
Davies and Campling (1996) looked at psychiatric service usage in a consecutive 
sample of adult admissions to Francis Dixon Lodgelv and their analysis of the data
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revealed a highly significant reduction in the utilisation of psychiatric services post 
treatment (p<.003).
Cost-offsetv following therapeutic community treatment has also been studied. Dolan 
and her colleagues (Dolan, Warren, Menzies and Norton, 1996) examined the 
psychiatric and prison service usage of a cohort of Henderson patients in the year 
leading up to their admission to the unit and in the year following their discharge. 
Dolan et al. report a substantial saving to the exchequer of £12.658 per patient post 
treatment. On the basis of this, they argue persuasively that any short-term financial 
savings that may be gained by delaying treatment for people with PD are, frequently, 
outweighed by the longer-term costs of increased service usage.
One of the difficulties facing researchers studying outcomes of therapeutic community 
treatment has been the impossibility of meeting the medical ‘gold standard’ of 
randomised controlled trials (RCTs). In the past clinicians have argued that to 
withhold psychotherapeutic treatment for research purposes would be (at the very 
least) unethical. However the introduction of the internal market in the NHS in 1991 
and the concomitant changes in funding provided an unforeseen research opportunity. 
Patients who were referred for treatment but whose local health authority would not 
fund extra contractual referrals (ECRs) could act as a control group. Dolan, Warren 
and Norton (1996) compared a sample of 44 unfunded ECRs with 86 patients treated 
at Henderson Hospital and they found that the treated group fared much better than the 
non-treated controls.
Dolan et al. (1996) report that at the one year follow-up “significant fewer of the 
treated group had been re-admitted as inpatients (16.3 per cent versus 31.8 per cent) or 
re-offended (7 per cent versus 29.5 per cent)”. In addition when the figures were 
analysed together, overall, 19.8 per cent of the treatment group had either been re­
admitted or had re-offended, compared with 54.5 per cent of the control group
(p<.001).
One could argue that the use of unfunded ECRs as a control group might have acted as 
a confounding variable in this study. For example, it could be hypothesised that the
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refusal of funding might have been experienced as a form of rejection. Individuals in 
the control group might have felt resentful about the lost opportunity and their 
outcome scores may actually have been lower than they would have been if they had 
not been assessed for the Henderson treatment. Nevertheless these figures are the best 
comparative indicators available (to date) for the efficacy of the therapeutic 
community model of treatment for PD.
In addition to the studies, which report reductions in service usage, researchers have 
also demonstrated a decrease in neurotic symptomatology following TC treatment 
(Dolan, Evans and Wilson, 1992), and changes in borderline symptoms (Dolan, 
Warren and Norton, 1996). Other studies have shown improvements in self-esteem 
and a decline in rule breaking (Norris, 1985), and a decrease in subjective levels of 
distress due to psychological symptoms (Dolan, Wilson and Evans, 1992).
In the prison service researchers have examined both improvements in relevant 
personality characteristics and reconviction rates (Cullen, 1994; Genders and Player, 
1995; Gunn, Robertson and Dell, 1978; Miller, 1982; Newton, 1973; Newton, 1996; 
Newton and Thornton, 1994). A recently reported outcome study (Marshall, 1997) 
conducted at Grendon Prisonvl found that reconviction rates were lower for prisoners 
who had gone to Grendon than for those who had applied to go there but had not been 
selected for treatment.
Although all of the studies reported above have methodological flaws, taken together 
they suggest that the therapeutic community model of treatment can be effective for 
people with severe personality disorders. Lees and her colleagues (1999) report the 
results of a meta-analysis of TC outcome studies commissioned by the High Security 
Psychiatric Services Commissioning Board. They conclude that “There is 
accumulating evidence .. of the effectiveness and particular suitability of the 
therapeutic community model to the treatment of personality disorder, and 
particularly severe personality disorder” (Lees, Manning and Rawlings, 1999, p.4).
So, in brief, TCs work quite effectively -  but why and how do they work?
Community Characteristics
Rapoport (1960), in his pioneering study of Henderson Hospital Community as 
Doctor, identified four themes which, he believed characterised the philosophy of the 
unit: ‘communalism\ ‘democratisation’, ‘reality confrontation’ and ‘permissiveness’. 
Democratisation referred to the view that every member of the community should 
have an equal say in decision making. Permissiveness related to the wide range of 
behaviour that is tolerated within the community. Reality Confrontation was 
expressed in the view that residents within the community should be continuously 
presented with the way their behaviour affects others. Communalism referred to the 
intimate structure of the community where all interaction is potential material for 
therapy. Rapoport developed a questionnaire designed to measure the extent to which 
these themes are manifested within staff and patient values and, although there is no 
record of any psychometric evaluation of this measure, Rapoport’s four ‘articles of 
faith’ (Haigh, 1997) have become axiomatic within the therapeutic community 
movement.
Other authors have also searched for the essential therapeutic mechanisms of the TC 
and certain themes continually re-emerge. For example Kennard (1989) suggests that 
the ‘Therapeutic Impulse’ consists of certain key features, which act as a catalyst to 
the therapy. These features include two of Rapoport’s (1960) original themes: 
democracy and permissiveness. Following Bloch (1979), Whiteley and Collis (1987) 
inferred more discrete curative factors from each of the four themes. These related to 
Yalom’s group factors (Yalom; 1975) and they were found to be meaningful for both 
residents and staff at Henderson Hospital when respondents were asked to describe 
their most important treatment event.
Birch, Dunstan and Warren (1999) and Dunstan and Birch (in press), report on a 
multi-site study, which attempted to clarify some of these issues. Using a values 
questionnaire that incorporated the fourteen statements from Rapoport’s (1960) 
original instrument, plus forty-four additional items from an exploratory study by 
Suddards and Wilks (1996), the researchers surveyed six different therapeutic 
communities (in both secure and non-secure service settings). The data they obtained
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did not provide empirical support for the existence of the four themes. However the 
authors highlight a number of methodological issues which they say limit the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the study and they suggest that the themes remain 
useful descriptors of the philosophy underlying therapeutic practice in TCs (Birch et 
al. 1999).
The Relevance of Attachment Theory for Contemporary Therapeutic 
Community Practice
More recently Haigh (1997) proposed a development model with five distinct stages: 
attachment, containment, communication, involvement and agency. Interestingly he 
has since suggested that they can all be subsumed under the single descriptor of 
attachment (personal communication, 1999).
The idea that Bowlby’s (1969, 1973, 1980) theory of attachment might be central to 
the therapeutic process has been raised by clinicians working in many different areas 
of psychology and psychiatry. Holmes (1993, 1995) has written extensively on this 
topic as have Fonagy and his colleagues (e.g. Fonagy, Leigh, Steele, Steele, Kennedy, 
Mattoon, Target and Gerber 1996; Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Leigh, Kennedy, Mattoon 
and Target, 1995; Fonagy, Target, Steele, Steele, Leigh, Levinson, and Kennedy, 
1997).
In terms of theory building and the generation of novel research, the concept of 
attachment has been enormously influential. Lopez (1995) describes it as a 
‘metaperspective1 and there is now a substantial literature relating to the different 
kinds of attachments, which occur across the life cycle. Furthermore the theory has 
been developed not just by clinicians but also by developmentalists and social 
psychologists.
There is an elegant simplicity about Bowlby’s original thesis. In his early writings 
(Bowlby, 1958, 1960a, 1960b, 1969, 1973), borrowing concepts from ethology, 
Bowlby proposed that infant/mother bond was a hard-wired mechanism, which had
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evolved in the ancestral environment to promote the safety and survival of the 
immature infant. According to the theory feelings of attachment ensured that the 
infant remained in very close proximity to its mother and would, therefore, be safe 
from predation. In addition he claimed that the attachment between mother and infant 
was crucial to the physical and psychological well being of the child.
Bowlby believed that children internalise their primary attachment relationship as a 
‘working’ or ‘mental model’, (Bowlby, 1980) which is then used as a template for 
subsequent relationships. If this bond is not ‘good enough’ and the infant is insecurely 
attached, the child will grow up with a negative view of both itself and the world, and 
its relationships will be impoverished (Bowlby 1958, 1960a, 1960b). Bowlby 
described attachment as ‘monotropic’V11 and in his early writing he seemed to suggest 
that if the mother/infant bond was absent (privation) or if it was seriously disrupted or 
destroyed (deprivation), the effect on the child’s physical, behavioural, intellectual, 
and psychological development would be severe and irreversible.
Bowlby’s original theory has been extended by the research work of Ainsworth and 
her colleagues. Ainsworth et al. (Ainsworth and Wittig, 1969; Ainsworth, Bell and 
Stayton, 1971) designed an experimental situation to assess the attachment status of 
12-month-old infants. The Strange Situation (as it came to be called) involved testing 
the reactions of the infants in an unfamiliar environment (The Strange Situation) to an 
unexpected event (meeting a stranger and being left alone by their mother for a few 
minutes in the company of the experimenter).
Initially they identified three distinct types: Type A - Anxious-avoidant, Type B - 
Securely attached and Type C - Anxious-resistant/ambivalent. More recently a fourth 
type of attachment style has been identified Type D - which was labelled 
Disorganised-disoriented (Main and Soloman, 1986). Infants in this group had been 
difficult to classify in the Strange Situation using Ainsworth et al’s (1969, 1971) 
original ABC categorisations. And there is now an accumulation of research evidence, 
which suggests that Type D infants may be more profoundly disturbed than insecurely 
attached infants who had been classified as Types A and C. It is interesting to note 
that a significant proportion of individuals with severe personality disorders referred
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to specialist units for therapeutic community treatment fall into this category (Norton, 
1996).
In the last fifteen years or so researchers have used Ainsworth et al’s (Ainsworth and 
Wittig, 1969; Ainsworth, Bell and Stayton, 1971) seminal work to inform theorising 
about adult attachments. Hazan and Shaver (1987) identified three adult attachment 
styles, which correspond broadly to the three categories of infant attachment described 
by Ainsworth and her colleagues in their write-up of the Infant Strange Situation 
Experiment (Ainsworth and Wittig, 1969; Ainsworth, Bell and Stayton, 1971). Their 
analysis of romantic relationships in terms of attachment theory has been extremely 
fruitful and there is now a considerable literature on the nature of adult relationships.
Attachment in Young Adults
Another area which has attracted research interest is that of attachment styles in young 
adults (for example Kobak and Sceery, 1988; Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991). 
Kobak and Sceery (1988) studied affect regulation and representations of self and 
other in a group of first year college students. Using the Adult Attachment Interview 
(Main and Goldwyn, 1985-1994) vm they assessed the attachment styles of the 
students and related their findings to Bowlby’s (1980) concept of the internal working 
models. Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991) also studied the attachment profiles of 
young adults but they employed a new four-category model, which, they believe, is a 
logical extension of Bowlby’s (1980) theorising, in that it provides for all possible 
combinations of an internalised image of self and others. However although both these 
studies look at relationships with peers, the attachment process is still conceptualised 
as a relationship between individuals (i.e. at an interpersonal level) rather than a 
relationship between the individual and a group.
Peer groups have long been identified as important influences in the lives of 
adolescents and young adults (Greca and Prinstein, 1999), but very little has been 
written specifically about peer group attachment. For example a computer literature 
search on the PsycLIT database did not find a single article about the topic. This is
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curious when one considers how central peer group identifications are in the formative 
teenage years. This topic will be considered in more detail below.
Criticisms of Attachment Theory
Over the years a number of researchers have questioned the validity of Bowlby’s 
conclusions about the consequences of privation and deprivation, pointing out that in 
some cases early hardship actually seems to ‘steel’ the child (Rutter, 1981; 1985). 
Furthermore social constructionist writers have criticised the whole concept, arguing 
that much of the theorising about attachment has been artificially shaped by societal 
attitudes and expectations (Burman, 1994).
Critics of attachment theory have cited a range of research studies, which reveal 
different types of attachment across the life cycle. For example researchers have 
demonstrated that children can have different attachment styles with each parent 
(Main and Weston, 1982). It has also been shown they can form multiple attachments 
to siblings and peers (Bartholomew and Horowitz, 1991; Freud and Dann, 1951; 
Stewart, 1983; Steward and Marvin, 1984). Furthermore evidence has been presented 
which suggests that attachment styles can be shaped by cultural expectations (van 
Ijzendoom and Kroonenberg, 1988).
For example studies, which have looked at infants raised in Kibbutzim, suggest that 
patterns of attachment in (some) Israeli infants deviate from ‘normative’ American 
samples (Sagi, Lamb, Lewkowicz, Shoham, Dvir and Estes, 1985; Sagi, van 
Ijzendoom, Aviezer, and Donnell 1995). Differences have also been found in German 
and Japanese samples (Grossman, Grossman, Spangler, Suess and Unzer, 1985; 
Miyake, Chen and Campos, 1985; Takahashi, 1990).
However these results need to be interpreted with caution as some difficulties have 
been identified with aspects of the methodology. For example van Ijzendoom and 
Kroonenberg (1988) point out that the sample sizes in many attachment studies tend to 
be small and, therefore, sampling error cannot be mled out. Furthermore van 
Ijzendoom and Kroonenberg’s (1988) meta-analysis showed that, in a number of
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instances, there was greater variation between samples within countries than between 
countries. The findings to date, therefore, do not provide the unequivocal support for 
the acculturation hypothesis that has been suggested by some writers.
Nevertheless patterns of cross cultural difference are discernible in the meta-analysis 
data and van Ijzendoom and Kroonenberg (1988) conclude that “A classifications 
emerge as relatively more prevalent in Western European Countries and C 
classifications as relatively more frequent in Israel and Japan” (van Ijzendoom and 
Kroonenberg, 1988, p.147).
In his latter years Bowlby (1980; 1988) revised certain aspects of attachment theory. 
For example he modified the doctrine of monotropy and agreed that in normal 
development infants can (and do) form hierarchical attachments. However he retained 
the notion of the importance of a primary attachment figure, although he did concede 
that a significant adult (other than the mother) could fulfil this role.
Attachment and the Therapeutic Process
Bowlby (1988) suggests that attachment theory can inform the therapeutic process and 
he lists five tasks, which he believes are part of the therapist’s role. The first is to 
provide the patient with a secure base so that s/he can explore the nature of his or her 
difficulties in a safe setting. The second is to help the patient to consider his or her 
own contribution to their problems. The third task involves examining the therapeutic 
relationship, which is developing between therapist and client, so that unconscious 
biases and distortions, caused by the transference (Freud, 1974, p. 491-500), may be 
brought to light and modified. The fourth task is related to the third in that the patient 
is encouraged to think about how early relationships (particularly those with their 
parents or caregivers) and significant events in their past may be shaping their current 
feelings and expectations. The final task involves the integration of insights gained 
during the therapy. During this process the individual’s internal working models 
(Bowlby, 1980, p. 138-139) of self, and self in relation to other, may be modified
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which, in turn, enables them to relate to other people in a more realistic way. 
Inevitably, this very brief description is an oversimplification of these concepts.
As might be expected there are similarities between the five tasks outlined above and 
elements of the therapeutic community approach to treatment. For example the 
provision of a secure base (Bowlby, 1988, p. 138), or safe environment, to enable the 
reworking of difficult aspects of past experience is a cardinal TC feature. In 
therapeutic communities this is facilitated by an emphasis on permissiveness, which 
was one of the four themes identified by Rapoport (1960). A permissive attitude, 
which permits individuals to express themselves freely (in words), is an absolute pre­
requisite of treatment. However many people with severe personality disorders are 
difficult to engage in treatment (Norton, 1996), and the development of basic trust and 
attachment to the community may take a considerable time (Campling, 1996).
Birchall (1997) has suggested that dependence is the adult equivalent of attachment 
and he believes that a key feature of both is that they share a ‘closeness-seeking 
component’. However people with personality disorders often find it very difficult to 
depend on other people and, frequently, they relate to caregivers in a negative way. 
For example individuals with borderline personality disorders (DSM-IV, Axis II, 
American Psychiatric Association, 1994) may feel a desperate need for care and 
protection but at the same time they may also be terrified of rejection and disapproval 
(Birchall, 1997). In therapeutic relationships people with these kind of difficulties 
often oscillate between approach and avoidance behaviours (Ryle, 1998, p.3). One 
could hypothesise that someone with BPD might find it extremely difficult to depend 
on the community for support and sustenance, because they have an internal working 
model, which leads them to believe that they are not worthy of care.
Therefore, in the early stages of TC treatment ‘simple’ containment may be a crucial 
factor. In time, a newly developed sense of ‘felt security’ (Sroufe and Waters, 1977b) 
may enable ambivalent or avoidant individuals to use the community as a secure base 
from which to explore his or her own difficulties. In his developmental model Haigh 
suggests that when the containment offered by a therapeutic community is successful 
“The culture feels like one of safety despite disturbance. The external part, the
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structure, is about holding: both maintaining the boundaries with whatever procedures 
are needed, and providing the sensuous, nurturant environment that a therapeutic 
space must be” (Haigh, 1997, p. 1). Thus, it may be, that the containment of the 
community is analogous to the sense of “felt security” provided in the early months of 
the infant’s life by its mother or primary caregiver.
Bowlby’s second task is also reflected in therapeutic community practice. Bowlby 
(1988, p. 138) suggests that, during therapy, clinicians help people to understand how 
their own behaviour and expectations can contribute to their current difficulties. In 
many ways, this is similar to Rapoport’s (1960) theme of reality confrontation. Reality 
confrontation refers to unit philosophy of continuously presenting people with 
feedback about their behaviour so that they can understand the impact of their actions 
on others.
However, Haigh (1997) argues that reality confrontation is, essentially, a behavioural 
formulation and he believes ‘communication’ may be a more useful term. Haigh 
suggests that in “a culture of openness” (Haigh, 1997, p. 5) “the therapeutic process is 
not just one of communication, but the struggle to get into a position to be able to 
communicate. In this way the ‘mumbling symptom’ -  which is autistic and cut off -  
can start to be articulated and understood and so lose its power to isolate and distress” 
(Haigh, 1997, p. 5).
The third task outlined by Bowlby (1988, p. 138) relates to the transferential aspects 
of the developing relationship between therapist and client, and it might be imagined 
that this is not a prominent feature within TCs. However, Whiteley (1994) suggests 
that “the community as a whole (as well as key individuals within it) can become an 
object of transference to which an attachment can be made in the Bowlby sense” 
(p.384). Therefore, careful exploration of the transference projections (Freud, 1984, p. 
103) and fantasies of individual patients may provide valuable information about their 
internal working models of attachment.
However in many therapeutic communities residents are actively discouraged from 
forming individual attachments. The underlying assumption is that somehow it will
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detract from the therapeutic task. For example people involved in one to one 
relationships with other members of the community may be less engaged with the 
group and if, as Rapoport (1960) argues, the community itself is the main therapeutic 
agent of change then people in couple relationships may be disadvantaged. In many 
modem communities (particularly those where the treatment is group based) the 
formation of emotional attachments to individual members of staff is also 
discouraged.
Somewhat paradoxically, Rapoport (1960) found that residents who were able to 
establish a closer relationship with staff members responded better to treatment than 
those who did not. In ‘Community as Doctor’ he writes “We found that, whether they 
like it or not, senior staff members are the most significant people in the Unit to the 
patients and that those patients who establish a strong identification with the senior 
staff improve at a higher rate than those whose primary identification lie elsewhere” 
(Rapoport, 1960, p. 197). One could argue that therapeutic communities have changed 
in the last forty years. In ‘Charisma and Routinization’ Manning (1989, p. 203-206) 
has written about a shift in the TC movement away from a charismatic leadership style 
towards one which embraces a greater distribution of power. This might account for 
the apparent paradox except for the fact that, more recently, Whiteley and Collis 
(1987) also found a link between the quality of staff/resident relationships and 
therapeutic outcome.
However, perhaps these findings are not so surprising. Attachment theory predicts that 
when someone is ill or distressed they will search for an attachment figure who may 
provide them with some relief. There is now a considerable amount of empirical 
evidence which underlines the importance of the therapeutic relationship. Bowlby 
(1988, p. 151-153), in his last major work on the clinical applications of attachment 
theory, writes about this at some length. Furthermore research has shown that the 
quality of the relationship between therapist and client is the most significant predictor 
of outcome (e.g. Hyman, 1981).
Relating current expectations and perceptions to past relationships and events is 
Bowlby’s (1988, p. 138) fourth task. Many people who are referred for therapeutic
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community treatment have had difficult family relationships (Coid, 1995; Paris and 
Frank, 1989; Patterson, DeBaryshe and Ramsey, 1989), and a significant proportion 
have been abused (either physically and/or sexually). Much of the work that takes 
place in therapeutic communities involves exploring painful feelings that are 
associated with the past. In this respect the treatment is similar to the individual work 
described by Bowlby (1988). However, in the TC it is the community which acts as 
doctor (Rapoport, 1960), not the unit psychiatrist or psychotherapist. In the theme of 
communalism Rapoport (1960) encapsulates the tight-knit, intimate structure of the 
group which provides support for community members during this difficult process of 
exploration.
Bowlby’s (1988, p. 139) final task is, essentially, an integrative one. In individual 
treatment the therapist helps the patient to make sense of his or her past experiences 
and use the insights gained in therapy to modify archaic internal working models of 
attachment. Unfortunately Rapoport’s (1960) fourth theme of democratisation does 
not fit quite so neatly with Bowlby’s five therapeutic tasks as permissiveness, reality 
confrontation and communalism have done. Nevertheless it may be that one can find 
at least one point of correspondence.
Unlike some psychoanalytically orientated theorists, Bowlby (1988, p. 141) does not 
see all of the problems which may arise between therapist and client as transference 
distortions. He points out that the therapist may also bring unresolved issues from the 
past into the relationship. In this model both participants contribute to the developing 
relationship, although (hopefully) the therapist is more aware of his own counter- 
transferential (Bateman and Holmes, 1995, p. 95) issues.
Democratisation as described by Rapoport (1960) is, essentially, about equality in 
decision-making. However one could argue that the concept should be extended to 
include more general notions of equality. For example Bowlby (1988, p. 141) is 
talking about equality when he suggests that we all contribute positive and negative 
elements to our relationships, and that this is as true of therapists as it is of their 
patients. It may be therefore that this concept can provide another valuable link
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between Bowlby’s attachment based perspective to treatment and therapeutic 
community approaches for people with severe PD.
It may also have a connection with Bowlby’s final stage in the process of attachment. 
In ‘Attachment and Loss Volume 1: Attachment’ (1969) Bowlby describes four 
phases of attachment: 1) ‘Pre-attachment’ - This stage lasts from birth to 
approximately six weeks and during this stage there is very little awareness of being 
dependent on caregivers. 2) ‘Attachment in the making’ - This second stage lasts from 
six weeks to six/eight months. During this phase infants leam to distinguish between 
their m[other]/primary caregiver and strangers. 3) ‘Clear-cut Attachment’ - This stage 
lasts from about six/eight months to approximately twenty-four months and during 
this third stage infants experience physical symptoms of anxiety when separated from 
their m[other]/primary caregiver. 4) ‘Goal-Corrected Partnership’ - This last stage 
occurs from around the age of three years and involves a recognition on the part of the 
child, that his/her primary caregiver has a separate existence, and might also have 
needs and desires that do not (necessarily) correspond with his/her own. Bowlby 
writes (1969) that this ability to form a partnership with another person “is, clearly, a 
new phase” (p. 322) in the child’s development.
Democratisation, as conceptualised by Rapoport (1960), is also about the ability of 
community members to form a partnership, or collaborative working relationship, 
with other people. Based upon the notions of equality and a recognition that other 
people also have needs and desires, this concept seems to relate to Bowlby’s (1969) 
final phase of attachment.
This section of the review has emphasised one of the earliest forms of attachment; that 
of the infant to it’s primary caregiver. This is very much in line with Haigh’s (1997; 
1999) initial conceptualisation of TC treatment as a developmental process which has 
it’s origins in the “vulnerability and nakedness of attachment” and ends in the “adult 
and empowered position of agency” (Haigh, 1997, p. 1).
However other forms of attachment may also be relevant to therapeutic communities. 
For example, sibling attachments (Stewart, 1983; Stewart and Marvin, 1984) may be
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re-enacted in relationships between residents in TCs and competitive feelings might 
emerge in relation to members of staff Also it may be that the attachment processes 
which are activated in people’s relationships with peer groups are quite distinct and 
can be measured as separate constructs.
As has been noted above peer groups play a significant role in shaping behaviour and 
attitudes in adolescents, and clinicians working within TCs have also emphasised the 
importance of peer influences (e.g. Kymissis, 1998; Kennard, 1989; Norton and 
Dolan, 1995). Often people with severe personality difficulties can take feedback from 
another resident that they could not accept from a member of staff (Campling, 1996; 
Rapoport, 1960).
Smith, Murphy and Coats (1999) report on a recent study, which has attempted to 
illuminate people’s identification with groups. The researchers hypothesised that 
individuals form attachments to groups which are influenced by mental models 
(Bowlby, 1980) of ‘self as a group member’. Furthermore they suggest that 
attachment to groups is quite different from other forms of attachment.
A number of theorists have suggested that people have multiple models of attachment 
available to them which they use to inform their understanding of interpersonal 
situations (Collins and Read, 1994; Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enns and Koh- 
Rangarajoo; 1996). Smith et al. (1999) believe that a similar mechanism operates in 
group relationships and they propose that “people have models of themselves as group 
members and models of groups that in combination affect their thoughts, emotions 
and behaviours regarding group members” (Smith, Murphy and Coats, 1999, p.94). 
Using a battery of test measures (including items from the Romantic Partner 
Attachment Scale; the Social Group Attachment Scale; the Rahim Organizational 
Conflict Inventory and the Collective Self-esteem Scale). Smith et al. (1999) 
identified two new dimensions — attachment anxiety and avoidance — which they 
suggest, represent individual attachment to groups. People can be high or low on 
either dimension, so that, for example, a person who has a low score on attachment 
anxiety and a low score on avoidance may be described as having a secure group 
attachment (Smith et al. 1999).
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Smith et al. (1999) report that these factors do not overlap with other attachment 
constructs, and that they have validity, good reliability and temporal stability. In 
addition group attachment has been shown to predict a variety of important outcomes 
including “emotions concerning the group, time and activities shared with the group, 
social support, collective self esteem and ways of resolving conflict” (Smith, Murphy 
and Coats, 1999, p.94).
This is, clearly, an exciting development in the field of attachment research and one, 
which has direct relevance for clinicians working in therapeutic community settings. 
In ‘Community as Doctor’ Rapoport (1960) identified the community as the main 
therapeutic agent in the TC. Yet many people entering communities for the first time 
often find it difficult to engage with the group. However, if individuals cannot do this 
then it is unlikely that they will benefit from the therapeutic community approach to 
treatment. Thus, a measure, which enables researchers to study an individual’s group 
attachment style, would provide a valuable tool for researchers in TCs.
Lopez, (1995, p. 395) has suggested that contemporary attachment theory offers 
counselling psychology “the promise of an integrative framework for enquiry and 
practice”. The study by Smith et al. (1999) described above, would seem to illustrate 
this promise in practice.
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to demonstrate the relevance of attachment theory to the 
therapeutic community treatment of adults with personality difficulties. Four separate 
strands of the psychological literature have been reviewed. Research into the 
prevalence, aetiology and clinical manifestations of personality disorder; evidence for 
the efficacy of the therapeutic community approach to the treatment of PD; studies 
relating to the process of therapy in TCs; and the origins of attachment theory and its 
relevance to the clinical treatment of personality disorders. A promising new avenue 
of therapeutic community research has been identified, based upon recent advances in 
the clinical application of attachment theory.
I l l
Notes
I Henderson Hospital is a Therapeutic Community for young adults, specialising in the treatment o f  individuals with severe 
personality disorders.
II The Association o f  Therapeutic Communities (ATC) is an international organisation, which exists to "further the 
implementation o f  the therapeutic community approach and ideology in the psychiatric hospital and social services fo r  the 
psychiatric patient and also in the appropriate related fields " Directory o f  Therapeutic Communities (1995).
III The Cassel Hospital is a therapeutic community offering both individual and group treatment to adults, children and families 
with severe emotional and personality difficulties.
Iv Francis Dixon Lodge n inpatient therapeutic community for adults.
v The annual saving to the exchequer when pre and post treatment costs are compared.
V1 Grendon Underwood Prison is the only prison in the United Kingdom "totally created for, and continuing to operate as, a 
collective o f  therapeutic communities ” (Cullen,1994).
v" Monotropy - An innate tendency on the part o f  the infant to become attached to one figure, usually the mother.
vm The Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) is a research instrument devised by Main and Goldwyn (1985-1994). The 
classifications o f  response correspond broadly to the four categories o f  attachment identified in the Infant Strange Situation 
Response.
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Newspaper constructions of ‘dangerous psychopathologies' 
following the conviction of Michael Stone in 1998 for the
murders of 
Lin and Megan Russell
ABSTRACT
In recent years there has been an increasing focus in medical and academic 
psychology upon the construction of psychopathological categories. Social 
constructionist writers argue that popular culture shapes both public and professional 
representations of mental health issues and that this can be seen in the way that 
representations of ‘madness’ change over time. This is particularly evident in 
discourses which relate to issues of ‘danger’. Using discourse analysis this paper 
examines the construction of ‘dangerous psychopathologies’ in a series of newspaper 
articles following the conviction of Michael Stone in 1998 for the murders of Lin and 
Megan Russell. The analysis suggests that different versions of ‘dangerous 
psychopathology’ are being constructed in the texts, centred around a ‘bad/mad’ 
dichotomy. Another feature of the articles was that certain pathologising labels were 
used apparently interchangeably. For example: ‘psychopath’, ‘sociopath’, ‘anti-social 
personality disorder’, ‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’, ‘serious personality 
disorder’, ‘dangerous personality disorder’ and ‘personality disorder’. Limitations of 
the study and the implications of the findings for clinicians working in the field of 
mental health are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1996, Lin Russell and her two daughters, Josie and Megan, were 
walking home along a quiet country lane, after a school swimming gala, when they 
were attacked by a stranger wielding a hammer. Lin and her younger daughter Megan 
were fatally injured during the attack, but Josie survived, although she sustained 
multiple skull fractures and could not remember much about the event. By the time 
Michael Stone was brought to trial for the murders in 1998 there had already been a 
considerable amount of media interest in the case. Following his conviction, when 
details of his personal history were revealed, the press coverage intensified and a 
national debate ensued about the treatment of so called ‘dangerous’ individuals. At the 
time it was widely reported that Michael Stone had visited his psychiatrist shortly 
before the murders but, because of a loophole in the Mental Health Act (the 
‘treatability’ criterion), he had been refused admission to a secure unit.
Fuelled, in part, by the intensive media coverage, the case caused widespread public 
concern. Questions were asked of Ministers in the House of Commons about how 
such a thing could have been allowed to happen. The Home Secretary blamed 
psychiatrists; psychiatrists blamed the government. But everyone agreed that legal 
reform was necessary.
Personality Disorder, psychiatry and the law
In psychiatry, ‘Personality Disorder’ (PD) is a widely used clinical diagnosis. Both the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 1994) and the ICD-10 
Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders (WHO, 1993) use the term in their 
taxonomies and both list a variety of diagnostic ‘subtypes’. However a number of 
writers have questioned the validity of the concept. For example Cavadino (1998) 
argues that the term ‘personality disorder’ means little more than a “peculiar person 
who upsets himself or herself, or other people” (p.6). While Widiger (1993) describes 
the basis of the DSM classification as “a sort of theoretical stew, with psychoanalytic
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theory represented by the narcissistic, social learning by the avoidant, and biogenetic 
by the schizotypal” (p. 35).
In recent years a great deal has been written about the construction of 
psychopathological categories (e.g., Barrett, 1988; Harper, 1992, 1994, 1999; Parker 
et al., 1995). In relation to PD, Parker et al. (1995) examine the different ways that 
pathological identities are constructed around the medico-legal category of 
‘psychopathy’ and show how these identities can stigmatise individuals and restrict 
their treatment options. Lewis and Appleby (1988) write that patients whom doctors 
dislike are often labelled in this way, and they conclude “that psychiatrists form 
pejorative, judgmental, and rejecting attitudes towards those who have [previously] 
been given a diagnosis of personality disorder” (p. 44).
Paradoxically, the fact that PD is not generally considered to be a ‘mental illness’ has 
meant that people with this label have often been disadvantaged compared with other 
patient groups. For example, whereas individuals with ‘recognised mental illnesses’ 
are generally seen as “less responsible and less in control of their actions” (Lewis and 
Appleby, 1988, p. 44), people with personality disorders are often subjected to 
negative evaluations and judgements because it is assumed that their actions are under 
their control. However, although this kind of stigmatisation is associated with all 
categories of PD, these pejorative connotations are most evident in accounts of 
‘psychopathic’ or ‘anti-social’ personality disorders.
The origins of ‘modem’ psychopathy can be traced back to the early 19th century 
concept of ‘moral insanity’ (McCallum, 2001). Up until this time, the ‘crime’ and not 
the ‘criminal’ had occupied the central position on the legal stage and the focus had 
been upon retribution rather than rehabilitation (Foucault, 1978). However the penal
threforms which swept Europe in the 19 century brought about a shift so that the 
criminal, and his or her rehabilitation, became central concerns of the judicial 
apparatus. Prior to this, motivation had not been an important factor in the legal 
process but subsequently the mental state of the criminal could no longer be 
discounted and it is at this point that the influence of legal psychiatry becomes 
stronger.
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Foucault (1978) argues that one of the reasons for this is the construction of the 
problem of ‘dangerousness’. This ‘spectre’ (Owen, 1990, p. 238) developed in relation 
to a number of unusually disturbing and apparently motiveless murders that were 
committed in the early years of the 19th century. Up until that time, the criminal justice 
system had recognised two kinds of insanity: ‘furor’ and ‘dementia’. However the 
perpetrators of these murders did not appear to fit into either category and the crimes 
that they committed were judged to have arisen from what Foucault (1978) has termed 
a “zero degree of insanity” (p. 4). In order to make sense of this, psychiatry came up 
with the concept of ‘homicidal monomania’. Essentially, this was an attempt to 
provide a medical explanation for seemingly inexplicable crimes that occurred without 
any warning, motive or visible sign of disturbance in the perpetrators prior to the 
event. Foucault (1978) refers to this as the “pathologification of crime” (p. 6).
The publicity that surrounded these murders, and the horror and incomprehensibility 
of them, gave rise to something which in a later century might have been called a 
‘moral panic’ (Glasgow Media Group, 1980). In his analysis of the development of 
the concept of the dangerous individual, Foucault writes “The collective fear of crime, 
the obsession with this danger which seems to be an inseparable part of society itself, 
are thus perpetually inscribed in each individual consciousness” (Foucault, 1978, p. 
12).
According to Foucault (1978), the role of 19 century psychiatry developed 
principally to ensure ‘public hygiene’ in the ‘social body’. Thus, to quote Owen 
(1990), “the spectre of dangerousness both defines the function of psychiatry and 
legitimates its operation” (p. 239). The concept of homicidal monomania was 
abandoned in the late 1860s (Foucault, 1978) and it is around this time that the term 
‘psychopath’ first emerges in the literature (Blackburn, 1988). Over the years it has 
been used in a number of different ways but, generally, it still strongly associated with 
notions o f ‘unpredictability’ and ‘dangerousness’.
However Blackburn (1988) argues that it is simply not possible to classify people in 
this way and, following a detailed review of the literature, he writes “It must be 
concluded that the current concept of psychopathic or antisocial personality remains ‘a
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mythical entity’. The taxonomic error of confounding different universes of discourse 
has resulted in a diagnostic category that embraces a variety of deviant personalities. 
Such a category is not a meaningful focus for theory and research, nor can it facilitate 
clinical communication and prediction” (p. 511).
Culture, Media Representations and ‘ Dangerous Psychopathologies’
In their discussion of popular representations of madness, Parker et al. (1995) 
highlight the pervasiveness of images of psychopathology, not just in newspaper 
articles but across a wide range of art and media productions. They argue that 
assimilation of these images into culture transforms both public and professional 
representations of mental health issues and that this can be seen in the way that 
constructions of ‘madness’ change over time. Foucault (1978) describes a similar 
process when he talks about the development of the collective fear of crime in the 
latter part of the 18 century and his thesis is that this occurred through the growth of 
a “literature of criminality” (p. 12). An important point to note here is that this 
literature did not have an academic or a medico-legal base but grew instead from 
romanticised fiction and popular newspapers.
The casting of newspapers as agents in the construction of the issue of 
‘dangerousness’ is important with regard to this study because it has been estimated 
that the United Kingdom has one of the highest levels of newspaper readership in 
Europe (National Readership Survey, 1997). The press, therefore, is in a powerful 
position to influence public understanding of mental health issues through the various 
constructions of psychopathology that are presented in their columns.
In the ‘realist’ world of discourse, newspapers (particularly the broadsheets) are 
generally thought to report ‘facts’. However social constructionist writers argue that 
facts are socially constructed objects (Gergen, 1999). According to this view, 
language cannot simply be regarded as a neutral medium, which reflects some 
‘knowable’ reality. Rather it is a means by which individuals and institutions construct 
different versions of reality, according to the requirements of the situation. Thus, in 
newspaper articles, representations are ‘worked up’ using different rhetorical devices
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and techniques (Potter, 1996) and readers are presented with ‘an account’, rather than 
a definitive account.
The aim of the study is to examine the different versions of ‘dangerous 
psychopathologies’ put forward in newspaper accounts following the conviction of 
Michael Stone in 1998 for the murders of Lin and Megan Russell.
METHOD 
Texts
In the United Kingdom, national newspapers can be split into two distinct groups -  
‘quality’ newspapers (which have a broadsheet format) and ‘popular’ newspapers 
(which have a tabloid format). There is also a broad liberal/conservative split in the 
press. However in an era when standard constructions of binary political categories 
such as ‘left wing’ and ‘right wing’ and ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are becoming 
much ‘fuzzier’ -  it is sometimes difficult to be definitive about which newspapers 
belong on which side of this divide; also, it is not intended to suggest that any 
newspaper adopts a consistently ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ stance.
To ensure that a wide diversity of constructions and discursive resources and features 
were represented in the data set, articles from The Guardian (liberal broadsheet), The 
Daily Mirror (liberal tabloid), The Daily Telegraph (conservative broadsheet), The 
Daily Mail (conservative tabloid) and The Sun (conservative tabloid) were collected 
for inclusion in the study. Six Sunday newspapers were also studied, i.e., The 
Observer (liberal broadsheet), The Sunday Mirror, (liberal tabloid), The News o f the 
World (liberal tabloid), The Sunday Times (conservative broadsheet), The Sunday 
Telegraph (conservative broadsheet) and The Mail on Sunday (conservative tabloid).
In order to be as inclusive as possible, a variety of key words was used to search 
newspaper databases. For example, although the broad search term ‘personality 
disorders] ’ yielded the greatest number of articles, the term ‘psychopath’ produced a 
number of relevant articles which would have been missed had it not been entered
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separately. Articles were collected from Saturday October 24th 1998 (the day after 
Michael Stone was convicted for the murders of Lin and Megan Russell) until the 
publication of the British Government’s White Paper on Mental Health Legislation on 
Thursday 21st December 2000. This produced more than 120 articles. This number 
was reduced to 100 when news and feature articles which focused mainly on the 
Russell family were excluded from the analysis.
Analytic Approach
Because of its constructionist epistemology, discourse analysis (DA) was used to 
examine the texts. Whereas realist approaches view language as a neutral medium that 
describes or reflects a ‘knowable’ reality, social constructionists hold that multiple 
‘realities’ exist and that language plays an active part in their construction. According 
to this view all discourse is occasioned and action (or function) orientated (Gill, 
1996). In DA the researcher’s task is to identify the function and provide a coherent 
account of how the text accomplishes it (Coyle, 2000).
Although there are different forms of DA (Coyle, 2000), the analysis was conducted 
according to the guidelines outlined by Potter and Wetherell (1987). Essentially, this 
approach focuses on the different rhetorical strategies employed by speakers and 
writers to accomplish various discursive functions1 (Edwards and Potter, 1992). 
However, because all mental health issues are culturally ‘embedded’ (Parker et al.
1995), it would seem important to draw upon relevant contextual material to inform 
the analysis of the texts in this research. Thus, following Wetherell’s (1998) recent 
call for a more synthetic approach to discourse analysis, it is anticipated that at 
different stages in the analytic process, there will be movement between the different 
levels of analysis (i.e. from micro to macro and vice versa).
1 Pugh and Coyle (2000) point out that the use o f the term ‘function’ in this context does not imply intentionality. 
“Often there is no conscious, purposeful intention behind the form o f language used or the way in which an 
account is constructed” (p.87).
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Coding
The articles were read through repeatedly to identify recurrent themes in the texts and 
provide a focus for the analysis. The material was then coded, as inclusively as 
possible, so that artificial limits were not imposed on the data. During the preliminary 
stages of the coding process, the categories changed repeatedly as different readings 
highlighted different issues and areas of interest. Eventually, however, as the analysis 
became more refined, a number of recurring themes and sub-themes relating to the 
research questions were identified (see Appendix 1). The preliminary analysis 
indicated that certain discourses are strongly linked. Both main and subsidiary themes 
are used to support a range of constructions in a variety of discursive contexts.
Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that this type of coding is different from traditional 
content analysis because the aim is not the generation of frequency counts but rather 
to “produce a body of instances” (Potter and Wetherall, 1987, p. 167) which can then 
form the basis for the ‘analysis proper’. After the coding had been completed, extracts 
which seemed to exemplify those themes relating to the chosen foci of the project (e.g. 
constructions of ‘dangerous psychopathologies’, the management of blame and 
responsibility and the construction of the issue of ‘dangerousness’) were chosen for 
detailed analysis.
Note that, due to limitations of space, it has been necessary to omit some material 
from the extracts. Where this has happened it is indicated by the use of empty square 
brackets.
Evaluating the Analysis
One of the hallmarks of discourse analysis is that it is a reflexive process (Potter,
1996). Whereas traditional approaches to psychological research are based upon 
adherence to the so-called ‘scientific method’ and the objective evaluation of ‘facts’, 
social constructionists reject these values, arguing that researchers cannot claim a 
privileged status for their discourses because they are subject to the same social 
processes as everyone else in society. According to this view individual research
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papers, like all texts, provide one version of many possible readings and it is simply 
not possible to produce a complete and unmotivated account.
Although clear evaluative guidelines for discourse analysis have yet to be established, 
Elliott, Fischer and Rennie (1999) argue that guidelines for DA are necessary, both to 
encourage high quality research and provide journal editors with a measure to evaluate 
qualitative research. But as Reicher (2000) observes trying to apply a common set of 
evaluative criteria across a range of qualitative methods could viewed as 
‘procrustean’. So it may be that, for the time being, each will have to be judged on its 
own merits.
In order to make my speaking position clear, it might be helpful for the reader to know 
that during my undergraduate studies I worked for a year as a researcher in a National 
Health Service unit which specialises in the treatment of ‘severe personality 
disorders’. During this time I became interested in the way that the term ‘personality 
disorder’ was used, both by professionals and by lay people, and I found myself 
becoming increasingly concerned by what I considered to be ‘inaccuracies’ in media 
reports relating to the topic. I decided, therefore, to explore newspaper constructions 
of PD as part of my doctoral research.
Starting (prior to embarking on this study) from an essentially ‘realist’ perspective, I 
struggled initially to make the conceptual ‘leap’ from empiricism to social 
constructionism. I was, however, greatly assisted in this by my involvement in the 
psychology department’s DA group. During our meetings I found the analytic input of 
other people with varied but overlapping interpretative frameworks invaluable, and I 
feel that their contributions helped to clarify my thinking about the subject and 
strengthen my analysis of the textual material.
Finally it is important to reiterate here that the analysis put forward in this paper is but 
one possible reading of the texts. Inevitably it is a partial account and it does not claim 
to tell the ‘whole’ story. The aim has been to provide the reader with a persuasive 
interpretation of the data and to supply enough information to enable them to judge 
whether the conclusions reached are valid in discourse analytic terms.
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ANALYSIS
Terminology
A number of different terms are used apparently interchangeably in the newspaper 
articles to describe the various kinds of psychopathology ascribed to Michael Stone. 
For example: ‘psychopath’, ‘sociopath’, ‘anti-social personality disorder’, ‘dangerous 
and severe personality disorder’, ‘serious personality disorder’, ‘dangerous personality 
disorder’ and ‘personality disorder’. This may, in part, reflect the fact that in lay/non­
expert thinking, the term ‘personality disorder’ does not have the same consensual 
status that it does in the world of mental health. The fact that so many pathologizing 
labels are used in this way (especially in the early articles) demonstrates confusion 
and ambiguity about what ‘personality disorder’ is, what its boundaries are and what 
the differences are between terms that sound (to the lay ear) quite similar.
The construction of ‘dangerous psychopathologies’
During the coding process different themes relating to ‘dangerous psychopathologies’ 
were constructed from the texts. In many of the accounts, journalists used a variety of 
descriptions that produced a clear ‘mad or bad’ dichotomy. For example:
1. “It will be asked: Was he mad or bad? I think we can say with some certainty that
tTiMichael Stone was not mad.” {Sunday Times, 25 October 1998, News Report)
2. “He was not clinically ill but had instead an antisocial personality disorder. In other 
words, he was not mad but bad.” {Sunday Times, 25th October 1998, Features)
3. “A source close to the Health Minister Paul Boateng said: These people are not mad 
but bad.” {Observer, 25th October 1998, Home News)
4. “Under the proposed New Deal for psychopaths, those deemed bad rather than mad 
must submit to closer supervision in the community or be locked up in secure units.” 
{Daily Mail, 27th October 1998, Home News).
5. “As another psychiatrist said: ‘People are bad not mad, and it is almost impossible 
and very dangerous to try and anticipate what their actions will be’.” {Guardian, 19th 
September 1999)
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As has been mentioned above, the thematic analysis shows that certain discourses are 
inter-linked and this can be seen quite clearly in the following extracts:
Extract 1 (The Mirror, 24 October 1998. By Adrian Shaw and Lucy Turner)
1. Stone is a paranoid schizophrenic -
2. a violent man who made at least three
3. requests to be admitted to a psychiatric hospital.
4. But health experts were unable to lock him up
5. because assessments showed that he was not mentally ill.
6. Ruth Camall, of West Kent Health Authority, said yesterday:
7. T think we can say with some certainty that
8. Michael Stone was not mad.’ But he was considered
9. too dangerous to be cared for in local authority accommodation
10. and was left to walk the streets.
11. He fantasised about killing children and drew up lists of people he
12. wanted to torture and murder.
In this extract, two apparently incompatible formulations are presented in the text. The 
first is that Michael Stone is being positioned in the article as someone who has a 
‘mental illness’. This illness is even given a diagnostic label -  paranoid schizophrenia 
(line 1). This provides a warrant for the argument that is being constructed -  he has a 
recognised medical condition. He is also described as a violent man (line 2) but the 
impact of this is softened slightly by the inclusion of information that he had asked to 
be admitted to a psychiatric hospital on ‘at least three’ (lines 2 and 3) occasions. The 
use of the words ‘at least’ suggests that the ‘real’ figure is probably greater than this 
and a number of studies have shown how quantification can be employed as a 
rhetorical device to support the argument that is being constructed (for example see 
Ashmore, 1995). Lines 4 and 5 reveal that discourses of blame and responsibility are 
being assembled here. Michael Stone, an ‘ill’ man (line 1) with a ‘violent’ history 
(line 2) had requested admission to a psychiatric hospital (line 3) but had been refused 
a bed (line 4) because [medical] assessments showed that he was not mentally ill (line 
5).
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In line 6, a representative of the West Kent Health Authority, Ruth Camell, is 
introduced to give a professional opinion: CI think we can say with some certainty that 
Michael Stone was not mad’ 2 (lines 7 and 8). The implication behind this statement is 
clear. Michael Stone is now being positioned as ‘bad’ rather than ‘mad’. This is 
formulation two. In theory, this should be persuasive because Ms Camell is presented 
as a representative of the Health Authority and, as such, might be considered to have a 
particular kind of ‘category entitlement’. Category entitlement is the idea that “certain 
categories of people, in certain contexts, are treated as knowledgeable” (Potter, 1996, 
p. 133).
However, there is also an element here of what has been described as the “Mandy 
Rice-Davis complaint” (Edwards and Potter, 1992, p. 158). Because she is a 
representative of the ‘health experts’ (line 4) who failed to lock Michael Stone up, it 
could be argued “Well she would say that wouldn’t she?” The management of stake 
and interest is a delicate business and the organisation that Ms Camell is said to work 
for clearly has an interest in presenting Michael Stone as ‘bad’ rather than ‘mad’. If he 
were ‘mad’ (accepting for a moment that such a term has any validity), then the fact 
that the .West Kent Health Authority had refused to admit him might mean that the 
searchlight of blame would fall on them.
It is interesting that Ms Camell’s speech is reproduced as a direct quotation as this 
may provide important information about the way that the argument is being 
constmcted in the text. According to Goffman (1979), footing is the basis upon which 
an account is offered. Is the voice that of the animator or the composer? 3 Often, in 
matters of attitude or evaluation, writers may wish to align themselves with a 
particular view, and the quoting of official sources can lend authority to an account 
and provide a powerful ‘warrant’ for an argument (Edwards and Potter, 1992).
However direct quotations can also sharpen the distinction between the views of the 
composer and the animator (Edwards and Potter, 1992). In other words they can be
2 In the Sunday Times article published on 25th October 1998 (see above, p. 136) Ms Camell was quoted as saying 
“It will be asked: Was he mad or bad? I think we can say with some certainty that Michael Stone was not mad.”
3 According to Goffman (1979) the ‘composer’ is the originator o f the textual material while the ‘animator’ 
reproduces it.
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used as a distancing device. Here it would seem that it is being used as a distancing 
device as the discourse appears to be orientated towards blaming the Health Authority. 
The quotation from Ms Camell also provides a neat launch pad for the irony of the 
next observation: ‘But he was considered too dangerous to be cared for in local 
authority accommodation (lines 8 and 9) and [therefore due to the negligence of the 
Health Authority] was left to walk the streets’ (line 10). The final lines complete the 
argument: ‘He fantasised about killing children and drew up lists of people he wanted 
to torture and murder’ (lines 11 and 12).
QED 4 - if the Health Authority had done their job properly, Lin and Megan Russell 
would still be alive today. Now the apparent contradiction of the two formulations can 
be understood. The different constmctions of psychopathology are performing 
different rhetorical functions, as issues of blame and responsibility are being managed 
in the account.
In this brief extract, several different themes can be discerned. First there is the ‘mad’ 
rather than ‘bad’ constmction. This is a companion theme to a similar one that 
emerged early in the analysis, that of ‘Disordered Souls’, which will be discussed in 
detail below. The opposite constmction was the ‘bad’ not ‘mad’ discourse, which will 
be picked up in the next extract. It is important to note here that although the 
presentation of these themes as binary oppositions may seem artificial, this 
constmction was put forward both explicitly and implicitly in many of the texts.
A discourse of ‘dangerousness’ was also threaded through the text. This theme occurs 
in a variety of different contexts, most notably those where discourses are oriented 
towards ‘calls for action’ (see Table 1). Finally, versions of blame and responsibility 
are being constmcted. Ms Camell’s response (which was reproduced in full in other 
newspapers) was cut to a single statement that could be easily countered in the final 
lines.
4 Quod erat demonstrandum
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The ‘bad’ not ‘mad’ theme also predominates in an article entitled ‘Forget psychiatry, 
stop psychopaths’ published in The Sunday Times two days after Michael Stone’s 
conviction:
Extract 2 {Sunday Times, 25 October 1998. Article by Melanie Phillips)
1. Of course this man is bad.
2. But there are many like him,
3. damaged products of shattered and brutal families,
4. drifters with lives bounded by drugs and violence
5. and -  most terrifyingly -
6. with a complete absence of any imaginative feelings for other people.
In extract two, the reader is presented with a formulation of Michael Stone as ‘bad’. 
Here the writer positions herself in a quasi-expert role. The use of the words ‘of 
course’ (line 1) suggests that there can be no question about the correctness of this 
judgement and it assumes that the reader will concur. In line 2 a new category is being 
constructed of which Michael Stone is but one exemplar. These are men who are not 
like the majority of ‘other people’ (line 6) who do have ‘imaginative feelings’ for 
others. Additionally, they are described as ‘damaged products’ (line 3). Now they 
have been constructed as objects, positioned as ‘other’. There is also a suggestion of 
inevitability about the process. How could they be any different, these drug taking and 
violent drifters (line 4) given their ‘shattered and brutal families’? (line 3) The origins 
of their psychological and social difficulties and the responsibility for these 
difficulties are presented here as the results of early childhood experiences. The 
invocation in this passage of a developmental psychology discourse, with all of the 
‘scientific’ legitimacy it possesses, could be seen as an example of ‘empiricist 
warranting’ (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). Additionally, in popular discourse, the use of 
the term ‘drifter’ often implies that a person is aimless or unreliable. Here the negative 
connotation of the word is compounded by the allusion to drugs and violence.
A construction of ‘dangerousness’ is evident throughout the extract but it is made 
explicit in the last two lines. The use of the words ‘most terrifyingly’ (line 5) and 
‘complete absence’ (line 6) are examples of what Pomerantz (1986) has called
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‘extreme case formulations’. The rhetorical function of such terms is that they can 
lend weight to an argument by emphasising the extreme nature of the case. In this 
extract, the use of the word ‘most’ (line 5) suggests that the idea is not ‘just’ 
terrifying; it is as terrifying as it could possibly be under any circumstance. Similarly 
the use of the adjective ‘complete’ (line 7) indicates that the lack of imaginative 
feelings for others is not comparative or partial; it is absolute.
An extract from the Sun newspaper may provide a final illustration of the ‘bad’ not 
‘mad’ theme. It also demonstrates the overlap between this construction and a related 
but slightly different version of psychopathology -  that of the ‘evil’ psychopath.
Extract 3 {The Sun, 24 October 1998. By Mike Sullivan and Neil Syson)
1. Crazed misfit Michael Stone was nicknamed
2. Mad Mick the Hammer Man
3. because he always carried a hammer in his car -
4. and was not afraid to use it.
5. Years before he slaughtered Lin and Megan Russell,
6. the bi-sexual junkie smashed an old man’s skull
7. with his favourite weapon. After he was convicted of the horrific attack,
8. his nickname was formally entered in his police record.
9. And Stone REVELLED in it.
10. The psychotic beast was a walking timebomb whose life had been
11. peppered with explosive flashes o f rage and violence.
12. He POURED boiling water over a fellow inmate while in prison.
13. STABBED a sleeping friend, tried to GOUGE out a policeman’s eyes
14. and threatened to CHOP up a probation officer’s family with a
15. machete (Original emphasis).
Although in the opening lines of the article, Michael Stone is referred to as ‘crazed’ 
(line 1) and ‘mad’ (line 2), the tone of the extract suggests intentionality. The 
formulation is not that he is unable to control his behaviour but that he chooses not to. 
We are told that he ‘always carried a hammer in is car’ (line 3) and ‘was not afraid to 
use it’ (line 4). It is also described as his ‘favourite weapon’ (line 7), which suggests
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that he had more than one. The use of the word ‘always’ (line 3) is another example of 
an extreme case formulation (Pomerantz, 1986) and here it emphasises the fact that 
Michael Stone carried a weapon as a matter of course. It was not a one-off event; it 
was a regular, routine occurrence. Furthermore the phrase ‘and was not afraid to use 
it’ (line 4) suggests that he had used it before and this is then made explicit in line 6: 
he ‘smashed in an old man’s skull’. The fact that the man is referred to as ‘old’ 
suggests that the attack was not self defence as might have been inferred if his victim 
was a younger man. The gloss is that he attacked someone who was defenceless. The 
use of the word ‘slaughtered’ (line 5) to describe the murders of Lin and Megan 
Russell evokes discourses of the slaughterhouse; there is something bestial about it. 
Here he is being positioned as a ‘butcher’ who treats his victims like animals.
The implication that Michael Stone derived some pleasure from his activities is 
highlighted by the assertion that he ‘REVELLED’ (line 9) in the fact that his nick 
name ‘was formally entered’ in his police record (line 8). The use of emboldened 
capitals in the latter part of the extract is a striking device, which highlights the 
aggressive nature of the acts that he is purported to have committed.
In line 10 the writers employ a technical term to buttress their account. Michael Stone 
is described as ‘psychotic’. In medical discourses the term is usually used as an 
adjective -  i.e. pertaining to psychosis. In common usage, however, the word is often 
applied in a pejorative way and the fact that it is used to qualify the word ‘beast’ (line 
10) suggests that it is meant to be read as deprecatory in this context.
The whole of this italicised phrase evokes discourses of dangerousness and chaos. The 
metaphor of the ‘walking time bomb’ (line 10) is a common one throughout the texts. 
The fact that it is then bracketed with the phrase ‘whose life had been peppered with 
explosive flashes of rage and violence’ (lines 10 and 11) immediately brings to mind 
vivid images of death and destruction. The word ‘peppered’ is reminiscent of 
grapeshot and gunfire and the ‘explosive flashes’ suggest land mines and cannon 
shells.
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The message in lines 10 and 11 is clear enough, as it is but, in the final four lines of 
the extract, the authors add narrative detail to lend authenticity to their account 
(Potter, 1996) and this is produced in the form of a list.
Discourse analysts have shown how list construction can be a useful rhetorical device 
and Edwards and Potter (1992) and Potter (1996) present comprehensive reviews of 
the topic. Jefferson (1990) writes that lists are often produced in three parts but in this 
case a four-part version is offered. The point of interest here is that the effect is 
cumulative. A discourse of violence is being constructed and each item strengthens 
the argument.
In line 13, the reader is informed that Michael Stone had ‘STABBED a sleeping 
friend’. This is a dramatic juxtaposition, which does not fit with traditional discourses 
relating to friendship. Generally one would not attack one’s friends unless one had a 
very good reason for doing so. An exception might be in a situation where self- 
defence was necessary. However this is ruled out because we are told that the friend 
was ‘sleeping’ (line 13). The use of the emboldened words ‘STABBED’ and 
‘GOUGE’ (line 13) add to the overall construction of ‘dangerousness’.
Finally, the reader is told that he ‘threatened to CHOP up a probation officer’s family 
with a machete’ (lines 14 and 15). The fact that it is members of the officer’s family 
who are threatened and not the officer himself re-orientates the reader to the attack on 
the Russells. The overall formulation of the extract is -  here is a violent man who 
chooses to do what he does and he is quite prepared to harm innocent women and 
children if it suits his purpose to do so.
The underlying assumption of both the ‘bad not mad’ construction of 
psychopathology and the ‘evil psychopath’ version seems to be that if a person is 
‘bad’ then s/he can be held accountable for his or her actions. But if s/he is ‘mad’ then 
s/he is not responsible for her/his actions and a different version of blame and 
responsibility must be constructed.
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The latter, alternative explanation has been touched upon briefly in the analysis of 
extract 1. However in extract 4, the theme is developed further in the ‘Disordered 
Souls’ version of psychopathology put forward by the Daily Mail. The label 
‘disordered souls’ came from the article below but another version -  Tost souls’ -  was 
used in an earlier account in the same newspaper (Daily Mail, 24 October 1998, 
Leading Article. ‘An indictment of a failing system’).
Extract 4 (Daily Mail, 16 February 1999. Leading Article)
1. As the HOME SECRETARY Jack Straw acknowledges,
2. his proposal for locking away dangerous, unconvicted
3. psychopaths is a serious step. But it is a necessary one.
4. And one that will be welcomed by the general public.
5. As the Daily Mail shows today there are at least
6. 13 compelling reasons for Mr Straw’s measure -
7. 13 victims who would be alive today had a
8. loophole in the Mental Health Act not allowed
9. the disordered souls who killed them to roam at large. [ ]
10. As things stand, even those who beg to be put behind bars, to be
11. prevented from succumbing to their inner demons, men like Michael
12. Stone, the killer of Lin Russell and her daughter Megan,
13. cannot have their wish granted.
At the beginning of extract 4, the concept of preventative detention is introduced and 
the position adopted is that this is both necessary and inevitable. The underlying 
assumption of lines 2 and 3 is that ‘dangerous’ psychopaths (even if they have not 
committed a crime) pose a threat to the public and that they must therefore be 
detained. Thus, the issue of ‘dangerousness’ is foregrounded once again. Line 4 states 
categorically that this ‘will be welcomed by the general public’. Here ‘the general 
public’ is being treated as a homogeneous group and implicit in this is the idea that 
any right-minded person would agree. Lines 6 and 7 provide evidence to buttress the 
argument.
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The reference to ’13 victims’ (line 7) as ‘13 compelling reasons’ (line 6) grounds the 
argument in something that is purported to be a ‘fact’. The message is clear -  lives 
would have been saved if this measure had been adopted earlier. Additionally, the use 
and repetition of the ‘unlucky’ number ‘13’ appears to be invoking a rhetoric of 
superstition. This oblique allusion to the ‘supernatural’ reinforces the implication in 
line 11 that things might be happening that are ‘outside the normal laws of nature’. 
The construction of ‘madness by demonic possession’ being invoked here, brings to 
mind discourses relating to the ‘casting out of devils’ and horror films such as ‘The 
Exorcist’.
However, overall, in this version of psychopathology ‘dangerous’ individuals are not 
portrayed as ‘mad or bad’. The use of the words ‘disordered souls’ (line 9) is 
reminiscent of Anglo/Catholic religious discourses where Tost souls’ (see above) 
wander in limbo with no hope of salvation. These are ‘innocents’ who have been 
condemned to perpetual suffering though no fault of their own. In the text ‘the 
disordered souls’ are described as being prey to ‘inner demons’ (line 11) and we are 
told that even though they may ‘beg to be put behind bars’ (linelO), they ‘cannot have 
their wish granted’ (line 13).
The theme of the ‘innocent’ psychopath (lines 2 and 3) is picked up in many of the 
articles. Whereas individuals in the constructed category of ‘disordered souls’ may be 
murderers (‘13 compelling reasons’ -  ‘13 victims’), ‘innocent psychopaths’ are people 
who have not committed any offence. The label came from the title of an article in the 
Daily Telegraph: “MPs say ‘innocent’ psychopaths must lose their freedom” (16 
March 2000). The final extract picks up this theme.
Extract 5 (The Guardian, 20 December 2000. By Ray Rowden)
1. This afternoon’s much heralded white paper on mental health
2. legislation will play well to middle England in the run-up to an election -
3. but it will worry many people using mental health services and
4. many of the professionals working with them. [ ]
5. The white paper attempts to tackle the difficult issue of people
6. who are seen to be a serious danger to the public,
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7. and living with a personality disorder. [ ]
8. The problems lie in the diagnosis, treatment and risk assessment of
9. such people, which is flimsy. How can we justify indefinitely detaining a
10. citizen who has committed no offence based on a poorly constructed
11. diagnostic label?
Extract 5 begins by suggesting that there has been some delay in the publication of the 
consultative document on mental health reforms. The phrase ‘much heralded’ (line 1) 
implies that there has been a great deal of advance publicity about the government 
plans and there is a suggestion that the timing and nature of the reforms may be linked 
to the forthcoming election (line 2). The sporting metaphor embedded in the
proposition that it will ‘play well in middle England’ (line 2) evokes images of ‘fair
play’ and cricket on the village green. Furthermore there is an implied contrast here 
with other less fortunate ‘constituencies’, i.e. those inhabited by the ‘worried users of 
mental health services’ (line 3).
The suggestion that ‘many of the professionals working with them’ (line 4) will also 
be worried, may be being used to warrant the argument that is being constructed in the 
text. As ‘experts’ in mental health care, these professionals might be considered to 
have a particular kind of ‘category entitlement’ (Potter, 1996, p.133) and their 
opinions, therefore, could be considered to be persuasive.
In line 5 it seems as though a ‘disclaimer’ (Hewitt and Stokes, 1975) is being 
employed to give the impression of fairness. We are told that the White Paper 
‘attempts’ to tackle the ‘difficult’ issue [of dangerousness] but it fails because of the 
problems inherent in “the diagnosis, treatment and risk assessment of such people, 
which is flimsy.” (lines 8 and 9). The word ‘flimsy’ (line 9) suggests inadequacy and 
it also sets up the final criticism ‘How can we justify indefinitely detaining a citizen 
who has committed no offence based on a poorly constructed diagnostic label?’ (lines 
9, 10 and 11). The use of the word ‘citizen’ evokes discourses of human rights and the 
struggle for ‘liberty and equality’. Also inherent in the concept is the notion of 
‘brotherhood’ (fraternity) and this makes the proposal seem like a betrayal. Finally, it
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is suggested that the whole edifice is founded upon a fatally flawed conceptualisation 
-  “a poorly constructed diagnostic label” (line 11).
OVERVIEW
The conviction of Michael Stone for the murders of Lin and Megan Russell and the 
subsequent media interest in the case provided a valuable opportunity to examine the 
different ways that ‘dangerous psychopathologies’ are constructed in newspaper 
accounts.
However, it could be argued that the analysis put forward in this paper is 
predominantly an analysis of newspaper constructions of Michael Stone, rather than 
an analysis of ‘dangerous psychopathologies’ per se. To a certain extent, particularly 
in the early articles, this is true. But even in these articles it is evident that Michael 
Stone is being constructed in the texts as an exemplar for a wider group of so called 
‘dangerous individuals’ who might present a ‘risk’ to the public. Often press reports 
would begin by describing a variety of constructions of psychopathology which were 
being ascribed to Michael Stone, and then the discussion was broadened to include the 
issue of ‘dangerousness’ and how society should deal with what one leader writer has 
called “The intractable problem of psychopaths” {The Guardian, 20th July 1999).
It could also be argued that there might be cultural differences in the way that 
newspapers construct different versions of psychopathology (cf. Coyle and Morgan- 
Sykes, 1998). The texts in this study were all drawn from British newspapers and it 
may be that different constructions of ‘dangerous psychopathologies’ might be found 
in publications from abroad. A cross cultural study of press reports following the 
conviction of individuals for ‘capital offences’ might, therefore, provide rich 
opportunities for discourse analysts to examine the similarities and differences 
between, for example, the constructions of ‘dangerous psychopathologies’ put forward 
by Western journalists and those of their colleagues in the East.
However, turning to the analysis itself, one of the most striking features was the 
mad/bad dichotomy that was put forward in many of the articles. In the mad/bad
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construction of psychopathy individuals were positioned in one of several ways - as 
‘evil psychopaths’, ‘innocent psychopaths’ or ‘disordered souls’. In the ‘evil 
psychopath’ and the ‘disordered soul’ versions of psychopathology, individuals in 
both groups had committed indictable offences, but whereas ‘evil psychopaths’ were 
portrayed as being responsible for their acts, ‘disordered souls’ were represented as 
victims who had been let down by a failing system. People who had not committed an 
offence but who were deemed to be ‘suffering’ from such a ‘dangerous and severe 
personality disorder’ that they needed to be detained on grounds of public safety, were 
labelled ‘innocent psychopaths.’
In his consideration of psychopathy Blackburn (1995) argues that a ‘bad/mad’ 
dichotomy is nonsensical because “mad is not the opposite of bad” (p.97). He 
continues “Questions about badness or wickedness belong in the domain of moral 
discourse. Questions about madness belong in the domain of science. If it were that 
simple, we should have dispensed with the question long ago” (p.97). However it is 
interesting that this dichotomy can also be found in the psychological/psychiatric 
literature (for example see Bohmer, 1976; Boyd, 1971; Krober and Lau, 2000; Tucker, 
1999; Wilczynski, 1997) which lends support to Parker et al’s (1995) assertion that 
“Professional accounts .. cannot be separated from the wider cultural context” (p.65).
Returning to the analysis above the way that these categories are constructed in the 
newspaper reports is important because issues of blame and responsibility are at stake 
here and this can have far reaching effects on treatment options and outcomes. As has 
been mentioned above people labelled with the diagnosis of PD are often 
disadvantaged compared with other patient groups because they are considered to be 
responsible for their actions and therefore ‘less worthy’ of help than people with 
recognised mental illnesses, who are often thought to be “less responsible and less in 
control of their actions” (Lewis and Appleby, 1988. p.44). Consequently constructions 
of psychopathology which position people in any of these groups will have profound 
implications for the way that they are treated by the criminal justice system and/or 
mental health services.
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In addition to personal responsibility, issues of fact and blame relating to collective 
responsibility were also rehearsed in the texts. In some articles (for example the Daily 
Mirror, 24 October 1998) a variety of rhetorical devices was used to blame the West 
Kent Health Authority for its failure to provide adequate care for Michael Stone in the 
months leading up to the murders of Lin and Megan Russell. In other articles 
accusations were also levelled against psychiatrists (Daily Mail, 27th October 1998) 
and the Government (Sunday Times, 25 October 1998).
The ‘issue of dangerousness’ (Foucault, 1978) was a prominent theme in many 
newspaper accounts. In each of the five extracts reproduced above this construction 
was evident to a greater or lesser extent. Sometimes the issue was foregrounded as in 
extracts 1, 3 and 4, at other times it was used to support alternative themes. The 
construction of the issue of dangerousness is important because it was used in many of 
the articles as a ‘rallying call to action’. Overall it was probably this issue more than 
any other that was instrumental in bringing about the government review of the 1983 
Mental Health Act.
The proposal contained in the White Paper (Home Office & Department of Health, 
2000) to detain people diagnosed with ‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’, 
(DSPD) who have not committed an indictable offence, has profound ethical and legal 
implications. Psychiatrists have warned that the assessment of ‘dangerousness’ is a far 
from an exact science (Cavadino, 1999) and the potential infringement of the legal 
rights of so many unconvicted people has raised serious concerns among civil liberties 
groups.
It has been estimated that approximately ten per cent of the general adult population 
have a diagnosable ‘personality disorder’ (Norton, 1996). Although this constructed 
category has been criticised by many writers because it is widely used as a diagnostic 
label, it seems likely that most clinicians will have at least one or two clients who 
have received a formal diagnosis of PD on their lists. This study has shown that in 
newspaper constructions of psychopathology, the term ‘dangerous and severe 
personality disorder’ is sometimes used interchangeably with the term ‘psychopath’. It 
has also shown that in some cases the term ‘psychopath’ has been used as a kind of
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shorthand for ‘personality disorder’. People fearful of being positioned as ‘socially 
dangerous’, may be wary of seeking help from mental health professionals if the 
proposed legislation is passed. Newspaper articles, which provide inflammatory or 
misleading information, are likely to make an already difficult situation worse.
Tomison (1999) has written eloquently about the fears of some of his patients 
following press reports of the Home Secretary’s proposals for the compulsory 
detention of DSPD. In the same article he also writes about his own concern that the 
proposed legislation may prevent some patients from talking freely about their more 
violent or sadistic fantasies. Anything that prevents people from talking about difficult 
issues in therapy is relevant to counselling psychologists. It is hoped, therefore, that 
this research will be of value to the profession, by providing an insight into the 
mechanisms by which media constructions of ‘dangerous psychopathologies’ help to 
shape both public and professional perceptions of people diagnosed with PD.
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Table 1. Thematic analysis of the newspaper articles.
Constructions of Dangerous Public Safety versus
Psychopathologies Civil Rights
Mad or Bad1 13 Dangerousness 68
Evil Psychopaths2 37 Public Safety 57
Innocent Psychopath3 28 Civil Liberties 48
Disordered Souls4 26 Stigmatisation 7
Legal and Medical Issues
Dilemmas: Criticisms o f Current Practice:
Diagnosis5 32 Care in the Community 19
Treatability6 84 Government 14
LMHA7 92 Psychiatrists 31
Financial8 26
Risk Assessment9 29
Action
Call for Action10 21
Preventative Detention11 70
The Third Way12 12
Other Gov’t Proposals 22
N B  The m ain figures in  the box indicate the number o f  articles that exp licitly  
m ention the theme.
1 Versions o f  ‘dangerous psych opa th o log ies ’ cen tred  aroun d a m a d /bad  dichotom y.
2 Version o fp sych o p a th y  which p o r tra y e d  individuals as bein g  respon sib le  f o r  their actions.
3P eo p le  who h a d  no t com m itted  an offence bu t who w ere  deem ed  to b e  ‘su fferin g ’ fro m  such a  
‘dangerous an d  severe  p erso n a lity  d iso rd e r ’ (D SPD ) tha t they n eeded  to  b e  d e ta in ed  on the  
grounds o f  pu b lic  safety.
4 Version o fp sych o p a th y  in which individuals w ere represen ted  as vic tim s o f  a  fa ilin g  system .
5 D ilem m as arou n d  the d iagnosis o f  person a lity  disorder.
6 W hether o r  n o t individuals are  con sidered  to be  am enable to treatm ent.
7 L ooph ole in the M en ta l H ealth A c t i.e. -  i f  n o t deem ed  ‘tr e a ta b le ’, deten tion  under the
curren t M en ta l H ealth  A c t not possib le .
8 C ost benefit analysis o f  o th er approaches.
9 A ssessm en t o f  ‘dangerousness ’.
10 C urrent arrangem ents m ust be  im proved  upon.
11 D eten tion  on the basis o f  an tic ipa ted  ‘dangerous beh aviou r’.
12 N ew  S ervice to ca ter  f o r  p e o p le  who do not f i t  in the current M en ta l H ealth  o r  C rim in al
Justice  System s.
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Social representations of personality disorder:
Professional and lay understandings
ABSTRACT
A newly developed questionnaire designed to examine social representations of 
‘personality’ and ‘personality disorder’ was administered to 160 health professionals 
(66 psychologists, 47 general practitioners and 47 social workers) and 91 lay 
participants (45 science students and 46 arts students) (Total N=251). It was predicted 
that, because of their “expert status”, health professionals would have different 
understandings of ‘personality disorder’ than lay (i.e. non-expert) participants. It was 
also predicted that, because of differences in training, the representations of general 
practitioners would be different to those of psychologists and social workers. 
Discriminant Functional Analysis demonstrated that the questionnaire does 
discriminate between the professional and lay groups. Partial support was also found 
for the second prediction - Function I of the Discriminant Function Analysis did group 
the psychologists and the social workers together but Function 2 grouped the 
psychologists with the general practitioners. This second finding runs counter to the 
research hypothesis; a possible explanation for this is that the approach to the trainings 
are not so clearly differentiated as had been thought at the outset. Limitations of the 
study and directions for future research are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
“Mental health professionals play a uniquely powerful role in the 
construction o f societal beliefs about mental health. As society’s “experts ” 
they have the power to define who is mentally unwell and how they should 
be treated .. In addition, [they] occupy a distinctive position at the 
crossroads between various social agendas, working at the interface 
between lay and expert knowledge -  belief systems whose basic 
assumptions and agendas may not necessarily correspond” (Morant,
1998, p. 667).
In recent years there has been an increasing focus in medical and academic 
psychology upon the social construction of psychopathological categories. Many 
writers have highlighted the stigmatising effect of pathologizing labels (e.g. Fink and 
Tasman, 1992; Parker et al., 1995; Tomm, 1990), while critics of psychodiagnostics 
(Laing, 1959; Silverstein, 1968; Szasz, 1972) point out that the classification and 
naming of abstract entities as ‘mental disorders’ serves to reify them and that this, in 
turn, can lend credence to flawed conceptualisations. Gergen (2001) observes that “the 
number of labels for ‘mental illness’ has expanded exponentially over the present 
century” and he argues that “Diagnostic categories function largely as moral 
judgements, reconstructing socially undesirable actions as diseases” (p.l).
This would seem to be particularly relevant in the case of ‘so called’ personality 
disorder (PD). In medicine (and psychiatry in particular) personality disorder is a 
widely used clinical diagnosis. ‘Enshrined’ in the two standard psychiatric 
classificatory schemes - the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) and the International Classification 
of Diseases (ICD) (World Health Organization, 1992) - the term ‘personality disorder’ 
is used by clinicians both as a descriptor of and an explanation for certain kinds of 
behaviour which fall outside socially accepted norms (Babika and Arnold, 1997). It 
has also entered into common usage via the news and entertainment media and the
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label is frequently ascribed to people who are generally considered to be ‘dangerous’ 
(Dunstan, 2001).
However, even within psychiatry, some clinicians have questioned the validity of the 
concept. For example, Costello (1996) points to the inadequacies of current 
taxonomies and suggests that it would make much more sense, both conceptually and 
clinically, to abandon the current categorical approach to personality disorder utilised 
by DSM and ICD and adopt a new approach based upon the observable behaviours 
and personality traits commonly associated with PD. Costello (1996) suggests that, 
“when we have gained thorough knowledge of the nature of these personality 
characteristics, we should then begin to investigate their interrelationships. In this 
way, we are likely to arrive at more valid diagnoses and at some understanding of the 
process underlying the conditions diagnosed” (p.vii).
In 1998 several high profile issues brought the term ‘personality disorder’ into the 
wider public arena, but two events in particular captured the public imagination. The 
first was the conviction of Michael Stone for the murders of Lin and Megan Russell, 
and the attempted murder of Josie Russell. The second was what came to be known in 
the press as the ‘case of the Carstairs Psychopaths’.
The murders of Lin and Megan Russell were particularly horrific. In 1996, Lin and her 
two daughters, Josie and Megan, had been walking home after school one day when 
they were attacked by a stranger wielding a hammer. Lin and her younger daughter 
Megan were killed but Josie survived. The subsequent arrest and conviction of 
Michael Stone in 1998 for these murders seemed to expose a serious flaw in the 1983 
Mental Health Act. At the time of his trial it was widely reported that Michael Stone 
had visited his psychiatrist shortly before the murders but, because of a loophole in the 
1983 Mental Health Act (the ‘treatability’ criterion), he had been refused admission to 
a secure unit.
In his consideration of the issue of ‘treatability’, Maden (1999) notes that the 1983 
Mental Health Act does not actually use the term but speaks instead “of a likelihood 
that treatment will alleviate or prevent deterioration in the patient’s disorder” (p.708).
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The treatability criterion was incorporated into the 1983 Mental Health Act to prevent 
individuals from being detained in institutions indefinitely, when there was no 
reasonable expectation that their condition would improve. It is ironic therefore that 
something which grew out of a concern for civil rights has been used by some 
psychiatrists as a covert means of rationing health service resources. Maden (1999) 
writes “There are few more depressing sights than the complacency with which some 
psychiatrists will diagnose an untreatable personality disorder, conclude that 
supervision is impossible -  then leave a probation officer to carry out the supervision” 
(p.708).
The issue of treatability also lies at the heart of the case of the ‘Carstairs Psychopaths’. 
Noel Ruddel had been convicted in 1992 for the murder of his neighbour with a 
Kalashnikov rifle in 1991 and he had been admitted to Carstairs State Hospital in 
Scotland “Without limit of time”. Seven years later his legal team mounted a 
successful challenge to the sentence, arguing that because his condition was 
untreatable (at his trial he had been described by psychiatrists as a psychopath), under 
the terms of the 1983 Mental Health Act, it was not lawful for him to be detained 
indefinitely in a psychiatric institution. This case caused considerable embarrassment 
to the newly appointed Scottish Executive because it transpired that twelve other 
patients might also be able to exploit this legal loophole. It was also embarrassing to 
the British Government because the news about the Carstairs Psychopaths ‘hit the 
headlines’ not long after the conviction of Michael Stone for the murders of Lin and 
Megan Russell. The intensive media coverage surrounding both cases caused 
widespread public concern. The tabloid press was particularly vociferous in its 
criticism and condemnation of mental health policy, and the rhetoric of these articles 
helped to set the tenor of the subsequent debate.
Dunstan (2001) found that a construction of what Foucault (1978) termed the ‘issue of 
dangerousness’ was evident in many of the newspaper accounts. An additional feature 
of these reports is that a variety of pathologizing labels were used apparently 
interchangeably (e.g. ‘psychopath’, ‘sociopath’, ‘anti-social personality disorder’, 
‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’, ‘serious personality disorder’, ‘dangerous 
personality disorder’ and ‘personality disorder’).
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The fact that journalists used different labels apparently interchangeably suggests that, 
in lay/non-expert thinking, the term ‘personality disorder’ does not have the same 
consensual status that it does in the world of mental health. It seems likely that, in 
popular conceptualisation, there is considerable confusion and ambiguity about what 
‘personality disorder’ is, what its boundaries are and what the differences are between 
terms that sound (to the lay ear) quite similar. This is important because research 
studies have shown that the media plays a key role in the shaping of social 
representations of mental health issues (Glasgow University Media Group, 1994; 
Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith, 1995; Philo, 1994; Rose, 
1998; Scott, 1994). Parker et al. (1995) highlight the pervasiveness of images of 
psychopathology, not just in newspaper articles but across a wide range of art and 
media productions. They argue that assimilation of these images into culture 
transforms both lay and professional representations of mental health issues and that 
this can be seen in the way that constructions of ‘madness’ change over time.
A social representations study of professional and lay understandings of 
personality disorder.
The theory of social representations (Moscovici, 1984, 1985, 1988) is concerned with 
the way that knowledge is represented in society. It has been built around the idea 
that individuals make sense of new information by drawing upon pre-existing 
knowledge structures, which have been acquired principally through social 
interactions and the mass media.
Social representation theory (SRs) is founded upon the twin processes of anchoring 
and objectification. In its original form anchoring is the mechanism “which strives to 
anchor strange ideas, to reduce them to ordinary categories and images, to set them in 
a familiar context” (ibid. 1984, p. 29, emphasis in original). It is a way of ‘making the 
unfamiliar, familiar’. Anchoring is also assumed to be a universal phenomenon 
(Billig, 1993).
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The second mechanism, objectification, is not assumed to be a universal process 
(Billig, 1993) but, like anchoring, objectification also helps to make the unfamiliar 
familiar. Describing the phenomenon of social representations, Moscovici (1984) 
explains that objectification “saturates the idea of unfamiliarity with reality, turns it 
into the very essence of reality” (p.38). In other words, it is the mechanism by which 
abstract concepts are ‘concretised’ or made real.
Morant (1998) writes that Moscovici’s (1985) theory “provides a framework for 
understanding the dynamic processes through which historically and culturally 
specific beliefs, knowledge and practices develop and circulate. It attempts to 
conceptualize how individuals and collectivities make sense of their social world 
through conversation, social practices and interactions with the mass media. The 
strength of the theory lies in its ability to conceptualize both the power of society and 
social forces and the agency of individuals” (p.667).
In her Italian study, Zani (1993) found that there were significant differences between 
the social representations of mental illness held by mental health workers and those of 
lay/non-expert participants. If, as the research literature suggests, lay/non-expert 
understandings of mental health issues are rooted primarily in media images and 
popular culture, it would seem likely that newspaper constructions of personality 
disorder and ‘dangerousness’ will have a profound effect upon the objectification of 
PD. As has been noted above, newspapers frequently use a variety of pathologizing 
labels interchangeably and one would expect this confusion to be reflected in lay 
representations of personality disorder.
Expert knowledge is also shaped by social and cultural influences, although 
professional representations of ‘psychopathology’ and mental ill-health are derived 
primarily from medical discourses. This expert knowledge system had wielded a great 
deal of power throughout the 19th and 20th centuries and the codification of its 
principles in ICD (World Health Organisation, 1992) and DSM (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) has further extended this influence.
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The research reported in this article will attempt to discover the similarities and 
differences between professional and lay representations of ‘personality disorder’. A 
preliminary hypothesis is that there will be differences between the understandings of 
these two main groups. It is predicted that the professional group will have a greater 
understanding of the issues surrounding the aetiology, diagnosis and treatment of 
‘personality disorder’ than lay people, and that the latter group (not having access to 
the same expert knowledge systems as medical practitioners and mental health 
professionals) will tend to draw more upon news and entertainment media 
representations for information about PD.
However, as Zani’s (1993) research has demonstrated, ‘health professionals’ may not 
necessarily be a homogeneous group, which shares a single system of beliefs, values 
and social representations. For example, because of their training, doctors may 
espouse views closely linked to the ‘medical model’ of treatment, whereas 
psychologists and social workers, whose training has a very different philosophical 
basis, may hold beliefs and values more in line with a psychosocial view. A second 
hypothesis therefore is that there will be within group differences between the three 
groups in the professional sample.
Traditionally, researchers studying social representations have employed both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection (Breakwell and Canter, 1993; 
Doise, Clemence and Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993). To examine professional and lay 
representations of PD, this study will use a newly developed self-report questionnaire 
containing statements specifically chosen to represent different aspects of the 
aetiology, diagnosis and treatment of personality disorder.
In summary, this study aims to examine the content of professional and lay 
representations of personality disorder. In particular, the following hypotheses will be 
explored:
Hypothesis 1 Predicts that because of their “expert status” mental health 
professionals will have different understandings of ‘personality disorder’ than lay (i.e. 
non-expert) participants.
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Hypothesis 2 Predicts that, because of differences in training, the representations of 
general practitioners will be different to those of psychologists and social workers.
METHOD 
Samples
The sample included two main groups of participants -  professional and lay. The 
professional group was comprised of health workers: general practitioners (GPs), 
clinical and counselling psychologists (because both groups work psycho- 
therapeutically with clients in health care settings) and social workers. Participants in 
the professional sample were identified in four ways:
1) Lists of principals in general practice were obtained from three primary care groups 
in the south east of England and all of the GPs appearing on these lists were given an 
opportunity to participate. 2) The names and addresses of psychologists working in 
the South Thames region were obtained from the regional list and letters were sent to 
86 (randomly selected) practitioners. 3) Trainee counselling psychologists on a 
practitioner doctorate course at a university in the south east of England were 
contacted by letter and invited to participate. 4) Social workers were recruited from 
three community mental health teams in the south east of England.
The lay group consisted of students from different educational schools in a university 
in the south east of England: arts students (from a School of Performing Arts) and 
science students (from a Department of Mechanical and Process Engineering, and a 
Department of Chemistry).
The response rates of the different groups varied considerably. A cut-off date for the 
inclusion of questionnaires in the study was agreed upon in advance and any forms 
that arrived after that date were excluded from the analysis. The individual rates for 
each group are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1 Response Rates for each group.
Number Sent Response Rate Age (mean)* Sex*
Psychologists 120 66 (55%) 33 years 49 females, 14 males
GPs 130 47 (36%) 43 years 16 females, 28 males
Social Workers 100 47 (47%) 37 years 36 females, 10 males
Science Students 150 45 (30%) 25 years 15 females, 30 males
Arts Students 150 46 (31%) 20 years 32 females, 11 males
Total 650 251 (39.8%)
*NB. Some o f  the demographic data are missing
Mean response rate across samples = 40 per cent. The sample was predominantly 
White (89%) with the remainder of the sample (11%) from other ethnic groups (4 
Black-Caribbean, 4 Black African, 3 Indian, 1 Pakistani, 1 Bangladeshi and 12 
‘Other’) * (see above).
Instruments
The questionnaire is a self-report measure consisting of 36 statements chosen to 
represent themes such as the definition of PD, the aetiology of the disorder, the 
consequences of being labelled with a diagnosis of PD, issues surrounding the 
supposed ‘dangerousness’ of individuals who have been diagnosed as suffering from a 
‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’, the types of intervention deemed to be 
most appropriate for the treatment of PD, the places considered to be most suitable for 
the treatment of personality disorder (i.e. in specialist units or in the community) and 
issues of blame and responsibility. The items were derived from two sources:
i) Dunstan (2001) conducted an analysis of newspaper constructions of ‘dangerous 
psychopathologies’ (see Dunstan, 2001, for a review of the methodology). In all, over 
100 articles were examined and a thematic analysis of the data set was conducted. The 
themes that she found were used as a basis for the construction of a semi-structured 
questionnaire.
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ii) Key informants were consulted to assist with this task and help to refine the 
research items. These key informants included: a psychiatrist (who specialises in the 
treatment of people diagnosed with severe PD), a chartered forensic psychologist, two 
research psychologists (both of whom have considerable research experience in this 
field) and ten practising clinical and counselling psychologists. A small (six subject) 
pilot study was conducted, using a non-professional sample to ensure that lay 
participants could make sense of the items and understand the terms used in the 
questionnaire. Following this some minor changes were made.
The questionnaire (see Appendix I) consists of two parts. Part One provided a list of 
five words ( ‘myself, ‘normal’, 'psychopath ’, ‘mentally ill’and ‘personality disorder’) 
and participants were asked to write down any words that came into their minds when 
they read each one. Part Two consisted of 36 statements. In this section, participants 
were asked read the statements and mark, on a five point summative scale, to what 
extent they agreed with each statement. Following consultations with a 
psychometrician, it was decided not to rotate the order of the stimulus words in Part 
One but to present them to participants in a fixed order
Procedure
The research proposal (plus a copy of the questionnaire) was submitted to the 
University of Surrey’s Advisory Committee on Ethics and ethical approval for the 
study was obtained (see Appendix II). Individually addressed envelopes containing a 
questionnaire and a covering letter (see Appendix I) were sent to 300 lay participants 
(150 science students and 150 arts students) and 350 professionals (130 general 
practitioners, 120 psychologists and 100 social workers). The students returned their 
completed forms via the university’s internal postal system. The professionals were 
provided with stamped addressed envelopes.
Data Analysis
The data were coded and analysed using SPSS (Version 10). Multivariate data 
analysis consisted of Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA). Hammond (2000)
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writes, “The technique of discriminant function analysis begins by forming a 
composite of the dependent variables such that this composite variable will maximally 
discriminate between the groups. This composite variable (or function), as in the case 
of multiple regression, is made up by weighting the dependent variables. A simple 
analysis of the group differences on this composite variable is then carried out” 
(p.383). See below for the results.
RESULTS 
Representations of ‘normality’ and ‘psychopathology’
The responses to five stimulus words in Part One of the questionnaire produced over 
5500 1 free associations. Following Zani (1993), the data were reduced according to 
the rules of content analysis outlined by Holsti (1968) and themes were extracted for 
each group (see Appendix II for the complete list). Words that could not be assigned 
to a category were excluded from the analysis, and the remaining items were given to 
another rater to assess the reliability of the initial categorisation process. For this task 
a ‘forced choice’ procedure was adopted and the second rater was presented with the 
categories which had been pre-determined by the researcher. The agreement between 
the two raters on this task was high -  the overall percentage was 76%.
However percentage agreement does not take into account agreement that might occur 
by chance (Cohen, 1960) so the data were entered into the formula for Cohen’s kappa 
and kappa co-efficients were calculated for the pairings for each word ('M yself = 
0.71; ‘Normal’ = 0.68; ‘Psychopath’ ~ 0.76; ‘Mentally III’ = 0.67; ‘Personality 
Disorder ’ = 0.59). The mean kappa across the categories was 0.68, which suggests 
that there is an acceptable level of inter-rater agreement for this task (Bakeman and 
Gottman, 1989). Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 show the themes that were mentioned most 
frequently by participants.
1 2147 if  you exclude repetitions.
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Figure 1 Themes generated from the free associations to stimulus word ‘myself
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Figure 2 Themes generated from the free associations to stimulus word ‘normal
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Figure 3 Themes generated from the free associations to stimulus word 
‘psychopath’
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Figure 4 Themes generated from the free associations to stimulus words 
‘mentally ill’.
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Figure 5 Themes generated from the free associations to stimulus words 
‘personality disorder’.
Examination of the capacity of the questionnaire to discriminate between groups.
To investigate the differences between the groups, discriminant function analyses 
were performed on the data using a stepwise selection procedure. Because one of the 
assumptions of DFA is that there should not be more predictor variables included in 
the analysis than there are cases in the smallest group (Tabachnick and Fidell, 1996), 
nine of the predictor variables that related to characteristics which were not felt to be 
cardinal features of PD were excluded from the analysis (Q6 and, from Q 36, 
“Compared to the general population people with personality disordered are likely to 
be” [more or less] responsible, independent, detached, intelligent, attractive, 
superficial, charming, and eccentric). Additionally, although there were some 
moderate violations to the assumptions of multivariate normality, because DFA has
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been shown to be reasonably robust, logarithmic transformations were not performed 
on the data (Lachenbruch, 1975).
Analysis 1 investigated the differences between the three professional groups. Table 2 
shows the statistics of the two discriminating functions. Both functions are highly 
significant (p ~ 0) and the results show that the percentage of groups correctly 
classified (equal priors) = 80%.
Table 2. Discriminant Function Analysis to Distinguish between the three 
Professional Groups
Function Eigenvalue % o f  Cumulative Canonical Test o f  Wilks’ Lambda Chi-Square d f Significance
Variance % Correlation Function
1 1.339* 70.8  70.8 .757 1 through 2 .276 193.993 28 .000
2 .551* 29 .2  100.0 .596 2 .645 66.078  13 .000
* F ir s t 2  ca n o n ica l d iscrim in an t fu n c tio n s  w e re  u sed  in th e an a lysis
Figure 6 is a graphic depiction of the cases in the three groups plotted on a single 
scatter plot using the two discriminant functions as axes and the clusters can be clearly 
seen. The classification results in Table 3 show that the general practitioners were the 
most accurately classified by the predictor variables (87.2%) followed by the 
psychologists (77.3%) and the social workers (76.6%). An analysis of the incorrectly 
classified cases reveals that psychologists were most likely to be misclassified as 
social workers (10 = social workers, 5 = GPs), social workers were most likely to be 
misclassified as psychologists (8 = psychologists, 3 = GPs) and general practitioners 
were most likely to be misclassified as psychologists (4 = psychologists, 2 = social 
workers). The overall percentage of cases classified correctly is 80.0% (128 out of 
160). Even allowing for the number of cases that may be misclassified by chance 
(Norusis, 1998), the results suggest that the questionnaire does discriminate 
effectively between groups.
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Figure 6 Scatter Plot showing Professional Groups using Discriminant Functions 
1 and 2 as Axes.
Table 3 Classification results of the professional groups
GROUP
Predicted Group Membership* 
P sycholog ists G P s Social W orkers Total
O rig in a l P sychologists 51 5 10 66
C ount G Ps 4 41 2 47
Social W orkers 8 3 36 47
%  P sychologists 77.3 7.6 15.2 100.0
G Ps 8.5 87.2 4.3 100.0
Social W orkers 17.0 6.4 76.6 100.0
*  80.0% o f original grouped cases correctly classified
The standardised canonical discriminant function coefficients and the predictor- 
function correlations were examined to see which variables were best at
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discriminating between the three groups. Table 4 presents the results of the 
discriminant analysis showing the composition of each function. All the variables with 
the highest correlations (after the raw scores had been standardised) are listed. The 
group scores for the individual variables are listed in Table 9.
Table 5 (overleaf) shows the relationship of canonical discriminant functions to the 
group means.
Table 4 Results of Analysis 1 showing the composition of the two functions.
Function
1 2
Q30 P eo p le  with severe  P D  rarely  im prove with treatm ent -.488* -.128
Q7 P erson a lity  D iso rd er  is a  trea tab le  condition -.485* .291
Q28 P eo p le  w ith  severe  P D  are  unlikely to com ply with treatm ent -.361* -.163
Q18 U sing the term  perso n a lity  d iso rder to describe  som eone is stigm atising .320* .081
Q26 P sych opa th s a re  ‘b a d ’ -.277* -.143
Reliable .254 -.473*
Burden on resources -.334 .381*
Anti-social -.156 .349*
Impulsive -.038 .330*
*Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function
Table 5 Canonical discriminant functions of Analysis 1 evaluated at group means
Group Function I Function II
1 -.811 -.707 (Psychologists)
2 1.774 -7.223E-2 (General Practitioners)
3 -.636 1.065 (Social Workers)
The evaluation of the function at group means reported in Table 5 shows that Function 
I is the best discriminator. This is supported by the chi-squared coefficient (see Table
2) which is smaller in the second function.
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Analysis 2 investigated the differences between the professional and lay groups. Table 
6 shows the statistics of the discriminating function. As in Analysis 1, the function is 
highly significant (p ~ 0) and the results show that the percentage of groups correctly 
classified (equal priors) = 86.5%.
Table 6 Discriminant Function Analysis to Distinguish between the Professional 
and Lay Groups
Function Eigenvalue % o f  Cumulative Canonical Test o f  Wilks’ Lambda Chi-Square d f Significance 
Variance % Correlation Function
1 1.202* 100.0 100.0 .739 1 .454 191.441 13 .000
* F irst 1 ca n o n ica l d isc rim in an t fu n c tio n  w a s  u sed  in th e an a lysis
The classification results show that the lay participants were the most accurately 
classified by the predictor variables (87.9%) followed by the professionals (85.6%). 
The overall percentage of cases classified correctly = 86.5% (217 out of 251). Again, 
even allowing for the number of cases that may be misclassified by chance the results 
suggest that the questionnaire does discriminate effectively between the professional 
and lay groups.
As in Analysis 1, the standardised canonical discriminant function coefficients and the 
predictor-function correlations were examined to see which variables were best at 
discriminating between the three groups. Table 7 presents the results of the 
discriminant analysis showing the composition of the function. The variables with the 
highest correlations (after the raw scores had been standardised) are listed.
Table 8 shows the relationship of canonical discriminant function to the group means.
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Table 7 Results of Analysis 2 showing the composition of the function.
Function
1
Empathic .392
Q25 P sych o tic  an d  psych opa th ic  are  different nam es f o r  the sam e condition .376
Burden on resources -.339
Q18 U sing the term  perso n a lity  d iso rder to describe  som eone is stigm atisin g -.323
Q23 A n ti-socia l perso n a lity  d iso rder is another nam e f o r  p sych opa th y -.314
Q14 P eo p le  who s e l f  harm  do  so  to gain  attention from  others .250
Table 8 Canonical discriminant functions of Analysis 2 evaluated at group means 
Group Function I
1 .824 (Professionals)
2 -1.448 (Lay Group)
The evaluation of the function at group means reported in Table 8 shows that Function 
I discriminates well between the two groups.
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Table 9 Group means for the individual variables
Psych. GP
Qi 2.42 2.02
Q2 1.83 1.81
Q3 2.05 2.49
Q4 3.14 2.77
Q5 2.36 3.15
Q6 3.42 3.30
Q7 2.30 3.62
Q8 2.50 2.26
Q9 2.33 2.62
Q10 4.26 3.68
Qll 2.20 2.49
Q12 2.23 2.83
Q13 2.03 2.87
Q14 3.65 3.00
Q15 3.36 2.77
Q16 1.62 2.43
Q17 2.14 2.85
Q18 1.73 2.55
Q19 1.52 1.81
Q20 1.52 2.02
Q21 2.94 3.13
Q22 2.64 2.68
Q23 2.56 2.68
Q24 2.79 2.17
Q25 4.35 4.51
Q26 3.80 3.02
Q27 3.47 2.77
Q28 3.14 2.23
Q29 3.50 3.11
Q30 3.41 2.38
Q31 2.00 2.49
Q32 3.77 3.55
Q33 2.45 2.96
Q34 2.98 2.38
Q35 3.47 3.04
aggressive 2.27 2.09
emotionally stable 4.17 4.11
anti-social 2.48 2.32
narcissistic 2.39 2.45
paranoid 2.27 2.60
obsessive 2.36 2.32
sensation seeking 2.32 2.15
empathic 3.79 3.98
burden/resources 2.26 1.81
reliable 3.92 4.15
impulsive 1.94 2.02
Trustworthy 3.45 3.91
Social W Student S Student A
2.40 2.47 2.28
1.79 1.64 1.78
2.26 2.13 3.30
3.32 2.98 2.98
2.94 2.73 2.63
3.45 3.24 3.41
2.85 2.56 2.35
2.70 2.53 3.17
2.68 2.56 2.57
3.77 4.04 3.57
2.64 2.58 2.46
2.34 2.80 2.39
2.23 2.00 1.83
3.77 2.73 3.00
3.32 2.93 2.80
2.17 2.18 1.89
2.57 2.51 2.87
1.91 2.67 2.80
1.68 2.04 2.20
1.53 1.93 1.83
2.74 3.20 3.17
2.40 2.78 2.72
2.77 3.38 3.28
2.45 2.24 2.28
4.15 3.62 3.41
3.51 3.13 3.50
3.02 2.87 3.15
2.83 3.11 3.17
3.32 3.20 2.89
3.17 3.13 3.50
2.28 2.42 2.50
3.51 3.31 3.09
2.51 2.98 2.54
2.94 2.96 3.22
3.38 3.02 2.93
2.45 2.29 2.13
4.06 4.20 4.20
3.02 2.91 2.87
2.70 2.71 2.98
2.40 2.16 2.11
2.38 2.04 2.17
2.45 2.47 2.65
3.40 3.27 2.87
2.70 2.80 2.87
3.43 3.64 3.83
2.36 2.22 2.41
3.49 3.38 3.54
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The differences between groups were also examined by selecting the univariate 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) option in the statistics menu of the discriminant 
function analysis. Table 10 provides a list of the variables where statistically 
significant differences between the means of the three professional groups were found.
Table 10 Statistically significant differences between the means of the three 
professional groups
Wilks’ Lambda F dfl d£2 Sig.
Q5 .892 9.26 2 157 .000
Q7 .735 28.401 2 157 .000
Q8 .959 3.383 2 157 .036
Q10 .920 6.823 2 157 .001
Q l l .959 3.337 2 157 .038
Q12 .925 6.358 2 157 .002
Q13 .881 10.587 2 157 .000
Q14 .905 8.270 2 157 .000
Q15 .915 7.325 2 157 .001
Q16 .826 16.517 2 157 .000
Q17 .890 9.666 2 157 .000
Q18 .876 11.081 2 157 .000
Q20 .920 6.828 2 157 .001
Q24 .929 6.035 2 157 .003
Q26 .897 8.968 2 157 .000
Q27 .913 7.445 2 157 .001
Q28 .841 14.868 2 157 .000
Q30 .753 25.747 2 157 .000
Q31 .945 4.602 2 157 .011
Q33 .953 3.835 2 157 .024
Q34 .923 6.572 2 157 .002
Q35 .957 3.531 2 157 .032
aggressive .942 4.794 2 157 .010
anti-social .909 7.820 2 157 .001
empathic .909 7.833 2 157 .001
burden on resources .813 18.025 2 157 .000
reliable .827 16.474 2 157 .000
impulsive .942 4.872 2 157 .009
trustworthy .894 9.335 2 157 .000
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Table 11 provides a list of the variables where statistically significant differences 
between the means of the professional and lay groups were found.
Table 11 Statistically significant differences between the means of the 
professional and lay groups
Wilks’ Lambda F dfl df2 Sig.
Q7 .963 9.646 1 249 .002
Q8 .943 9.813 1 249 .002
Q13 .962 9.715 1 249 .002
Q14 .930 18.694 1 249 .000
Q15 .977 5.775 1 249 .017
Q18 .888 31.285 1 249 .000
Q19 .925 20.261 1 249 .000
Q21 .984 4.096 1 249 .044
Q23 .894 29.479 1 249 .000
Q25 .855 42.240 1 249 .000
Q28 .962 9.915 1 249 .002
Q29 .980 4.983 1 249 .026
Q30 .974 6.581 1 249 .011
Q31 .984 4.155 1 249 .043
Q32 .956 11.514 1 249 .001
Q34 .979 5.219 1 249 .023
Q35 .967 8.613 1 249 .004
anti-social .980 5.126 1 249 .024
narcissistic .955 11.706 1 249 .001
paranoid .973 6.926 1 249 .009
obsessive .969 7.999 1 249 .005
sensation seeking .968 8.157 1 249 .005
empathic .844 45.981 1 249 .000
burden on resources .879 34.327 1 249 .000
impulsive .980 5.197 1 249 .023
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DISCUSSION
Response Rates
The response rates of the psychologists (55 per cent) and the social workers (47 per 
cent) were encouraging given that it was a postal survey and it is extremely difficult to 
obtain high rates using this method (Fife-Schaw, 2000). Similarly, the return rate of 
the GPs (36 per cent) although lower in absolute terms, was gratifying because GPs 
are a notoriously difficult group to access for research purposes (Stocks and Gunnell, 
2000). By contrast the student samples were somewhat disappointing (arts -  31 per 
cent and science -  30 per cent). The comparatively poor response of these groups 
may, in part, be due to the timing of the survey. The forms were distributed in the two 
weeks before the Easter break and the students may have been preoccupied with 
coursework deadlines.
Overall there was a gender imbalance in the sample. Far more female than male 
psychologists are represented in the study but this was predictable because the 
majority of the psychologists targeted were female. This reflects a wider trend in 
psychology for a preponderance of female applications both to undergraduate and 
post-graduate psychology courses. The same is true of the social work sample. In the 
case of the GPs, the situation is reversed: there were more male participants than 
female. But again this may be a reflection of the fact that, although record numbers of 
women are now entering medical schools currently, the majority of principals in 
general practice are male. There is a greater balance in the student/lay sample. 
Although there are more female than male arts students, there are more male than 
female science students and these figures reflect the gender balances in both 
disciplines.
Representations of ‘normality’ and ‘psychopathology’.
The ffee-associations to the stimulus words - ‘mentally ill’, ‘psychopath’ and 
‘personality disorder’ provided interesting information about the semantic universe of
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mental illness and ‘personality disorder’. These collections of words or ‘dictionaries’ 
(Doise et al. 1993) suggest that the associated SRs of the respondents are rich and 
complex. As has been stated earlier, over 5500 words were produced but, during the 
content analysis, clear trends emerged in the data. One of the most striking of these 
was in response to the stimulus word ‘psychopath’. Here a consensus emerged, across 
the five groups, in the items associated with the theme of ‘dangerousness’. As has 
been stated above, following the thematic content analysis, 112 counts of words 
classified under the heading of ‘dangerous’ were recorded (see Appendix III for the 
complete list). Figure 3 shows that other closely related themes (see Figure 3) 
included frightening, mad, murdered/killer, unpredictable/unstable and 
violent/aggressive.
The themes listed above correspond to similar ones found by Dunstan (2001) in her 
analysis of newspaper constructions of ‘dangerous psychopathologies’ which suggests 
that they are ‘core’ components in the social representations of severe personality 
disorder and psychopathy. This finding is interesting because, for Moscovici (1976), 
one of the key mechanisms by which scientific theories are transformed into common 
sense is through the offices of the press. As this pattern of item generation occurred 
uniformly across all five groups, it would seem reasonable to assume that both the 
professionals and the lay participants are drawing upon media constructions to inform 
their thinking about severe personality disorder (SPD) and psychopathy.
By contrast, the free associations produced in response to the stimulus words ‘myself 
and ‘normal’ (see Figures 1 and 2) are mundane. For ‘myself, themes included 
family, happy and independent and for ‘normal’ - acceptable, average, boring/dull, 
friendly, healthy and ordinary. Again this is interesting because, according to Zani 
(1993), “the conception of self serves as a central reference point from which 
comparisons with others are made” (p.316).
A limitation of the analysis is that, as it stands, it is purely descriptive. This is because 
the data were coded initially at a group level and, within the time constraints of the 
study, it was not possible to go back and recode the data so that relationships between 
different items in the dictionaries of individual participants could be examined. A
181
future extension of the project would be to recode the data and then perform some 
kind of multidimensional scalogram analysis on it, followed perhaps by a 
correspondence analysis. This would allow a more complex analysis of the cognitive 
structure of the different representations (in multidimensional space) and, thereby, 
elucidate further the key SR mechanism of objectification.
Finally, Figures 1,2,3,4 and 5 show that in some cases the psychologists are producing 
many more free associations than the other groups. This can be explained, in part, by 
the fact that more forms were returned by psychologists than any other group. 
However, even taking this into account, the psychologists were generating a greater 
number of adjectives in response to the stimulus words. A possible explanation for 
this is that because the study was being conducted by a psychology trainee, the 
psychologists were ‘investing’ more in the research than the other groups. 
Alternatively there may be real differences in semantic universes of the samples.
Examination of the capacity of the questionnaire to differentiate between groups. 
Discriminant Function Analysis 1
The results of Analysis 1 demonstrate that the questionnaire does discriminate 
effectively between the professional groups. The evaluation at group means (see Table 
5) for Function I shows that the psychologists and the social workers are being 
grouped together in this part of the analysis and that the general practitioners are being 
grouped separately. This lends support to the prediction that differences in training 
(i.e. a medical versus a psychosocial model of mental illness) would lead to 
differences between the doctors on the one hand and the psychologists and the social 
workers on the other.
Although the functions were not easy to interpret, Function I seems to be about 
treatment, as the first three of the five variables (with the highest correlations) fall into 
this category (questions 30, 7 and 28). However the fourth and fifth variables that 
were positively correlated with the function (questions 18 ~ Using the term
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personality disorder to describe someone is stigmatising and 26 Psychopaths are 
‘bad*) are more difficult to explain. Upon reflection, however, it may be that their 
inclusion as discriminators in Function I relate to the findings of a classic study 
conducted by Lewis and Appleby (1988). These authors describe how patients whom 
doctors dislike are often labelled as being ‘personality disordered’ and they show how 
medical judgements and attitudes towards treatment and therapeutic outcomes are 
negatively affected when patients have previously been given a diagnosis of PD.
A fine grained analysis of the means for each variable (see Table 9) shows that the 
psychologists and the social workers are more positive than the GPs about the 
treatment prospects of people with PD. They also believe that using the term 
‘personality disorder’ to describe someone is stigmatising (question 18) but they 
disagree with the statement Psychopaths are bad’ (question 26). In contrast to this, 
the views of the general practitioners on both questions (18 and 26) are broadly 
neutral. Thus, it seems that overall GPs representations of patients with a diagnostic 
label of ‘personality disorder’ are more negative than either of the other two 
professional groups. These findings suggest that patients who have been labelled as 
suffering from a ‘personality disorder’ may well be disadvantaged when it comes to 
the allocation of treatment in a primary care setting. Given that the first three items 
most highly correlated with the function seem to relate to evaluations about treatment, 
the superordinate discriminating construct for Function I might be labelled as 
‘treatability’.
The four items most highly correlated with Function II relate to comparisons with the 
general population {Reliable, burden on resources, anti-social and impulsive). Unlike 
Function I, the psychologists and the social workers are not grouped together. The 
evaluation at group means for Function II (Table 8) shows that now the psychologists 
and the general practitioners are being grouped together and the social workers are 
being grouped separately. This somewhat surprising finding runs counter to the 
prediction that because of differences in training the representations of general 
practitioners would be different to those of psychologists and social workers. A 
possible explanation for this may be that the approach to the trainings is not so clearly 
differentiated as had been assumed at the outset. It could be that certain aspects of the
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training of psychologists also draw upon a disease model of mental illness. Similarly 
the training of doctors may, at times, reflect a psychosocial outlook. It is interesting 
that GPs who were misclassified (Table 3) were almost twice as likely to be classified 
as psychologists (8.5 per cent) than as social workers (4.3 per cent).
The items most highly correlated with this second function provide a negative overall 
picture of people with personality disorder. Compared to the general population they 
are seen, by all three groups, as being less reliable, more of a burden on resources and 
more impulsive. However the psychologists and GPs also see them as being more 
anti-social. In addition, compared to the social workers, the evaluations of GPs and 
psychologists with regard to the reliability, impulsivity and the burden that people 
with PD place on resources are more extreme. For the ‘burden on resources’ item, 89 
per cent of GPs endorsed the responses ‘much more’ and ‘more’ than the general 
population and 64 per cent of psychologists did the same. In comparison only 36 per 
cent of social workers felt that people with PD were more of a burden on resources 
than the general population. How can this be explained?
In the current NHS climate, the responses of the general practitioners are perfectly 
understandable. The ‘limited prescribing list’ of the late 1980s and the trend towards 
‘fundholding’ in the 1990s made family doctors acutely aware of the financial 
constraints of their budgets. Now with the advent of Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), the 
government is, theoretically, placing even more purchasing powers in the hands of 
general practitioners and yet some argue that this power is illusory. The way that the 
finances have been organised means that many PCTs have inherited huge debts and 
for most GPs, whatever the rhetoric, it will be pretty much ‘business as usual’.
Traditionally patients with PD have been viewed by family doctors as ‘heartsink’ or 
problem patients. The analysis of the free associations to the words ‘personality 
disorder’ confirms this (see Figure 5). Research studies have shown that the health 
service usage of individuals with severe personality disorder is considerably higher 
than that of the population generally (Menzies, Dolan and Norton, 1993) and that 
approximately 20 per cent of regular attendees at GPs surgeries meet the DSM 
diagnostic criteria for one (or more) personality disorders (Norton 1992).
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Of the three professional groups, general practitioners are, perhaps, in a unique 
position to ‘compare individuals to the general population’. They see people both ‘in 
sickness and in health’ whereas psychologists and social workers tend to see ‘subsets’ 
of the general population. Thus their comparisons can only ever be partial. Turning to 
the differences between the psychologists and the social workers, these may due, in 
part, to the fact that the majority of the social workers in the sample were working 
with ‘the severe and enduring mentally ill’. This category specifically excludes people 
with PD (unless they have additional mental health problems) because personality 
disorder per se is not considered to be an ‘illness’. So it may be that many of these 
social workers do not consider people with PD to place an additional burden on 
resources because, in general, their services do not cater for people presenting solely 
w ith‘personality difficulties’.
Although it is very difficult to interpret Function II in a meaningful way, the items 
seem to be about negative stereotypical attitudes towards PD. So, given that the items 
appears to be providing an (albeit negative) overview, the superordinate 
discriminating construct for Function II might be labelled as ‘the characteristics of 
PD’.
Analysis 2
The results of discriminant function analysis 2 demonstrate that the questionnaire does 
discriminate effectively between the professional and lay groups. Again, although the 
functions are difficult to interpret, two of the six items refer explicitly to technical 
terms (question 25 Psychotic and psychopathic are different names for the same 
condition and question 23 Anti-social personality disorder is another name for 
psychopathy) and ‘empathic’ and ‘burden on resources’ also draw, in part, upon expert 
knowledge. The fact that question 18 (Using the term personality disorder to describe 
someone is stigmatising) discriminates between the professional and lay groups 
appears, at first glance, to be puzzling. The group means for the individual variables 
(Table 9) show that the responses of the science and arts students are not that different 
from those of the general practitioners. However analysis 1 has shown that this
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variable discriminates between the doctors on the one hand and the psychologists and 
the social workers on the other. It may be, therefore, that even though the GP 
responses are closer to those of the lay group than to those of their fellow 
professionals, the combined weight of the psychologists and the social workers is still 
sufficient to make it a discriminating variable.
The group means for Question 14 (People who self-harm do so to gain attention from 
others) show that, broadly speaking, the general practitioners and the arts students are 
neutral about the statement, the psychologists and the social workers disagree with it 
and the science students agree with it. This does not seem to be readily interpretable 
and yet the ANOVA shows the difference between the two groups (professional 
versus lay) to be highly significant. A possible explanation may be that the GPs and 
the arts students are somehow ‘cancelling each other out’ and the difference lies 
principally between the psychologists/social workers and the science students. It 
would seem that, unlike the professional group, the lay respondents are not seeing 
self-harm as evidence of psychological distress/psychopathology. The question to be 
asked then is why do the science students believe that people who self-harm do so to 
gain attention from others?
The answer may lie, in part, in the popular music culture of the early 1990s, which 
brought the issue of self-harm into the wider social arena through the actions of the 
lead singer in a popular music group.1 During the band’s performances he used to self- 
harm on stage (by cutting himself with a razor blade). It may be, therefore, that for 
certain youth groups the mores of the entertainment world were used to ‘anchor’ this 
unfamiliar activity and, subsequently, self-harm became associated with attention 
seeking and exhibitionism. However, if this theory is correct, it seems curious that it 
was the science students who were utilising the mechanism in this way rather than the 
(performing) arts students. Intuitively one might have thought that the situation would 
be reversed and that it would be the science students, not the arts students, who would 
have similar representations to the GPs.
1 The Manic Street Preachers
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The six items most highly correlated with the function seem to have a professional 
orientation, which draws upon the expertise of the standard diagnostic systems. Thus, 
the superordinate discriminating construct for the function might be labelled 
‘professional knowledge’.
Finally, a point to note here is that statements relating to issues of ‘dangerousness’ do 
not appear in either of the analyses as discriminators, which suggests that overall 
participants’ representations of issues relating to ‘dangerousness’ are fairly 
consensual. This is in line with the findings of the word association task, which 
showed that there were marked similarities between the dictionaries of the different 
groups in response to the stimulus word ‘psychopath’.
Directions for future research
This study has several limitations. The first has been alluded to above in the 
discussion about the analysis of the data produced by the word association task in Part 
One of the questionnaire. A second limitation is that because participants in all five 
groups were recruited from the relatively privileged county of Surrey the sample is not 
representative of the country as a whole and that different results might be obtained if 
the questionnaire was administered in an inner city area.2 It could also be argued that 
the three professions chosen to represent the ‘expert’ sample might not hold the same 
representations about ‘personality and personality disorder’ as their colleagues in 
allied professions. Therefore it would be useful for a follow-up study to include 
psychiatrists, registered mental nurses and occupational therapists in the sample, to 
see if it is possible to replicate these results with different groups of mental health 
professionals.
This research has implications for the profession of counselling psychology. As 
counselling psychologists begin to attain senior (consultant) posts within the National 
Health Service, they will, increasingly, become responsible for service planning. Since
2 Although many o f  the students may have come from other parts o f  the country, it is likely that their views will be affected (to 
some extent) by the social and cultural mores o f  the university.
187
the early 1990s (Reed, 1994), it has been recognised we need to provide more 
facilities for individuals who present with severe personality difficulties. In spite of 
this, partly because of the so called ‘treatability criterion’ and partly because of the 
negative attitudes of some mental health professionals, individuals with SPD have 
often found it extremely difficult to access the full range of medical and support 
services available to other client groups. This situation must be rectified.
CONCLUSION
The findings of this study have lent support to Hypothesis 1, which predicts that 
because of their “expert status”, mental health professionals will have different 
understandings of ‘personality disorder’ than lay (i.e. non-expert) participants. 
Discriminant Function Analysis demonstrated that it is possible to distinguish between 
the two groups and possible reasons for the differences are discussed. The results also 
lend partial support to Hypothesis 2, which predicts that because of differences in 
training, the representations of general practitioners will be different to those of 
psychologists and social workers. Although Function I of the Discriminant Function 
Analysis did group the psychologists and the social workers together, Function 2 
grouped the psychologists with the general practitioners. This second finding runs 
counter to research Hypothesis 2; a possible explanation for this is that the approach to 
the trainings are not so clearly differentiated as had been thought at the outset. 
Limitations of the study and directions for future research are discussed.
POST SCRIPT
On 25 June 2002 the British Government unveiled its draft Mental Health Bill. 
Interestingly, the term ‘dangerous and severe personality disorder’ does not appear in 
the document. The reasoning behind this is explained in the annex to the consultation 
paper: “People with personality disorders will be treated in exactly the same way as 
patients with other mental disorders and will come under compulsory powers if they 
meet the same conditions for compulsion. This removes a problem in the 1983 Act
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where the ‘treatability’ test prevents people with mental impairment or psychopathic 
disorder from being treated under statutory powers for their own benefit or to protect 
the safety of others. This will no longer appear” (Department of Health, 2002, p.23).
[Overview of the research assignments in Years 2 and 3
Reflections of a reluctant researcher
I am not, by nature, a researcher. I can see the value of research and I believe that it is 
vitally important for clinicians to engage in high quality research so that it can provide 
an evidence base for good clinical practice. But, for me, it is very much a means to an 
end, rather than an end in itself. Having said this (and perhaps rather to my surprise) I 
have found myself, both as an undergraduate and as a postgraduate, working on 
several large scale research projects. For the most part the methodology was 
quantitative and I think that this is largely because my undergraduate training was 
deeply rooted in empiricist traditions - we had very little exposure to qualitative 
methods.
However, when I began the PsychD Course in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling 
Psychology, a new world opened up to me. I discovered that qualitative research did 
not begin and end with content analysis -  there were other methods -  mysterious ones, 
which seemed to require one to master a completely new language. For example, 
when I first attempted a discourse analysis (DA), I soon found out that I needed to 
learn to ‘talk the talk before I could walk the walk’. Never having read anything about 
social constructionism and starting from an essentially ‘realist’ perspective, I 
struggled initially to make the conceptual ‘leap’ required of me. I found it extremely 
difficult to formulate my ideas in a way that was consistent with the constructionist 
epistemology and frequently found myself slipping back into the realms of realist 
discourse.
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In spite of this, I was determined to use DA for my second year research project. The 
idea for the study had its origins in a newspaper article that I had read some years 
previously. I had been working in a NHS unit which specialised in the treatment of 
people with ‘severe personality disorder’ and was horrified to read the statement 
(written by a well-known journalist working for the Sunday Times Newspaper) 
“psychopathy, or to give it its posh name personality disorder”. Following this, I 
found myself becoming increasingly concerned by what I considered to be 
‘inaccuracies’ in media reports relating to the topic and decided to pursue this further 
in my doctoral research.
When considering which research method to use to study newspaper constructions of 
‘dangerous psychopathologies’, it seemed obvious to me that DA was the method of 
choice. However to say that I found the analysis ‘challenging’ would be something of 
an understatement. At times I thought that I would never be able to complete it. I felt 
paralysed and unable to think. I also felt that I would never be able to reduce the vast 
quantities of data to manageable proportions. Eventually (metaphorically speaking), I 
just had to close my eyes and jump and it was a relief for me to discover that, once I 
had managed to put ‘something’ on paper, the analysis began to flow. Looking back 
on it, I think that it was one of the hardest (academic) tasks that I have faced in many 
years’ study. And yet it was also one of the most satisfying.
Having managed to make the conceptual ‘leap’ from empiricism to social 
constructionism for my second year project, I did not really anticipate any difficulty in 
‘reversing the process’ for the quantitative study that I was required to conduct in my 
final year. I had already used the methodology previously and felt fairly confident 
about the approach that I was going to take. Unfortunately, I had not appreciated how 
much social constructionism had influenced my thinking. Since finishing the 
discourse analysis, I have been constantly bedevilled by nagging concerns about the 
social construction of different aspects of ‘reality’ and I now find myself stuck in a 
kind of research ‘no man’s land’. I have also had to relearn how to ‘talk empiricist talk 
again’.
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Edmund (2000) suggests that, “As much as humanly possible, a researcher should 
strive to be free of prejudice and bias” (p.3) and yet it seems likely that this is a 
counsel of perfection, which is probably unachievable. I am acutely aware of the 
influences that have helped to shape the quantitative study into the social 
representations of personality disorder outlined in the paper above. First, it was 
informed by the results of the discourse analysis of ‘newspaper constructions of 
dangerous psychopathologies’. Of particular interest in the DA research was the 
finding that newspapers tended to use a variety of pathologizing labels 
interchangeably. Thus, when I came to consider the construction of the SR 
questionnaire, I decided to include themes, which had been shown to be important in 
the discourse analysis. I also consulted ‘key informants’ to help me choose relevant 
items for the instrument. However, as these individuals were all known to me 
personally, it could be argued (with some justification) that I would have been 
adhering more to the ‘spirit’ of the scientific method (and removing a potential source 
of bias) if I have chosen to consult people with whom I had had no previous contact.
Another factor that.has influenced my thinking about the research is that Tam 
currently employed in a specialist psychology service (attached to the forensic team). 
At the moment, we are in the process of setting up a service for people who have been 
diagnosed with ‘borderline personality disorder’ and several of the service users have 
spoken movingly about feeling stigmatised by the label. In a recent issue of 
‘Dialogue’ (a newsletter which is specifically aimed at professionals and service users 
within the field of PD), a banner headline on the front page announced ‘Personality 
disorder -  how much more stigmatising could a label be?’ (Hadden and Haigh, 2001, 
p.l). Exactly. My personal belief is that, as clinicians, we need to find new ways of 
making sense of the experiences of people presenting with ‘personality difficulties’. It 
is simply not good enough to say that we need to retain diagnostic labels so that we 
can communicate more efficiently with one another. A greater understanding of 
professional and lay representations of ‘personality disorder’ may provide us with 
some assistance in this endeavour. ]
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PsychD Psychotherapeutic and 
Counselling Psychology 
Department of Psychology 
Tel: (01483) 259176
A pproved by the A dvisory Com m ittee on Ethics 
Ref. A C E /2002/08/P sych
University 
of Surrey
Guildford
Surrey GU2 7XH, UK 
Telephone
+44 (0)1483 300800  
Facsimile
+44 (0)1483 300803
School of
Human
Sciences
Information Sheet for Participants
Dear Colleague,
I am a counselling psychologist in training at the University of Surrey and, as part of 
my doctoral dissertation, I am conducting a study into views about ‘personality’ and 
‘personality difficulties’. The enclosed questionnaire takes about 15 minutes to 
complete and it consists of two parts. Part One provides a list of five words and asks 
you to write down any words that come into your mind when you read each one. Part 
Two consists of 36 statements and you are asked to indicate your response to each by 
circling a number on the five point scale described at the beginning of the section.
If you are interested in taking part, please complete the enclosed questionnaire and 
return it to me in the envelope provided. Part One is on the back of this pack. When 
you have completed Part One break the coloured seal - Part Two is on the middle 
page of this sheet. Please note that any information that you give will be completely 
confidential. No individual can be identified from these forms.
Thank you for participating in this research,
Yours Sincerely,
!A /& s
Fiona Dunstan 
Counselling Psychologist in Training
A ll data w ill be protected in accordance w ith the Data Protection A ct 1998.
> *  w
** H 
o  &  
z  oO < »n m in in in i n i n m i n m i n i n i n i n
g  82 . ■
H  Q
cn
T T T t  T f T f t T f T t ' 1 , ^ , T f T t r t T f ' > t t T r t T f T f ’ t T t ^ ^  T f  ^  T f
n  m  m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m m  m m  m m m m m m m m m m
n fS N N ( i N ( S N N N M M N N H ( S N N N M r i M N N N N r ) N N D M N M N N
n «
§ 2  H <
in
a
5
§p
' a *
*•*»
V.'
a
a
< 3
o
•§
a
a
6
6
a
a
< 5
s
aa
*a
- a
2
o
*
H
•m
ucsA-i
I
bo g^ Sf
I I *is bi <u
C o  ^  ^I I I I I
•>, (\| rr| >  Irj
&> £ 
.§ sQ to
CO
I
9'
£ P
"O
C
O
03
o^  q3 2 T3 p I-1 c o
7 3  t o
. S ^  . 
' 5  £ »
6 0  i r s
Co
o
4->
O
c
o
T 3
> .
CD
- C
CD
J=>
T 3
(Dli
<D
T 3
w
O
t o
' O
£ *
1 3
co
o  *
<u
o „ 
e  o
CO
0 3  L h
CD.52 O. 
s-«S o
" P  CO
o  < °  O  (U
52 >-*=3 g>
S  «>g S3
O  4> 
t o  ~  l_ o> 
<U x :  
C U  H
3
O h Ed 
O
CD 0 )  Oh X)
Cd 03
<U 03 60 co
CD <D
0 }  CD
)-< ) -  
0 )  CD -13 t3 
>-. > - o om  <n
0>  a )
CD CD 
7 3  7 3
cd cd  
C  C  
O  O
CO CO
m  o s (D  CD 
O .  O h
CD cd0 )  D
1 pO  . H  
»-,
<D <13 CD CD > >
CD CDCD CD 
O h O h
cd 61)
CD CDCD CD
O h O hO O 
CD CD 
CL, CL,
CD 03 CD CDCD CDCD CD
' c t i o c o t ' O o o \ 0 ' - n n ' t v ) ' o > M O \ o » n  i o  i-'- CS (N (N o o o \ o > — ' C N m - T r m  CNtNmcommmm
eI i
S w H
2 ^ 2  H ^
^ ■ T f ^ T f T f r t T t T f T t T f T f T r T f T r ^ ^ ' I ' I ' T f T r
2 Mr t fonMf OfOMf nnr t ^f omMf onr ofOf O
N I S N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N n N
* 3
3
3<
B
3
S c 
a  -2
*  -5
<w §< a
£> 3  «
^  a ,
»  ^  - s- 3  <u a
~ S  
3  3  
O Q_
'a q  5 ^
I, 5O 3
Cl, KCT3 t>0
S  3  
*0 § W bo 
3-. <u 
- 3
b o
3
a•JS
Su3
8
„  3
I i§! l>3
•> <N ^  >  *n
§ « £ o ° 2 g W H2 a <M H J
i « 2H
X>
O+->
13
£
<D
cd
S-i<D
~a
T 3
£
13
Go
CO
S-I<D
CX
CL
O
<D
CL
£3
O
G
CLo
CL
<u
G0)
bO
Td
0)
C3
CL
£
o
O
vd
m
o  >
' c o  52
<D
I
fl> >,
0)
M ^ O
bO  a> £< & W
G
<o
13
Go
CL<D
id
G
co id
•55
.J3 o
p  cd 
cd t )
2  P
G
<U 2
b £ )  o 3 ca 
13 g
c3  PL,
bJD
G
M<D
0)
CO
. s
o
IG
S-i<D
CL
y i y w u n .  c i . a c ' n n  
fc  2  G f t  e  J3  -  a  b  u  t j - £ a 3 3 G ~ : < P G ^ o  <OWMPP<!f5H!JW
c v .
3
3
Ss
8!
3
5
3
!§
3L.
3
3
3
bi
3
* 3
£
-3
3
. 3
a
3
&*3
3
3
3*
3
3
.3
82
3
s25
33
<§•
*
.£
5
o£
3O
3
3
I
£
O
bO3
3
3
3
L.
I*
CT
3
•s
3
C"--o•^ ->
bO
GO
13x>
G
£
CO
GOPb
23o
£
£
3x>
id
O h
GO
bO
0
1
<u
G3
4do
W
hi
te
 
( 
) 
Bl
ac
k-
C
ar
ib
be
an
 
( 
) 
Bl
ac
k-
A
fr
ic
an
 
( 
) 
Bl
ac
k-
O
th
er
 
( 
) 
In
di
an
 
( 
) 
Pa
ki
st
an
i 
( 
) 
B
an
gl
ad
es
hi
 
( 
) 
Ch
in
es
e 
( 
) 
O
th
er
 
(p
le
as
e 
sp
ec
ify
)
C/5
WHH
H
P
uHH
faHH
Q
HHH
P
£o
C/5
£
fa
fav*
o
<
«*\
HHH
fa
£o
C/5
P4
faPlhS*
H
P
O
w
<«
C/5
faHH
>
• «-H> >=s
<3
(D <&
O 03 H
O
£
H
•h»H*
0 3PH
■M
0 3
44OjS
so
a>u
«sa»42
vS
o
S«
0 3Ph
a>
<u
' a
aoo
V
IZ3
0 3V
fa
£
OHH
H
Pm
PS
ss
P4
p
o
fa
o
fa
P
o
>
fa
£<
w
H
a
<HIO
3o
3(U
XI3
3o
o
<u
6oo
'a33
a3
0 
£
1
oX
<D
£o
3O>%
oX
c d33
£
>>
a
33 s
« >>
3 .
o 13
33 -4-J
CJ S
<uft m 3
E P M
Hi
o
e
<4M
O
Hm
O
_k>■a
«4Mo
3O
3<D33
£
X3
3OP*'*
o
CL,3
0 
£
1
o
£o
3O
oX
"cd33
£
13
ai-o3
0)
a
O■+M
S-I
03
fa
3OP>'i
3<U
X3
3O
o4-»
. a
<u
ao
0 
£
1
§oX
£fc0
1
2
3o
oX
Id
3CUo3u
3o>4
3(l>3
£
. a
3O
o-HH
.3
0)
aooVL/
a
o "cd3 3
cd
. g
o ■4-1 y—N
"cd
3 -
/-- \
3<D
3u
+-* ■4—4
/—\  
3 o+->
O
o>
o
a
3
a ,
^ 3 ,
o
£
£3
o
<D
£  . o
3O
>4
oX
c d
f
•4-43
0>
a
- >* c«
X X X 3 T 3
Mi M >-i Mi
o O O o
£ £ £ £
<D o <1) <D
3=i , g 3 3■4—> -4-4
X 5 T 3 T 3 X 3
3 3 3 3
<L> <U <D <U
Mi Mi Mi Mi
3 3 3 3
O O O O
>4 ^ 4 P -,
3 3 3 3
o <D (D 0 )
• <N rn
W
he
n 
yo
u 
rea
d 
the
 
wo
rd
s 
‘p
er
so
na
lit
y 
di
so
rd
er
’ w
ha
t 
do 
yo
u 
thi
nk
 
of?
 
W
rit
e 
do
wn
 
any
 
wo
rd
s 
(up
 
to 
ten
) 
th
at 
co
m
e 
in 
to 
yo
ur
 m
ind
 
wh
en
 
you
 
thi
nk
 
of 
‘p
er
so
na
lit
y 
di
so
rd
er
’.
Appendix II
Uni
28 February 2002 University Registry 
of Surrey
Ms Fiona Dunstan
Counselling Psychologist in Training
1 Guildford
Surroy GU2 7XH, UK
Telephone
+44 (0)1403 300800
Facsimilo
+44(0)1483 683811
Department of Psychology 
University of Surrey
Dear Ms Dunstan
Social representations of personality disorder: Professional and lav perspectives 
fACE/2002/08/Psvcli)
I am writing to inform you that the Advisory Committee on Ethics has considered the 
above protocol and has approved it on the understanding that the Ethical Guidelines 
for Teaching and Research arc observed and the following conditions are mct:-
1. That the Mental Health Act, as mentioned in the Introduction on page 2, second 
paragraph, is specified by the appropriate year (cither 1983 or 1959).
2. That the Information Sheet for Participants states that all data will be protected in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.
For your information, and future reference, the Guidelines can be downloaded from 
the Committee’s website at http://www.surrev.ac.uk./Surrev/ACE/.
This letter of approval relates only to the study specified in your research protocol 
(ACE/2002/08/Psych). The Committee should be notified of any changes to the 
proposal, any adverse reactions, and if the study is terminated earlier than expected, 
with reasons.
Contd....
200
2I should be grateful if you would confirm in writing your acceptance of the condition 
above, forwarding the amended documents for the Committee’s records.
Date of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 28 February 2002
Date of expiry of approval by the Advisory Committee on Ethics: 27 February’ 2007
Please inform me when the research has been completed.
Yours sincerely
Catherine Ashbee (Mrs)
Secretary, University Advisoiy Committee on Ethics
cc: Chairman, ACE
Dr A Coyle, Supervisor, Dept of Psychology 
P Hair, Dept of Psychology
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Myself Themes
Psych.
A lon e 7
B usy/Stressed  12
Caring 8
Fam ily R elationship/R ole 7
Friendly/Social 3
H appy 11
H onest 3
I/M e 46
Identity 11
Independent 16
L oving 7
M y/M ine 13
N orm al 1
Person 23
Profession/R ole 5
S e lf  23
Thinker 5
T ota l 201
GP Social Student Student Total
W S A
1 6 3 5 22
3 2 1 3 21
3 2 3 4 20
18 10 3 6 44
6 5 6 7 27
2 5 14 16 48
2 3 1 9
32 26 19 32 155
1 2 2 2 18
6 5 8 6 41
3 3 2 1 16
8 9 6 3 39
2 1 4 2 10
9 7 9 14 62
13 1 2 1 22
6 4 8 4 45
2 5 1 13
115 93 96 107 612
Normal Themes
Psych. GP Social Student Student T otal
W S A
A bnorm al 10 2 2 2 16
A cceptable/A ccepted 10 1 7 3 1 22
A verage 31 20 10 16 17 94
Balanced 8 3 2 3 4 20
Boring/B land/D ull 21 8 5 10 17 61
C om m on 3 4 1 3 1 12
C onform ity/C onsensus/Fits 7 4 3 3 17
in
Expected 5 1 2 1 1 10
Friendly/Sociable 9 3 11 1 5 29
Happy 3 3 2 3 5 16
Healthy 12 7 5 5 2 31
M ajority 6 1 2 9
M e/M yse lf 3 3 3 2 11
N on-existent? 5 1 4 1 3 14
Okay 6 4 4 1 1 16
Ordinary 8 2 6 6 4 26
Safe 3 3 1 3 3 13
Sam e 1 2 5 3 2 13
Stable 8 1 2 2 1 14
Standard 5 3 3 5 3 19
Straight 3 2 1 2 6 14
T ypical 4 1 1 3 9
U sual 8 7 7 4 2 28
T ota l 179 85 82 81 87 514
203
Psychopath Themes
Psych. GP Social Student Student T ota l
W S A
Abnorm al/Different 5 9 2 12 5 33
A ntisocial 7 5 3 1 1 17
B ad/E vil 5 4 5 4 3 21
C old 9 2 4 15
Crim inal/Forensic 11 3 3 3 3 23
Dangerous 34 23 20 12 23 112
D ifficult/C hallenging 6 8 2 5 21
Disturbed 6 7 2 15
Frightening 19 3 5 8 14 49
M ad 23 8 10 22 21 84
M edia 14 3 4 4 3 28
111 8 7 10 12 7 44
M urderer/Killer 15 3 8 6 10 42
W eapon 4 1 1 3 5 14
Label 2 3 5
Lack 8 4 5 2 2 21
Strange 5 1 1 3 10
U npredictable/Unstable 12 6 6 9 8 41
V iolent/A ggressive 9 11 7 6 4 37
U nbeatable 4 1 4 9
T ota l 206 101 103 117 114 641
Mentally 111 Themes
Psych. GP Social Student Student Total
W S A
A nxious/A gitated 8 11 2 3 24
C lassification/D iagnosis 7 1 2 1 11
C om plex/C hallenging 3 4 3 10
D epressed 19 17 15 7 5 63
D ifferent/E xcluded/ 13 1 3 1 1 19
M arginalised
D isadvantaged 2 2 1 2 5 12
D istress/D isturbed/Suffering 44 14 18 14 22! 113
Em otion 4 1 2 1 2 10
Frightened/Scared 4 2 3 3 2 14
H ospital 15 8 7 9 4 43
111 18 11 6 10 8 53
M ad 4 1 2 4 11
Labelling 8 1 9
M edication 14 3 7 4 28
M isunderstood 9 1 10
N eed y 5 5 2 3 2 17
Psychiatric 6 4 3 1 1 15
P sychologica l 5 4 9
Schizophrenia 5 9 4 4 22
Stigm a 12 4 3 1 20
Treatment 12 6 7 4 4 33
U nstable 9 2 5 5 8 29
V ulnerable 4 5 4 2 15
T ota l 230 115 96 72 77  590
204
Personality Disorder Themes
Psych. GP Social Student Student Total
W S A
A bnorm al/Different 5 7 6 7 6 31
A ntisocial 3 2 1 3 1 10
B ehaviour 5 1 4 1 2 13
Borderline 10 10
Categorisation 17 2 19
C onfusing 7 1 4 4 6 22
Dangerous/Frightening 3 3 5 3 9 23
D epressed 5 2 1 2 10
D ifficu lt 21 16 7 3 1 48
D isturbed/D istressed 14 3 4 2 1 24
Early A dverse Experience 11 3 2 16
Em otional D ifficu lties 15 5 5 1 2 28
H eartsink/Challenging 9 13 3 1 1 27
M anipulative 10 10 4 3 27
M entally 111 7 1 4 8 3 23
M isunderstood 4 1 4 1 1 11
N arcissistic 7 1 8
S e lf  absorbed 4 3 4 11
Social/R elationship 14 2 3 2 2 23
D ifficu lties
Split 3 2 1 3 9
Stigm a/Labelling 16 1 2 19
U nstable 12 3 6 10 13 44
U nbeatable 1 5 4 10
T ota l 198 77 70 49 62 456
U N W E P T '  S U
